Senegal

Civil Society Participation and the Governance of Educational Systems in the Context of Sector-Wide Approaches to Basic Education

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<tr>
<td>ADEA</td>
<td>Association for the Development of Education in Africa</td>
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<td>AEA</td>
<td><em>Aide et Action</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>APE</td>
<td><em>Association de parents d’élèves</em> (parents’ associations)</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td><em>École communautaire de base</em> (community school)</td>
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<td>FTI</td>
<td>Fast-Track Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIEP</td>
<td>International Institute for Education Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCEBLN</td>
<td><em>Ministère delegué chargé de l’éducation de base et de langues nationales</em> (Ministry for basic education and national languages)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>Non-formal education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAPA</td>
<td><em>Project d’appui au plan d’action du MCEBLN</em> (Project supporting the plan of action of the MCEBLN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDEF</td>
<td><em>Plan décennal de l’éducation et de la formation</em> (Ten-year Education and Training Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UPE</td>
<td>Universal primary education</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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**Executive Summary**

Senegal is a stable society with good relations between its different ethnic and religious groups (Hermier 2004), although it has experienced some internal conflict in recent decades, within its southern Casamance region. Following independence from France in 1960, Senegal was ruled for four decades by the same socialist party -- although under different names -- and neo-patrimonialism was a prominent characteristic of the political landscape (Kuenzi 2003). The year 2000 marked a new era, when Abdoulaye Wade was elected president. Senegal has since been commended for its overall growth as a democracy (Kuenzi 2003), and the press and civil society actors enjoy freedom in their activities (Galvan 2001). A recent phase of decentralization, launched in 1996, assigned regions and communities major responsibilities for providing services -- such as health and education -- but the nature and amount of resources and authority transferred to them remains subject to debate (Clemons 2001).

Senegal has major economic challenges, including over-dependence on the production of a few primary commodities (Phillips 2002), limited investment, a poorly-equipped agricultural sector (Hermier 2004), and aid dependence -- its net ODA/GNI was 13.9% in 2004 (OECD n.d.). Senegal qualified for HIPC debt relief (reaching its completion point in June 2004), and for participation in the G8 debt reduction initiative World Bank n.d.). Its partners in development include France, the IMF, the European Union (EU), the African Development Bank, USAID, Japan, Germany, Canada, and several UN agencies (World Bank n.d). Approximately 16% of its bilateral ODA in 2003-2004 went to education (OECD n.d.). Senegal is one of CIDA’s 25 development partners, and CIDA’s new program there will provide approximately 60 percent of its resources to basic education (CIDA n.d.).

Senegalese civil society is "extremely heterogenous;" the government has an official list of 316 NGOs, in addition to many associations, trade unions, media organizations, universities, research centres, umbrella organizations and 'tontines,' or “informal solidarity groups” (Hermier 2004: 2). Generally speaking, CSOs tend to be grouped according to “status or area of interest,” but they lack overall coordination and common platforms, and are heavily donor-dependent (Hermier 2004:2). Their structuring “remains closely linked to the various dialogue settings created as part of cooperation policy (such as the PRSP […]”) – rather than robust, pre-existing networks that can strongly influence decision-makers (Hermier 2004: 4, 7).

Senegal has a 10-year education sector program, the *Plan décennal de l’éducation et de la formation*, or PDEF. Launched in 1998, the PDEF’s basic education goals include universal primary education by 2010, and a reallocation of 49 percent of the national education budget to elementary education (Government of Senegal 2002: 41). Education features as an
important part of Senegal’s PRSP, under the second of the PRSP’s four pillars/strategic thrusts (Government of Senegal 2002: 23-23, 41).

Senegal’s gross primary enrollment ratio is 79.9% and primary completion rate, 47.8% (World Bank figures for 2001-2003). A 2000 study of quality of basic education found the following problems: dilapidated infrastructures and shortage of desks; lack of textbooks; high repetition and drop-out rates; irrelevance of teaching programs (which had not changed in decades); the inexistence of a culture of evaluation in schools, departments and regions; and a lack of pedagogical supervision of teachers (Niane 2004). There is considerable inequity in the allocation of public expenditures on education between poorer and richer households (Government of Senegal 2002). Finally, huge disparities in literacy rates exist between men (51.1%) and women (28.9%), between poor and less poor regions (e.g. Dakar 60%; Kolda region, 27.9%) and between urban (57.2%) and rural (24.1%) areas (Government of Senegal 2002).

In education, the Senegalese government’s faire-faire (“Making things happen”) strategy places a strong emphasis on state-civil society partnerships, and gives non-state actors the responsibility for designing and implementing NFE initiatives (Assié-Lumumba, Mara et al. 2005). NFE includes literacy programs and community schools (écoles communautaires de base, ECBs) (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). ECBs are designated for 9-14 year olds who are not enrolled in school or who have left school early, and literacy programs, for people above 14 years (Niane 2003).

Faire-faire uses an “outsourcing” approach, hiring CSO ‘opérateurs’ to implement NFE programs, seeking to reinforce civil society (Government of Senegal 2002, Kuenzi 2003). The faire-faire approach follows a detailed design that includes clearly-defined roles for various actors and processes for monitoring, evaluation, research, and technical support (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004: 39, 42-43; World Bank 2004). It has been commended for assisting civil society actors to organize themselves, express their priorities, and demand accountability (Nordtveit 2004; 2005; World Bank 2004). The faire-faire strategy has influenced other countries in West Africa (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004; World Bank 2004).

The government of Senegal has also actively supported the development of community schools (ECBs) since 1993 (Marchand 2000; Hoppers 2005). The MDCEBLN (the ministry charged with basic education and national languages) has provided a “complete [state] administrative frame at the central level” in support of ECBs (Clemons 2001), and has designated MoE inspectors specifically to provide pedagogical supervision to ECBs — evidence of strong political will to promote these alternative models (Marchand 2000). Tensions, however, abound in state-civil society partnerships around ECB’s. For example, while the “outsourcing” approach has greatly multiplied the number of CSO opérateurs delivering educational services, the term partnership has been critiqued as “problematic
because it is questionable whether the public and private sectors can share common goals and risks in a situation where the public sector is subcontracting the private sector to do a job” (Nordtveit 2005: 23). Outsourcing also has the potential to make CSOs act like businesses dependent upon government (Nordtveit 2005).

Diarra, et. al. argue that ECBs are considered a short-term experiment to provide learning for the continued reform of basic education (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). They represent only a small minority of the overall number of schools within Senegal, and their students have very low rates of passage into the formal system. Indeed, ECBs are expected by government to become redundant by 2010, because UPE should be obtained by then, and any important pedagogical innovations mainstreamed (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000; Miller-Grandvaux and Yoder 2002).

This raises questions about the future role of CSO opérateurs and other CS actors mobilized within NFE initiatives. Certainly, they have gained considerable capacity and credibility as designers, implementers and managers of education programs. At the same time, it is not clear that they are regarded by government as having the technical expertise necessary for a complementary role of input into policy (S. Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006). The national coalition of NFE opérateurs did participate in PDEF (the education sector program) design (S. Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006). However, it is not clear how community-level CSOs without a national-level structure can make their voices heard in such processes – although they do have a good deal of say about the content of NFE initiatives in their communities (Nordtveit 2004; World Bank 2004).

This said, NFE is not the only domain for participation of non-state actors within education. CSOs operate within formal, non-formal and informal sub-sectors, contributing towards access, quality, and management of education (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Their main sources of funding are UN agencies, NGO opérateurs who in turn receive their funding from donors, and governments via multilateral or bilateral co-operation programs with the Senegalese state (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Parents’ associations (APEs) are a major actor within formal education, particularly in support to quality, and have an active national-level federation, FENAPES – although it is seriously hindered by resource shortages (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Teachers’ unions have a major voice within education policy, and are consulted by the ministry on all important matters (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). The degree to which other civil society actors in formal education have a voice in shaping the wider system, and if/how they collaborate in doing so, is not well-documented. It is unclear whether these various civil society actors in the formal, non-formal and informal sub-sectors act in coordination.
The PDEF’s decentralization reforms envisage new relationships of sharing and negotiation being created between central government, local authorities, teachers, pupils and parents (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Towards this end, PDEF educational governance structures have been created at regional, département and local levels, and each level must formulate and monitor education development plans along with non-state actors (Aide et Action 2002b). At the school level, management committees have been established to include representatives from local and MoE officials, civil society, and school staff. These committees are charged with implementing “projets d’école,” (school development projects). Projets d’école appear to have the potential to form the basis for bottom-up, collaborative education planning by state and non-state actors, but are too new to judge (Aide et Action 2002b; CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005).

Recent research suggests that there are serious challenges to implementing the government’s partnership policies in the new decentralized educational governance structure. In a study of Kolda region, elected local authorities did not understand their roles within the PDEF, and were not engaging in joint budgeting with education authorities and school directors (Aide et Action 2002a). Deconcentrated education authorities struggle to provide the necessary pedagogical supervision to schools (Marchand 2000; Clemons 2001; CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005) and to collect data for monitoring the PDEF (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). There remains a great need for much stronger collaboration mechanisms and capacity, amongst local authorities, education authorities and CSOs at all levels of the system (Clemons 2001; Aide et Action 2002b; CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). It is also important that CSOs create a strong role for themselves, in ensuring that the learning and innovations acquired from NFE are incorporated into the wider education system.
1. Background

Economic situation

Senegal is a country of 10.5 million people (2004 figure) located on the west coast of Africa, beside the North Atlantic Ocean. Senegal shares borders with The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Mauritania. The country’s ethnic groups include Wolof 43.3%, Pular 23.8%, Serer 14.7%, Jola 3.7%, Mandinka 3%, Soninke 1.1%, European and Lebanese people 1% (CIA Factbook n.d.). Its languages include French (the official language), Wolof, Pulaar, Jola, and Mandinka (CIA Factbook n.d.).

The OECD’s 2004-2005 report on Senegal’s economic outlook estimates that Senegal “could replace pre-crisis Côte d’Ivoire as the motor for growth in French Africa,” however its “economy must be modernized, diversified and decentralized in order to make it a tool for reducing poverty” (OECD 2005: 395). Senegal’s primary sector employs approximately two thirds of the active population (OECD 2005). The country is a sub-regional industrial centre; its industries include food-processing, construction materials, chemicals and textiles (OECD 2005). Between independence (1960) and the 1980’s, its economy suffered from erratic groundnut production and prices for its exports (groundnuts and phosphate), and it continues to be over-reliant on the production of a few primary commodities (Phillips 2002). Since 1979, Senegal has been implementing economic adjustment programs with the Bretton Woods Institutions. In June 2004, Senegal reached its HIPC completion point, and also qualified under the recent G8 debt reduction initiative (World Bank n.d.). Overall, government spending remains reliant upon foreign aid; for example, “net foreign transfers […] were 18 percent of government spending (3.2 percent of GDP) from 1997 through 2001” (World Bank 2003: 10).

Senegal’s poverty and human development demographics are as follows: 1

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1 Unless otherwise noted, these data are the “most recent estimates, latest year available 1998-2004,” retrieved February 20, 2006 from the World Bank’s Senegal at a glance webpage: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/sen_aag.pdf
- Life expectancy: 52 years
- Infant mortality: 78 per 1000
- Child malnutrition: 23% of children under 5;
- Literacy rate: 39% of population age 15+;
- Gender disaggregated literacy rate: 41% total; Men 56%; Women 29% (2000-2004); ²
- Under-5 mortality: 137 per 1000 (2003); ³

The World Bank’s 2003 Country Assistance Strategy for Senegal describes the “deep divide between rural and urban Senegal - in income, education, health, and access to modern services” (World Bank 2003: 1). According to Senegal’s 2002 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the rural incidence of poverty varies between 72-88%, compared to 44-59% in urban areas (Government of Senegal 2002: 9). Regional disparities are also considerable. The 2001 Household Survey on Perception of Poverty in Senegal found very low rates of access to a health care centre (within less than 1 km) for the populations of Kolda (23.2%) and Diourbel (25.5%) regions, among others, compared to the national average of 50.4% (Government of Senegal 2002: 18). Concerning education, huge differences in literacy rates exist between men (51.1%) and women (28.9%), between poor and less poor regions (e.g. Dakar 60%; Kolda region, 27.9%) and between urban (57.2%) and rural (24.1%) areas (Government of Senegal 2002: 18). Public expenditures on health and education are not equally allocated between regions and social strata (Government of Senegal 2002).

Many of Senegal’s households are unable to pay for these services themselves. From 1960-1993, the average annual growth rate of Senegal’s economy, 2.7% a year, did not keep up with demographic growth rates, and was thereby insufficient to improve “real per capita incomes and employment” (Government of Senegal 2002: 15). Another challenge: agriculture “represents 10 percent of GDP but occupies more than 50 percent of the active

² This is quoted from CIDA’s Senegal, Facts at a Glance webpage, retrieved February 20, 2006, from: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/webcountry.nsf/VLUDocEn/Senegal-Factsataglance
³ This is quoted from CIDA’s Senegal, Facts at a Glance webpage, retrieved February 20, 2006, from: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/webcountry.nsf/VLUDocEn/Senegal-Factsataglance

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population, who are for the most part illiterate” (Government of Senegal 2002: 16). Contributors to poverty in agricultural areas include drought, desertification and low groundnut yields. Urban centres, also, are not without their challenges. A 2002 USAID profile of Senegal showed that while 75% of Senegal’s poor live in rural areas, 30% of the urban population is also poor (USAID 2002). Unemployment rates in Dakar increased from 25% in 1991 to 44% in 1996; these rates are linked to rural migration caused by erosion, drought, deforestation and locusts (USAID 2002).

In response to these challenges, Senegal’s PRSP has four main strategic thrusts: wealth creation, capacity-building and promotion of basic social services, improving the living conditions of vulnerable groups, and implementation of a participatory and decentralized approach to the steering, execution and monitoring and evaluation of the programs (Government of Senegal 2002: 23-23, 41). Senegal’s development partners include the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Union, United Nations Development Program, African Development Bank, Japan, Canada, USA, West African Development Bank, France and other UN agencies (World Bank 2003).

For Canada’s part, CIDA supports Senegal’s PRSP, having played a key role in its preparation, and counts Senegal amongst the 25 development partners where CIDA will focus the majority of its country-to-country assistance. Within Senegal, CIDA will be increasing its support to the major country-led programs in the areas of education and grassroots economy. The new program will focus about 60 percent of its resources on basic education, specifically, providing support for literacy, primary-level education, professional training and the development of new curricula, and new management methods.

A 2005 CIDA-funded study of Senegalese civil society actors in education explains some new emphases in CIDA’s 2001-2011 Strategic Framework for Senegal. Until now, Canada’s support to the implementation of Senegal’s 10-year education sector plan (the Plan décennal

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4 This is quoted from CIDA’s Senegal Programming Framework webpage, retrieved February 20, 2006, from: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/webcountry.nsf/VLUDocEn/Senegal-ProgrammingFramework
de l’éducation et de la formation, or PDEF) has been targeted at the Senegalese Ministry of Education and its deconcentrated structures (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Within its new strategic framework, CIDA plans to increase its support to civil society groups working towards Education For All in Senegal. CIDA will also support the Ministry of Education in the establishment of management systems and good governance practices that incorporate the efforts of various actors in the education system (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Other donors to education in Senegal are: the Asian Development Bank, Canada, France, the European Union, the Nordic Development Fund, UNICEF, Japan and Luxembourg (World Bank FTI n.d.). Senegal is not yet a Fast-Track Initiative (FTI) country, although it was expected to be at the end of 2005 (World Bank FTI n.d.).

Political Situation

Senegalese political context

Senegal’s political context receives very positive reviews from official websites, such as CIDA’s:

“One of the most stable countries in Africa, the Republic of Senegal has long been cited as a model for inter-ethnic and religious harmony. Senegal is one of the continent's oldest democracies and has enjoyed a peaceful transfer of power since independence in 1960. […] The country has an active civil society and a free and vigorous press. Senegal also serves as a yardstick for economic development in the region and plays a dynamic diplomatic role in Africa.”

In addition to these merits, Senegal is one of the five African states which initiated the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and its third and current president, Abdoulaye Wade has been active in conflict resolution efforts concerning Gabon, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger – and, in the past, between Senegal and Mauritania. Senegal has had its own internal conflict in the southern region of Casamance. Beginning in the 1980’s and continuing for two decades, the Mouvement des Forces Démocratique de la

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5 This is quoted from CIDA’s Senegal Overview webpage, retrieved February 20, 2006, from: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/VLUDocEn/Senegal-Overview

6 This is drawn from CIDA’s Senegal Overview webpage, retrieved February 20, 2006, from: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/VLUDocEn/Senegal-Overview

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Casamance (MFDC) fought for the secession of Casamance. While peace accords were signed in 2001 between the government and the MFDC, the stability of this area remained tenuous -- however a lasting solution to the conflict is now being found (Beck 2001a; Hermier 2004).

Senegalese political history under colonialism involved some complex regional differentiations. There were four *communes* of Senegal where the inhabitants were considered French citizens, and everyone else outside the communes was seen as being subjects (Kuenzi 2003). Thus, the “prototype” political leaders in the communes were “urbane, Western-educated Senegalese intellectual[s]” and in the countryside, the political leaders were the Muslim religious leaders, or *marabouts* (Kuenzi 2003: 37). Historically, this created a particularly strong “geographic dichotomy” (Galvan 2001: 57). While today, this dichotomy does not characterize Senegal to the same degree, Galvan (2001: 57) argues that it still provides a metaphor for two contrasting types of social capital in Senegal: bridging social capital based on “common interests rather than familial, ethnic, regional or religious ties” and bonding capital based on common traits such as kinship and similar backgrounds (Galvan 2001: 57). A Senegalese example of the latter is illustrated in the *marabouts* (Muslim leaders) who, in the past, pronounced *ndigels* telling their followers (talibés) how to vote. In exchange they offered their talibés patronage if the outcome of the election went as planned (Kuenzi 2003). Indeed, Muslim brotherhoods have historically had a major role in Senegalese politics, although their use of *ndigels* has given way to a much more neutral political stance since the 1990s (Galvan 2001).

Another oft-cited feature of the Senegalese political context is the fact that the same socialist party – under different names – ruled for four decades following Senegal’s independence in 1960. Neo-patrimonialism has been considered central to Senegalese politics (Kuenzi 2003). The year 2000, however, was a landmark year, when an opposition politician, Abdoulaye Wade, won the presidential elections. This event “injected new vitality
and energy into a lethargic political system and public” (Kuenzi 2003: 53). Overall, Senegal has been growing as a democracy, and has seen little mobilization along ethnic lines, partly because there is considerable emphasis placed on different groups having representation within government (Kuenzi 2003).

**History of Senegal’s education system**

The education system in Senegal has experienced setbacks due to the cleavages created within the population under French colonialism. During that period, schooling was developed mostly in urban areas, was woefully inadequate in its overall coverage of the population, and sought to produce low-level civil servants for colonial administration (Nordtveit 2005). Even today, the formal school system has been critiqued for alienating Senegalese people: “the curriculum is highly theoretical and offers little relevant learning for rural people’s improved livelihoods. Rather, it is designed for civil service positions that are held mostly by urban men” (Nordtveit 2005: 9). Indeed, curricula have been a subject of debate since independence, when Senegalese elites were reluctant to change francophone components of the system (Kane 2003). As Kane (2003: 28) points out:

> [...] the official language, French, is not a *national* language; it is spoken in schools, but not in homes. Schools are hence isolated from communities; they are entities that prepare for a life outside the community. Thus, the instructional language contributes to the high rates of illiteracy, even amongst those who have been to school.

As a result, non-formal education (NFE) initiatives have sprung up to meet needs unmet by the formal education system. These programs are conducted in African languages and are usually adapted to local culture and priorities (Kuenzi 2003). As we shall discuss in upcoming sections, most of these programs are run by national or international NGOs, although the Senegalese government has in recent years greatly increased its activity within NFE (Kuenzi 2003).

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7 In his discussion of the two types of social capital, Galvan (2001) draws from Robert Putnam’s *Bowling Alone*. 
Decentralization of governance

In terms of its administration, Senegal is divided into 11 regions (régions), each of which is subdivided into 3 departments (départements). Each of the ‘départements’ are subdivided into districts (arondissements), which are in turn subdivided into rural communities (communautés rurales). The latter comprise a certain number of villages (Nordtveit 2005).

Senegal has attracted interest for having the longest history of decentralization amongst West African countries (Ouedraogo 2003). Its decentralization processes have undergone several phases and forms, with some gradual relinquishment of central government control. Even under President Wade, however, the state has on-going challenges determining the distribution of authority and responsibility amongst the country’s regions (Clemons 2001). While political decentralization has occurred (i.e. sub-national elections of new governmental structures) “taxation, budgeting and expenditure decisions, borrowing, and even the appointment of some sub-national government officials have remained prerogatives of the central state” (Dickovick 2005: 187). In the third and most recent phase of decentralization, launched prior to Wade’s presidency in 1996, regions and communities were assigned major responsibilities for providing services, such as health and education. A fund has been created to undergird this shift -- but the nature and amount of resources and decision-making authority transferred to these decentralized structures has been subject to debate (Clemons 2001: 107).

2. Education policy landscape

Overview of the Senegalese education system

Basic education demographics: 8

Gross enrolment ratio: Primary 79.9%; Secondary 19.4%
Primary completion rate: 47.8%
Total spending as % of GDP: 3.6%
Ratio of pupils to teachers: Primary: 48.9; Secondary 27.1
Private sector enrolment share: Primary level 10.9%; Secondary 25.2%
Gender Parity Index: Gross enrolment ratio in primary and secondary: 87.1%
Progression to secondary level: 40.1%

Major issues in basic education

Kane’s 2003 study of girls’ education in Senegal found literature scarce and statistics lacking: “the little that is available indicates that girls are lagging behind boys […] girls are first and foremost perceived as wives, mothers, and care providers while boys are regarded as future heads of households and providers. That conception impacts the amount of education that girls receive, if any” (Kane 2003: 38). In addition, a 2000 study of quality found the following problems: high teacher/student ratios; dilapidated infrastructures and shortage of desks; lack of textbooks; high repetition and drop-out rates; irrelevance of teaching programs (which had not changed in decades); the inexistence of a culture of evaluation in schools, departments and regions; and inadequate pedagogical supervision of teachers (Niane 2004). A subsequent evaluation (2004) found that pre-school, elementary and NFE access had increased significantly, but that quality of teaching and learning remained poor (Niane 2004).

Structure of the education system

There are two ministries of education in Senegal: the MEN (Ministère d’Éducation Nationale) for secondary and higher education, and the MCEBLM (Ministry for basic education and national languages), for preschooling, elementary education, and non-formal education. Pedagogical supervision and support to schools (formal and non-formal) is provided by ministry staff at the regional level (Inspections d’académie or IA), and by
inspectors at the ‘département’ level (*Inspections départementales de l’éducation nationale*, or IDEN).

Formal education encompasses four types of schools: public schools, private secular schools, private Catholic schools, and private Arabic schools (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). The different levels of schooling are as follows: preschool, for children 3-5 years of age (*éducation préscolaire*); elementary, a 6-year cycle for children from 7-12 years of age (*enseignement élémentaire*); middle-school (*enseignement moyen*); general secondary (*secondaire général*), a 3-year cycle; technical and professional secondary (*secondaire technique et professionnel*); higher education or university (*enseignement supérieur*); and teacher training (Ndiaye, Diop et al 2004). Non-formal education (NFE) comprises literacy programming and community schools, also known as ECBs, or *écoles communautaires de base* (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000).  

*Senegal’s education sector plan, the Plan décennal de l’éducation et de la formation (PDEF)*

Senegal has a 10-year education sector plan, launched in 1998: the *Plan décennal de l’éducation et de la formation* (PDEF). The PDEF outlines governmental policies for education up to the year 2010 (Government of Senegal 2002). Concerning basic education, the PRSP lists some of the PDEF’s targets as:

(i) universal primary education by the year 2010;  
(ii) reallocation of 49 percent of the national education budget to elementary education;  
(iii) improvement of access to all levels of education for girls and lengthening of the time they spend in formal education […]

Diarra, Fall et al. (2000) identify four main principles of the PDEF:

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9Ndiaye, Diop et al. (2004: 51-53) mention other forms of alternative basic education, beyond ECBs and literacy programs. For example: the government’s experimental *écoles communautaires de base articulées* (ECB-A) for students 12-16 years of age; and Enda Ecopole’s *formations Coins de Rue* (FCR), mostly located in Dakar (particularly in disadvantaged areas) which offer programs in daycare, elementary, secondary, professional training and literacy. These programs target girls, boys and young adults who have never had access to basic education.
-better involvement of actors and partners in reinforcement of the education system
-increased power of ‘collectivités locales’ (communes and communautés rurales) in the decentralization and deconcentration framework
-an approach of negotiated participation with actors and beneficiaries
-a faire-faire (“make things happen”) policy; in partnership with civil society, a realistic and accepted distribution of roles.

Similarly, the PRSP explains the PDEF as being based on the following principles:

(i) diversification of the types of education offered;
(ii) an effective and well-coordinated partnership;
(iii) strengthened decentralization/deconcentration;
(iv) quality education for all (equality and equity);
(v) achievement by all of the highest performance levels (quality), and
(vi) transparent and efficient management (Government of Senegal 2002: 42).

The PRSP states that the PDEF was “initiated by the State in collaboration with the financial partners, civil society, and the institutions and agencies of the education sector with the aim of spurring quantitative and qualitative development of the education and training system” (Government of Senegal 2002: 41). However, detailed information on the design process for the PDEF, and the role of state and non-state actors therein, is scarce. CSO participants within the process were mainly those with a national-level structure, for example, the national coalition of ‘opérateurs’ who deliver non-formal education, the national federation of parents’ associations (APEs) and the national Education For All coalition (S. Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006).

Senegal’s community schools, or écoles communautaires de base (ECBs)

Écoles communautaires de base (ECBs) are designated for 9-14 year olds who are not enrolled in school or who have left school early (Niane 2003). The target is that 65% of these students should be girls (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). NGOs assume a role of ‘opérateurs,’ supporting ECBs in recruitment, training, hiring and supervising of teachers, and in establishing and equipping income-generating activities for schools (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). ECB teachers are called ‘volontaires’ and are frequently paid by foreign donors, such as CIDA via the state agency PAPA (Project d’appui au plan d’action du MCEBLN), or by
NGO ‘opérateurs’. PAPA also pays for training, refresher training and textbooks (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). ECBs generally offer a 4-year program, using national languages with the gradual introduction of French (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). Literacy programs, meanwhile, are targeted for people above 14 years of age.

ECBs were introduced for two purposes: a) increased access to basic education, especially for those without access to formal education; b) promotion of basic education that contributes to community development (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). They are considered by the government to be non-formal education, and complementary to formal education (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). Officially, ECB graduates are allowed to enter the public system. However, the evidence suggests that ECBs do not offer their students effective passage into formal middle school. In an IIEP study sample, only 1 of 103 ECB candidates passed the 1999 public primary leavers’ exam (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). The ECBs’ legal status needs further clarifying, since their students do not receive certificates upon completion of the 4-year program (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). This lack of clarity may be because the government views ECBs as an experiment to provide learnings for the continued reform of basic education (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). ECBs are expected by government to become redundant by 2010, because UPE should be obtained by then, and important pedagogical innovations mainstreamed (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000; Miller-Grandvaux and Yoder 2002b).

Prior to the launch of ECBs, the Senegalese government passed a 1991 law giving a new dynamism to non-formal education, influenced by the 1990’s Education For All conference in Jomtien and the meeting of African education ministers, MINEDAF 6. This law emphasized four principles: a priority on elementary education, so as to address illiteracy at its source; affirmation of the central role of NFE (meaning literacy programming and

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10 There is somewhat contradictory information about the learning results of ECBs. In contrast to the IIEP example, a USAID-funded working paper by Assié-Lumumba (2005) refers to DAEB studies from 1999-2004 showing that ECB results are generally satisfactory in reading and writing, but weaker in math. (DAEB is the government’s Direction de l’alphabétisation et de l’éducation de base.) Miller-Grandvaux and Yoder (2002b) assert that it is premature to evaluate ECB’s success in this regard. Similarly, Hoppers (2005) writes that for African community schools in general, little is certain about learners’ levels of achievement.
ECBs; articulation of the sub-sectors of formal and non-formal education; and the establishment of national plans for basic education (Ndiaye, Diop et al 2004: 27). Concerning the literacy component of NFE, 1993 and 1995 marked two major consultative processes, aiming for “consensus upon national literacy policy,” at which time faire-faire policy\textsuperscript{11} was promoted (World Bank 2004: 2; Ndiaye, Diop et al 2004: 28). The year 1996 then saw the transfer of major responsibilities for literacy to the ‘collectivités locales’ (elected local authorities) (Ndiaye, Diop et al 2004: 28).

Senegal’s ECBs were piloted under the NGO ADEF in 1993, and their number increased greatly thereafter, with the support of the state and NGOs such as Aide et Action, ENDA Tiers Monde and others (Clemons 2001). The Senegalese state is very supportive of ECBs (Hoppers 2005). Miller-Grandvaux calls ECBs an “NGO-government partnership” (Miller-Grandvaux and Yoder 2002b: A-10), and other sources show ECBs to be at the heart of government NFE policy (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000; Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004; Assié-Lumumba, Mara et al. 2005). In 1999, the Minister of Basic Education and National Languages committed to creating 1000 ECBs per year until 2003, to creating legal status for ECBs, and to giving ECB ‘volontaires’ (teachers) the status and privileges of the formal sub-sector’s teachers (Clemons 2001). The Ministry also provided a “complete [state] administrative frame at the central level” in support of ECBs (Clemons 2001: 129). Marchand (2000) comments that Senegal’s ECBs, as compared to those in Mali and Togo, have higher levels of supervision by authorities; the GoS has designated ‘département’ inspection officials specially to ECBs, to supervise quality through providing pedagogical supervision of teaching staff and technical support to NGO ‘opérateurs.’

3. Civil Society in Senegal

Although Senegal was dominated by one political party for several decades, it has remained,

\textsuperscript{11} Faire-faire policy will be discussed at length in Section 4.

S. Cherry
03/03/06
one of the most liberal and open societies in Africa, and indeed in the postcolonial world. Press freedom, although restricted, was never entirely eliminated. Intellectuals and artists—and, to a lesser extent, labor and civic activists—enjoyed a range of freedoms of expression, despite the government’s efforts to incorporate them within Senghor’s vaguely democratic corporatist vision of one-party rule” (Galvan 2001: 52).

As we have seen, the Wade government, elected in 2000, has been commended for giving new energy to the political system (Kuenzi 2003). Hermier (2004:2) describes Senegalese civil society as "extremely heterogeneous;" the government has an official list of 316 NGOs, in addition to many associations, trade unions, media organizations, universities, research centres, umbrella organizations and 'tontines,' or “informal solidarity groups.” Generally speaking, CSOs tend to be grouped according to “status or area of interest,” but they lack overall coordination and common platforms, and are donor-dependent (Hermier 2004: 2). Their structuring “remains closely linked to the various dialogue settings created as part of cooperation policy (such as the PRSP) […]” – rather than robust, pre-existing networks that can strongly influence decision-makers (Hermier 2004: 4, 7).

Apart from the Hermier (2004) article, there are a few current studies of Senegalese civil society in the public domain. For example, the involvement of civil society actors in the Casamance peace process has been researched (Beck 2002b). Some study has also been conducted of the interaction between elected decentralized authorities and religious leaders (marabouts) (Beck 2001a) – while other literature suggests a decreased influence of religion in politics (Galvan 2001, Kuenzi 2003). Patterson (1998) studied some rural Senegalese organizations whose goal of mutual help had been lost amidst class and gender discrimination. The result was un-transparent, un-democratic management, and co-option of members to accept the political status quo (Patterson 1998). It does not seem reasonable, however, to generalize about Senegalese civil society overall, based on these few studies; the current literature is rather limited in volume.

Some information is available about the overall involvement of civil society in the formulation of Senegal’s PRSP. The PRSP itself has an annex detailing “Actors and Their degree of participation in PRSP Modules” (Government of Senegal 2002: 89). The category
of civil society actor (e.g. development NGO, labor union, religious organization etc), the stages at which they participated, and the degree of participation (whether low, average or high) at each stage is provided. While this kind of detail is a promising start, it must be remembered that presence does not automatically equate with influence (Brock, McGee et al. 2002), and that it is hard for a reader to discern which of the various stages or actors were the most influential in determining the outcomes of the overall process.

An article by Phillips (2002) -- of the INGO World Vision -- provides some further detail about the degree of civil society participation in PRSP design processes. Government, civil society, and donors all agreed upon time limitations as the biggest constraint in this regard (Phillips 2002). For example, civil society actors were given the responsibility for managing the media campaign to educate the public, but had inadequate time to come to an agreement with donors on its content, thereby delaying its launch (Phillips 2002). In addition, civil society consultations were inconveniently scheduled during July and August, which are cultivation and vacation seasons (Phillips 2002). Phillips (2002) also asserts that the necessary documentation was not provided by the government with sufficient lead-time for CSOs to contribute as meaningfully as they might have done. Finally, this study found that women, women’s groups, traditional groups and village-level stakeholders were inadequately represented at important stages in the process (Phillips 2002).

Despite these considerable limitations, some positive outcomes of civil society participation in the PRSP process were identified. For example, an NGO received funding to launch independent monitoring of the PRSP, in partnership with other groups (Phillips 2002). In addition, the PRSP process overall generated some collaboration between civil society groups to engage with government about poverty (Phillips 2002). These are fitting developments, given that the PRSP itself calls upon civil society to be one of its implementers (Government of Senegal 2002):

The various actors (i.e., government, local authorities, civil society, donors) will be responsible for ensuring that the program actually reaches the targeted populations. In order to achieve this goal, it will be necessary to set up networks of interlocutors and representatives of target populations, including in particular agents of regionalized and decentralized government departments, local elected officials,
leaders of community organizations such as village development associations, women’s groups, young people’s organizations and professional associations, and, more generally, organizations representing civil society (Government of Senegal 2002: 55).

**Categories of Senegalese civil society actors**

Both the Phillips article (2002) and the PRSP itself give some useful detail about categories of civil society actors involved in PRSP processes. We can thus glean from the PRSP that the following groups of civil society actor exist in Senegal: development NGOs, human rights NGOs, labor unions, farmers’ organizations, young people’s organizations, women’s organizations, associations of the handicapped, religious organizations, organizations associated with villages and neighbourhoods, university researchers and press corps (Government of Senegal 2002: 89). Meanwhile, the Phillips article (2002) confirms the existence of umbrella groups for different categories of actor: NGOs and CBOs, producers, women’s groups, young people’s associations, human rights organizations and trade unions (Phillips 2002: 63). Meanwhile, at the community level, Senegalese civil society in most villages includes a ‘chef du village,’ a variety of committees for youth, women and development activities, a village’s Women’s Association and women’s for-profit associations (Nordtveit 2005).

**4. Civil society and Education**

*Political context for civil society participation in the governance of education*

**The faire-faire strategy**

The government’s faire-faire (“Making things happen”) strategy places a high priority upon state-civil society partnerships. For example, the PRSP explains that “in accordance with the faire-faire principle, the government recognizes that implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy is not a job solely for official and administrative authorities, but also for local authorities, representatives of civil society and the private sector” (Government of Senegal 2002: 53).
In the education sector, the faire-faire policy gives non-state actors -- NGOs, GIEs (*Groupes d’intérêt économique*), associations, development organizations -- the responsibility for designing and implementing NFE initiatives (Assié-Lumumba, Mara et al. 2005). These initiatives are highly-adapted to local needs and priorities (Ndiaye, Diop et al 2004; Hoppers 2005). In the delivery of educational services, the PRSP refers to faire-faire within education as a kind of “outsourcing” approach (Government of Senegal 2002: 43), meaning that the state hires local NGO ‘*opérateurs*’ to implement programs, thereby building civil society (Kuenzi 2003). Major donors who have supported faire-faire government literacy projects in Senegal include CIDA (supporting the *Projet d’appui au plan d’action*, or PAPA), the World Bank (supporting *Project alphabétization priorité femmes*, or PAPF), GTZ (supporting *Projet d’alphabétisation des élus et notables locaux*, PADEN and *Alph Femmes*) and the Senegalese state (supporting *Programme d’alphabétisation intensive du Sénégal*, PAIS).

Ndiaye, Diop et al.’s 2004 study offers a strong argument for the faire-faire strategy’s effectiveness in promoting state and civil society partnerships within delivery of literacy programs.¹² In terms of learning results, more than 1.5 million people were enrolled in faire-faire-based literacy programs between 1993 and 2001, and the illiteracy rate in people 10 years of age and up was reduced from 68.9% (1988) to 46.1% (2001), while female literacy improved by 25.5% (Ndiaye, Diop et al 2004: 57). Similarly, a World Bank (2004: 10) evaluation of the PAPF, a female literacy project, asserts that institutional development was a “substantial” outcome of the project, building a strong partnership between public and private sectors. During a decade of implementation, the number of ‘*opérateurs*’ within faire-faire literacy programming increased from 90 in 1995 to more than 500 by 2004 (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004: 57).

¹² This is a Senegalese government-initiated study, carried out in collaboration with the ADEA, and refers largely to documents produced by the Senegalese government e.g. MoE, Cabinet, reports produced by the DAEB (*Direction de l’alphabétisation et de l’éducation de base*), or the government’s PAPA project. The purpose of the study is to illustrate the contribution of faire-faire to improved quality of learning in basic NFE, that is, within literacy programs and *écoles communautaires*. It targeted the major literacy projects (PAPF, PAPA, PADEN, Alpha-Femmes).
Diop et al. 2004: 18). Moreover, the plans for institutional support of these partnerships seem quite robust. For example, the Senegalese government developed -- in a participatory fashion -- procedural manuals explaining the roles and responsibilities of the various actors within literacy programming, as well as clear guidelines for how non-state actors could apply for resources to run programs, and the procedure whereby their proposals would be evaluated (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004; World Bank 2004). The government devised a detailed framework for close-up monitoring and evaluation of projects at local and national levels, and for staff and management capacity-building within projects (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004: 39, 42-43). Structures were also established for technical support, training and action research (e.g. the Centre national de ressources éducationnelles or CNRE); and for dialogue, exchange of ideas and dissemination of research findings (e.g. the Comité national de concertation et d’appui technique or CNCAT) (Ndiaye, Diop et al 2004: 35, 39). Good results noted from these partnerships include: improved literacy rates, introduction of innovations into the formal system (such as the use of national languages in elementary education), enhanced professionalism of ‘opérateurs,’ job creation, and improved quality of life for program beneficiaries (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004: 57-60, S Cherry, personal communication with CIDA staff, January 10, 2006). The faire-faire strategy has also influenced other West-African countries (The Gambia, Chad, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea) and has been applied to other social sectors (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004; World Bank 2004).

The notion of partnership within faire-faire, however, is not without ambiguities and challenges. The World Bank’s 2004 evaluation commented that faire-faire “is built on the PAPA, PAIS, PLCP), in three key regions Thiéf (PAPA), Kolda (PAPF), and Kaolack (PADEM, Alpha-Femme, PAIS) (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004).

13 A 2004 World Bank evaluation of the PAPF found that in practice, the monitoring and evaluation system was unsatisfactory, the “weakest aspect of the project” – government capacity to monitor, evaluate and coordinate literacy programs was not adequately built (World Bank 2004: 7). Capacity building of literacy providers to prepare and implement literacy courses, however, was found to be satisfactory (World Bank 2004: 8).
assumption of a relationship of trust, but is susceptible to political pressures. The risk of political interference on the fairness of the process represents the major threat to the institutional sustainability” (World Bank 2004: 12). The equality of the government-civil society partnership is also questioned in Nordtveit’s (2005) study of the PAPF:

In Senegal, the partnership approach was designed to establish a risk-sharing partnership [along the lines of public-private partnership...] The government outsourced funds to private providers, and established yearly contracts for delivery of literacy education. The word partnership [partenariat] is used in Senegal, rather than ‘outsource’ (the terms sous-traiter or commanditer are rarely used [...]
The word ‘partnership’ is problematic because it is questionable whether the public and private sectors can share common goals and risks in a situation where the public sector is subcontracting the private sector to do a job (Nordtveit 2005: 22-23)

In addition, there is a certain lack of agreement in the literature about the level of civil society participation in national-level faire-faire policy design. The Ndiaye, Diop et al. (2004) study suggests high levels of civil society participation within the design of faire-faire. In terms of the strategy’s implementation, however, Nordtveit (2005) asserts that the faire-faire approach gives government the policy-making and evaluation role, and civil society, the role of implementing agent. Certainly, the capacities and credibility that civil society actors gain from their role as implementers should not be downplayed -- particularly given the degree of innovation they enjoy in adapting programming to local priorities (S Cherry, personal communication with CIDA staff, January 10, 2006). Furthermore, the role of implementer should not be viewed as less demanding or desirable than a role in national policy-making (S Cherry, personal communication with CIDA staff, January 10, 2006). At the same time, the experience gained by CSOs in implementation has the potential for a complementary role of evidence-based input into policy processes, and thus, the opportunity to enrich the wider education system. Detailed information is lacking, however, on whether or not this scope of roles is available to CSOs active in NFE.

As to other implications of faire-faire for civil society actors, one of the aims of the PAPF (women’s literacy project) was to build civil society (Nordtveit 2005). In this regard, the project had some success; outsourcing did allow for new, non-state actors to emerge within literacy, such as local ‘relais’ persons trained by providers to take over after the...
project (Nordtveit 2005). Provider organizations increased in number, mainly grassroots, for-profit associations (Nordtveit 2005). Indeed, these NGO ‘opérateurs’ now have a national coordinating body (the Coordination nationale des opérateurs en alphabétisation, or CNOAS), for negotiating with the state and training provider personnel (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004).

In addition, the participants in literacy programming were mainly from women’s associations, and relationships thus grew between service providers and these associations (Nordtveit 2005). These processes in turn strengthened the women’s voices, and represented a step of progress towards their greater involvement in decision-making, including within management of their own villages (Nordtveit 2004; 2005).14 The program participants also had input into course schedules, and into needs assessments whose content shaped the proposals designed by the project providers (Nordtveit 2004; World Bank 2004). The World Bank found that this kind of participation strengthened the “demand-driven nature of the project, which is a key factor in sustainability” (World Bank 2004: 12). This kind of result can lead to a “spiralling up” of demand, whereby participants’ expectations of their local services turn into stronger, more unified demands on the wider system and the state (Miller-Grandvaux, Welmond et al 2002a). In addition, Nordtveit (2004) points out that this situation illustrates a successful example of the “short route of accountability,”15 where service providers are directly accountable to the project participants, rather than only being accountable to the state. This kind of accountability was reinforced in the government’s technical PAPF (women’s literacy project) evaluations, where one component measured the

14 Interestingly, the government agency DAEB’s (Direction de l’alphabétisation et de l’éducation de base) 2001 longitudinal study of PAPF’s outcomes showed a greater success rate in communities where the sub-project was built on an existing women’s association, and where village people had established a local management committee as the implementation phase began (Nordveit 2004).

15 This concept comes from the World Bank’s 2003 Development Report, Making Services Work for Poor People.
degree to which project content “corresponded to the participants’ requirements” (Nordtveit 2004: 3).

In all these ways, the faire-faire approach assisted civil society actors – both participants and providers – to express their priorities, demand accountability, and gain credibility as implementers\textsuperscript{16} of educational services. At the same time, this approach has been noted for the potentially negative effect of “chang[ing] the nature of civil society associations, which bec[o]me government-dependent businesses” or “clients” of government (Nordtveit 2005: 426, 448). Another point of ambiguity in the literature on faire-faire surrounds the origins of this model of public-private “partnership.” The Ndiaye, Diop et al. study (2004) presents faire-faire as ‘home-grown,’ and thus well-suited to the Senegalese context. Other studies, however, emphasize the impact of global trends towards privatization, outsourcing and decentralization of education upon Senegal’s education system, including in NFE (Clemons 2001; Kane 2003; Nordtveit 2005). It is not clear, however, whether or not the Senegalese state, and consequently, Senegal’s education system, are any more influenced by global forces, than any other country receiving external funding for its education system. It might also be argued that the Senegalese state’s increased support to NFE within the last decade shows some political will to anchor education in Senegalese realities. As we have seen, the faire-faire strategy has in many cases allowed for programming that is responsive to local priorities -- which in turn raises questions about the degree to which global forces shape Senegalese education at the grassroots level.\textsuperscript{17} These studies on faire-faire, read at a distance, create many unanswered questions about the current

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\textsuperscript{16} In some cases, women’s organizations who began by receiving the services organized themselves to become providers (Nordtveit 2004).

\textsuperscript{17} For example, the state’s PAPA literacy project has developed a model curriculum, but still local organizations have autonomy in their choice of curriculum and content of classes (Kuenzi 2003). Hoppers (2005:125) has commented that the Senegalese ECB curriculum “has been purposely re-designed for improving the schools’ response to the needs of learners” (Hoppers 2005: 125). Distinctions are made between “themes and competencies that have a national relevance and those that are specific to individual regions” (Hoppers 2005: 125).
balance of power and influence between donors, state and civil society in Senegal, and about the degree to which civil society actors can create their own opportunities for participation within educational governance.

Governance roles and responsibilities under decentralization

Since 1996, the Senegalese education system (except for higher education) has been undergoing decentralization reforms (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). It is not entirely straightforward to determine from the literature what opportunities and challenges decentralization poses for civil society actors in education. Gershberg and Winkler (2003:8 emphasis mine) describe Senegal’s decentralization of education as a case of “Explicit Delegation to Schools” – as opposed to deconcentration or devolution to regions or localities. Their definition of delegation – excerpted from their chart defining deconcentration, devolution and delegation of education – is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education/General</th>
<th>Administrative</th>
<th>Fiscal</th>
<th>Political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delegation to schools and/or school councils</td>
<td>School principals and/or school councils empowered to make personnel, curriculum, and some spending decisions.</td>
<td>School principals and/or school councils receive government funding and can allocate spending and raise revenues locally.</td>
<td>School councils are elected or appointed, sometimes with power to name school principals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Gershberg and Winkler 2003: 4-5)

Similarly to what Gershberg and Winkler describe, Senegal’s PDEF (education sector plan) calls for “decentralized, ascendant and partnership-oriented” planning within education, and has established structures for planning and implementing the PDEF at regional, ‘département’ and local levels (Aide et Action 2002b: 57). Niane (2003) suggests, however, that central government still retains many of the major decisions in educational governance, including policy and curriculum development, teacher recruitment and remuneration, and
evaluation of the system. Aide et Action (2002b) comment that there is some ambiguity in government documents about whether to *devolve* power to elected authorities or to aim for *deconcentration* of educational governance to education authorities at the regional and ‘département’ levels (AEA 2002b). The more general and strategic state documents lean towards the former option, and the more operational documents, towards the latter (AEA 2002b). It is not a foregone conclusion, moreover, that elected local authorities have greater capacity for partnership with civil society than deconcentrated education authorities.

It is also not clear in the literature whether decentralization of educational governance ‘plays out’ differently in the formal and non-formal sub-sectors of education. Niane’s (2003) findings about the roles of central government in educational governance contrast with certain studies of governance in NFE specifically. In that sub-sector, there is a reasonable degree of evidence for shared governance between state and non-state actors -- although not so much, perhaps, in national policy-setting, as we have already discussed. Moran and Batley (2004: 40) state that in ECBs, “NGO, community and state roles are so thoroughly intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish lines of accountability.” As far as they can be identified from a limited number of studies, the roles and players in non-formal ECB school governance are as follows:

**Government** carries out direction-setting; coordination; motivation; mobilization of resources; regulation; monitoring and evaluation when other organizations are designing and implementing education programs; community and action-research capacity-building (Ndiaye et al. 2004)

**NGOs** act as ‘*opérateurs,*’ or support-structures, to communities and their ECBs. They often cover school fees, recruitment, training, hiring and supervising of volunteer teachers, and make substantial investments in establishing and equipping income-generating activities for schools (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). Officially, NGO ‘*opérateurs*’ are supposed to withdraw

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18 These NGO ‘*opérateurs*’ are considered by other players to know and understand the communities well, to mobilize participation and cooperation, and to bring vital resources (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). They are also perceived to have expertise in teacher training, producing textbooks and teaching aids (*manuels pratiques*), pedagogical supervision, integrated community development, establishing income-generating activities, and establishing community-based organizations (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000).
after 4 years (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000), once an ECB is sustainable. The CIDA-funded government agency PAPA (Project d’appui an plan d’action du MCEBLN) is a major source of funding for these NGO ‘opérateurs’ of ECBs (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000).

As to community roles, community people participate in determining curriculum, constructing and managing schools, and determining the school calendar (Niane 2003). Local school committees also recruit and manage young people to be tutors to ECB students (Niane 2003). ECB management committees are elected or designated by a village assembly (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). There are often more men on the committees than women, and the most influential posts are often held by elders, close to the village chief (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000).

ECBs are intended also to have the support of a ‘cellule école-milieu’ (CEM). This CEM is meant to promote cooperation and partnership between local authorities, the ECB management committee, teachers, and resource people (e.g. CSOs, traditional chiefs, NGO staff, heads of women’s associations, farmer’s associations). In reality, however, there are few functional CEMs (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000).

In formal education, schools are considered more permanent -- as compared to ECBs -- and the configuration of civil society actors around schools is slightly different (S Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006). Parents’ associations (‘associations de parents’ d’élèves’ or APEs) have existed since the 1960’s, and are a major actor in this sub-sector, particularly in support to quality (S. Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006). They have an active national-level federation, FENAPES – although it is seriously hindered by resource shortages (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Under the PDEF (the education sector plan), another important school governance structure in the formal sub-sector is the school management committee. These are distinct from APEs in that they are made up of a wider group of community representatives, including school staff (teachers, principals), local education authorities, locally-elected authorities, resource people, NGOs, CSOs, and APE members (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). These committees are charged with developing ‘projets d’école,’ or school development projects. ‘Projets d’école’ may be regarded as a building block for
‘bottom-up,’ decentralized planning of the basic education, and are required to be synergistic with PDEF plans at regional, ‘département,’ and local levels (Aide et Action 2002b). They may also represent an entry point for targeting a wider sphere of action within the formal education system (Aide et Action 2002b).

Outline of civil society actors in education19

A source that provides detailed information about the categories of civil society actor in Senegal’s education sector is the CIDA-funded 2005 Étude sur la société civile (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). This study sought to identify all CS actors active in education and training in Senegal, to research the impact of their activities upon the realization of EFA objectives, to analyze their mission, objectives, membership, achievements, problems and future plans of action, and to analyze their needs in terms of human resources, technical and financial support for an enhanced contribution to the realization of Education For All objectives (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005).20 Some findings of this study are summarized below.


-INGOs: Aide et Action (a French INGO); Christian Children’s Fund (CCF); CARITAS (Catholic aid). Plan International is also named (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000).

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19 Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this section is drawn from CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère’s 2005 study, translated from French to English by the author of this paper.

20 The CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère (2005) study included only organizations principally involved in education (as opposed to other sectors). In addition, the study had difficulty making contacts with deconcentrated authorities, and was unable to interview some key actors such as Tostan, ANCEFA and the ‘Forum Civil.’

21 For more information on individual CSOs, please refer to Appendix 1. Senegalese Civil Society Organizations.
Sub-regional NGOs with their headquarters in Dakar: le Forum des Educatrices Africaines (FAWE), le Réseau Africain pour le Développement Intégré, (RADI), TOSTAN et Action – Jeunesse - Environnement (AJE)

National NGOs are involved in improved access, quality and management of basic education; they work in formal, NFE, middle and secondary, and professional training. These include: l’association pour le Développement en Afrique (ADEF/Afrique), L’ONECS (Office National de l’Enseignement Catholique au Sénégal) and ENDA Graph 3D.

Associations: these are regulated by law, have modest resources, and seek to contribute to basic education. They include: association des Femmes du Ministère de l’Education (AFMEN), les comités pour la promotion de la scolarisation des filles (CNSCOFI et CDPSCOFI) and les associations de parents d’élèves (APE), among others.

Federations (coalitions) and networks include national federations of local organizations (e.g. APEs) or coalitions of different associations sharing common goals. They may be working towards EFA or advocating with government on behalf of communities. They may also carry out mobilization, lobbying, organizing fora, seminars, and demonstrations, especially during key dates defined by the UN system. They include FENAPES, CONGAD and the EFA Coalition, among others.

Unions: This study found about 14 unions. They are major players and important pressure groups in the education system; the Ministry invites them to all meetings relating to pedagogical matters. Their opinions are sought whenever important decisions are being made.


Civil society actors contribute within formal, non-formal and informal education. Their participation enhances:

Access, through building and equipping infrastructure;

Recruitment and sensitization, with a particular emphasis on girls’ education;

Retention of girls in school through income-generating activities, school feeding, assistance to families, health education and mobilization, and sensitization about early marriage;
Promotion of a literate environment, though development of literacy programming and alternative models. Associations are heavily involved here as well;

Quality through pedagogical training and seminars, sponsorship and scholarship systems; inputs such as textbooks, libraries; attention to working conditions for teachers, and school feeding programs;

Management though support to enhanced working conditions for local and deconcentrated authorities; capacity-building of leaders; sharing information, innovations and creating data bases;

Social development activities in the school context, including those in favour of marginalized groups; incorporation of local initiatives within education; citizenship education and promotion of gender equity.

Challenges facing civil society actors in education

Within formal education, both school management committees and APEs need their capacity built for organizing and operating more effectively (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). In non-formal education, Diarra, Fall et al. (2000) concluded similarly that the management capacity of school committees is often very weak; their study found that written documents were rare (e.g. meeting minutes, account books) and that no committees in their sample were able to present a budget (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). In addition, many civil society actors in education, particularly Senegalese actors, have serious shortages of resources to carry out their missions; lobbying for resources then takes time away from their more important objectives (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Their other major needs include capacity-building, improved coordination with decentralized education authorities, and strategies for improving education quality and quality of learning within NFE (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005).

The political context for civil society actors in NFE has also been found less-than-ideal. Despite the strengths of faire-faire’s design, and the government’s political will to support NFE, some research shows that realities ‘on the ground’ do not quite live up to policy and plans. Central and decentralized state actors have been criticized for not having
established the planned “new institutional arrangements or mechanisms to administer a decentralized alternative education […] and for a] lack of evident attitudes, practices, and norms that would encourage participation and shared decision-making” (Clemons 2001: 172). Despite their signed agreements, the national coordination of the education sector program (PDEF) and even education authorities at the lower, ‘départemental’ levels are not always aware of what is happening ‘on the ground,’ and do not always know the CSOs operating in their areas (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005).

This said, decentralized education authorities still need further training, as well as increased technical, logistical and human resources, so as to support and monitor ECBs and literacy programs (Clemons 2001; Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004). In addition, although these actors have been given some tools for data collection (e.g. internet access, information technology equipment, logistical means), they lack the resources to maintain these tools and thus ensure monitoring of PDEF indicators (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). The establishment of complete and reliable data was also found to be a problem within faire-faire literacy programming (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004). As a related problem, Aide et Action’s 2002 study of Kolda region found that elected local authorities in the ‘collectivités locales’ were struggling to appropriate and understand their roles and responsibilities within the education sector and the PDEF (Aide et Action 2002a). Some members of local authorities need increased capacity in literacy, and in planning and budgeting (Aide et Action 2002a). There is also a lack of collaboration between these elected authorities (‘collectivités locales’) and state education officials in planning and budgeting, although ‘collectivités locales’ are supposed to give a high priority to funding ECBs and literacy programs (Aide et Action 2002a; Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004).

Civil society actors, moreover, have been found to have shortcomings. There have been complaints that ECB ‘opérateurs’ are not providing schools with the necessary technical and financial support – although ECB ‘opérateurs’, themselves, have insisted that
they are over-extended (Clemons 2001). CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère (2005) also found evidence that certain ‘opérateurs’ in NFE are not performing up to standard, not respecting their contracts and wasting resources (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005), while Ndiaye, Diop et al. (2004) report that ‘opérateurs’ are not consistently hiring competent resource people to train their staff. Finally, Clemons and Vogt (2002) argue that there are strong discrepancies between government, community and NGO perspectives on the purposes of ECBs, and that there is need for all actors to engage in continual dialogue and come to an understanding of their different goals.

**Part 5. Summary**

In Senegal’s overall political context, civil society actors enjoy freedom of association and expression. At the same time, there are substantial ‘unknowns’ surrounding the decentralization of governance – a major feature of the political landscape and the context for civil society activity. Firstly, there is a lack of clarity about how decentralization policy is translating into practice – in other words, about the degree to which decision-making power and adequate resources are being transferred to decentralized authorities (Clemons 2001). Secondly, the capacity of those authorities to collaborate with civil society actors, and vice versa, is not clearly-documented. In the education sector, decentralization reforms within the sector plan, the PDEF, appear to have created confusion in the relationship between elected local authorities and education officials (Aide et Action 2002b). In short, the changing governance context is difficult for both state and non-state actors to navigate.

The same may be said within non-formal education. The government is a strong supporter of NFE, and has designed sound policies and designated MoE staff to undergird state-civil society partnerships (Marchand 2000, Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004, World Bank 2004). Still, rendering these partnerships operational poses financial, logistical, and capacity-related challenges for deconcentrated education authorities (Clemons 2001, CREDA

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22 Weak involvement of ‘collectivités locales’ was also noted within faire-faire literacy programming (Ndiaye,
and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Tensions also exist within the partnership: for example, outsourcing education service-delivery to NGOs has the potential to make them act like businesses dependent upon government (Nordtveit 2005).

In addition, serious questions arise from the idea that ECBs are considered a short-term experiment to provide learning for the continued reform of basic education (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). If indeed ECBs are to become redundant as progress is made towards UPE, what will be the future role of CSO ‘opérateurs’ and other civil society actors mobilized within NFE initiatives? Certainly, CSOs have gained considerable capacity and credibility as implementers and managers of education programs. At the same time, it is not clear that they are regarded by government as having the technical expertise necessary for a complementary role of input into national policy (S. Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006). Some civil society actors – such as the national coalition of NFE ‘opérateurs’ -- did participate in PDEF design (S. Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006). However, it is not clear how community-level CSOs without a national-level structure can make their voices heard in such processes – even though they have a good deal of say about the content of NFE initiatives in their own communities (Nordtveit 2004; World Bank 2004). Therefore, it is important that CSOs work towards creating a strong role for themselves, in ensuring that the learning and innovations acquired from NFE can enrich the wider education system.

This said, NFE is not the only domain for participation of non-state actors within education. CSOs operate within formal, non-formal and informal sub-sectors, contributing towards access, quality and management of education (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Parents’ associations (APEs) and teachers’ unions, for example, are major players within the formal sub-sector (S. Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006) – and the latter, particularly, are consulted by the Ministries of Education on matters of importance (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). However, the degree to
which other civil society actors in formal education have a voice in shaping the wider system, and if or how they collaborate in doing so, is not well-documented. At the school level, management committees and their *projets d’école* (school development projects) have the potential to form the basis for bottom-up, collaborative education planning by state and non-state actors, but are too new to judge as to their success in this regard (Aide et Action 2002b; CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005).

The PDEF’s decentralization reforms envisage new relationships of sharing and negotiation being created between central government, local authorities, teachers, pupils and parents (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). However, there remains a great need for much stronger collaboration mechanisms and capacity amongst authorities, education officials and CSOs at all levels of the system (Clemons 2001; Aide et Action 2002b; CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Civil society actors also need to act in greater coordination across formal, non-formal and informal sub-sectors so as to create participation opportunities for themselves in this fluid context of educational governance.
### Appendix 1: Senegalese Civil Society Organizations (non-exhaustive list)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSO category &amp; comments</th>
<th>CSO name</th>
<th>Areas of intervention (in education only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>These are not the only CSOs in Senegal intervening in education; they are CSOs whose main focus is in education (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005: 13).</td>
<td>Unless otherwise noted, these categories and names of CSOs in education, and the information about them, are translated by the author of this paper directly from CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005: 16 - 19 and Annex 3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **International NGOs** | a. Aide et Action  
 b. Christian Children’s Fund (CCF)  
 c. CARITAS (Catholic Aid) | a. basic education (including NFE), peace education, child rights  
b. basic education  
c. school feeding, literacy, agricultural training centres |
| **Sub-regional NGOs with their headquarters or a country chapter in Dakar** | a. ADEF (Association for the Development of Education in Africa)  
 b. AJE (Action-Jeunesse-Environnement)  
 c. FAWE (Forum des Educatrices Africaines)  
 d. RADI (Réseau Africain pour le Développement Intégré) | a. formal education, non-formal education  
b. informal sector of professional training  
c. girls in elementary education, middle and secondary education  
d. non-formal education, informal sector, professional training for middle-school graduates |
### National NGOs:

In meeting PDEF (the education sector plan) objectives including: improved access, quality and management of basic education. They work in formal, NFE, middle and secondary education, professional training, training for women (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005)

| National NGOs | a. ONECS (Office National de l’Enseignement Catholique au Sénégal)  
|               | b. ENDA Graph 3D  
|               | c. AERS (Amicale Enseignants Retraités du Sénégal) – organization for retired teachers  
|               | - ADEF/Afrique (Association pour le Développement en Afrique) |
|               | a. basic, middle, secondary and higher education, professional training  
|               | b. decentralization, human rights  
|               | c. all areas of education |

### Associations:

These are regulated by law, have modest resources, and seek to contribute to basic education, particularly to schools (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005)

| Associations | a. AEPR (Association Enseignements de Pikine) -- teachers’ association  
|             | b. CDEP SCOFI (Comité Départemental Enseignants pour Promotion Scolarisation des Filles) – teachers’ association promoting girls’ schooling  
|             | c. CEPPE (Coordination des Écoles Publiques de Pikine Est)  
|             | - AFMEN (Association des Femmes du Ministère de l’Education) – MoE’s women’s association  
|             | - CNSCOFI and CDPSCOFI, les comités pour la promotion de la scolarisation |
|             | a. formal, non-formal and informal education  
|             | b. formal education  
|             | c. elementary and middle schools |
| Federations (coalitions) and networks: these may include national federations of local organizations (e.g. APEs or parents’ associations) or coalitions of different associations sharing common goals. They may be working towards EFA, advocating with government on behalf of communities, carrying out mobilization, disseminating information, lobbying, organizing fora, seminars, demonstrations and so forth, especially during key dates defined by the UN system (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère) | a. FENAPES (Fédération Nationale Associations de Parents d’Élèves du Sénégal) – national federation of parents’ associations  
b. la Coalition pour l’EPT – EFA coalition  
c. CNEAP (Collectif National d’Éducation Alternative et Populaire) – federation for alternative and population education  
d. CONOAS (Coordination Nationale Opérateurs en Alphabétisation) – national coordination of opérateurs in literacy  
-CONGAD -- umbrella organization for NGOs  
-le RISOA | a. all sectors of education and training  
b. formal and non-formal education, professional training, national and international-level interventions  
c. non-formal education and informal sector  
d. informal sector |
Unions: these are important pressure groups. They are numerous in the education sector; this study found more than 14 unions (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unions for more “emerging” groups in education -- for “Volontaires de l’Education, professeurs et maîtres contractuels” (volunteers, teachers and contractuals) (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. SUDES (Syndicat Unique et Démocratique des Enseignants du Sénégal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. SNECS (Syndicat National des Enseignants des Écoles Catholiques du Sénégal)</td>
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<td>c. SNEEL (Syndicat national Enseignement Élémentaire)</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. UDEPL (Union Démocratique Enseignants du Privé Laïc) -- union for private, secular-school teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. SELS (Syndicat des Enseignants Libres du Sénégal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDEN (l’Union Démocratique des Enseignants)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYPROS (le syndicat des professeurs)</td>
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<td>UNSAS (Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes du Sénégal)</td>
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<th>Unions: all sectors and levels of education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. all sectors and levels of education</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. all levels of Catholic schooling in Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. elementary public schooling</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. all levels of secular schooling in Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. representation of the interests of schools and teachers; promotion of a national, democratic, lay school; workers’ rights; training of members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Syndicat des Enseignants libres du Sénégal (SELS)
| Education Research Groups | ERNWACA (Education Research Network for West and Central Africa) | -ERNWACA is a “Professional Scientific, non political and non profit association … created to increase research capacity, strengthen collaboration among researchers and practitioners, and promote African expertise on education so as to positively impact educational practices and policies” (ERNWACA website, consulted February 11, 2006 at: http://www.rocare.org/ernwaca_brochure_eng.htm) |
| Other civil society actors | CSO name and source | Areas of intervention (not exhaustive) |
| Quotations from Phillips (2002) are CSOs who were involved in the PRSP design process (Phillips 2002:63). |
| INGOs | -Plan International (Diarra 2002) | |
| | -World Vision (Beck 2001a) | |
| | -Handicap International (Beck 2001a) | |
| | -Oxfam America and Oxfam Great Britain (Beck 2001a) | |
| | -Red Cross (Beck 2001a) | |
| | -World Education (Beck 2001a) | |
| | -Appropriate Technology International (Beck 2001a) | |
| Umbrella organizations | a. CONGAD (Conseil des ONG d’Appui au Développement) -- Council for NGOs | a. building NGOs’ technical, institutional and organizational capacity; promoting dialogue between |
in support of development (Phillips 2002; Hermier 2004)

b. **FONGS** -- Federation of NGOs in Senegal (Hermier 2004)

- focusing on rural areas, “increase inter-community solidarity, develop the autonomous skills of rural organizations,” training programs, literacy, land management (Hermier 2004)

| Women’s organizations | - **FAFS** (Federation of Women’s Associations of Senegal), represents women’s groups (Phillips 2002)  
- **COSEF** (Hermier 2004)  
- **FDEA** (Hermier 2004)  
- **ASBEF** (Hermier 2004)  
- **Profemu** (Hermier 2004) |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

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<tr>
<th>Youth organizations</th>
<th><strong>CNJS</strong> (National Youth Council of Senegal) and <strong>OJP</strong> (Organization of Pan-African Youth), represent young people’s associations (Phillips 2002)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Human Rights organizations | - **Senegalese Civic League** and **African League of Human Rights** -- umbrella groups for human rights organizations (Phillips 2002)  
- **Civil Forum** (Hermier 2004)  
- **ONDH** (Organisation nationale de droits des hommes) (Beck 2001a) |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

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<tr>
<th>Trade Unions</th>
<th>- <strong>SYNPICS</strong> – national umbrella group for trade unions (Phillips 2002)</th>
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</thead>
</table>
- **Association des jeunes agriculteurs Sénégalais** (Beck 2001a) |
| **Faith-based organizations** | - **Association Nationale des Imams** (Beck 2001a)  
- **Church World Services** (Beck 2001a)  
- **Catholic Relief Services (CRS)** (Beck 2001a) |
Bibliography


