Civil Society Participation and the Governance of Educational Systems in the Context of Sector-Wide Approaches To Basic Education


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1. Introduction

Like other donor organizations, the Canadian International Development Agency is increasingly interested in finding ways to encourage civil society participation in the sector-wide policy processes it supports. CIDA is currently engaged in program-based or sector-wide approaches in education in twelve countries, making education the largest single focal point for Canada's experimentation with these new aid modalities. Education sector PBA initiatives typically revolve around a detailed national education sector reform plan and a sector investment framework (Takala 1998; Riddell 2002; Lavergne and Alba 2003).

In the fall of 2005, CIDA funded an 8-country desk study to help inform its efforts to support civil society participation in education sector-wide programs. The study was carried out by a research team lead by Professor Karen Mundy at the University of Toronto's Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, and supported by a smaller team under Professor Richard Maclure at the University of Ottawa. CIDA and the IDRC have now agreed to fund four field based studies building on this initial desk research.

This report provides a brief overview of the CIDA and IDRC funded research program, and highlights some of the initial findings from the first phase or desk-review portion of the research. The review is preliminary and descriptive – analysis and generalizable findings will be the focus of the next phase in our research.

2. Goals and Design of the CIDA Funded Study

The CIDA funded research has four main goals:

- To provide baseline assessment of the current capacities of civil society organizations in case countries to engage effectively in governance of the education sector.
- To provide insight into the quality and effectiveness of civil society participation in the planning and implementation of sector-wide reform initiatives that CIDA and its development partners are currently pursuing.
- To propose specific mechanisms to enhance the participation of national civil society organizations in the development and implementation of national education sector plans.
- To investigate possibilities for a longer-term collaborative program of support for Southern civil society organizations interested in joining with Southern and Northern research and policy institutions to become more effective education policy advocates and partners.

In addition, the study aims to produce a state-of-the-art piece of comparative research that analyzes issues of governance, educational change and the role of civil society organizations across a series of case countries. Cross-case comparison will be used to better understand the sources of variation in the character, capacity, and scope for civil society participation in education sector policy and governance activities. It will also help identify best practices and model initiatives for civil society engagement in the education sector.
The countries for this study were selected in conjunction with CIDA, with a bias towards those African countries in which CIDA participates in an education sector SWAp. Burkina Faso, Mali, Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Bangladesh, Senegal were selected for the desk-based portion of the study. Discussions between CIDA and the research team have led to the preliminary selection of Kenya, Tanzania, Mali and Burkina Faso for field research in Spring and Summer 2006.

A detailed rubric for data collection and case analysis was prepared for the desk studies and can be found in Appendix A. For each country, the data collected included official documentation from government ministries, I/NGOs and donor organizations, as well as studies of the broader political, social and economic context, the education sector and its reform program, civil society and its formation and place in national politics, and civil society participation in education. More information about the design of the four field-based studies to be conducted during 2006 is available in Appendix B.

3. **Conceptual Frame**

For the purposes of this research, the term "civil society" is used to refer to organized groups or associations which "are separate from the state, enjoy some autonomy in relations from the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests, values or identities." This is the definition employed by Manor, Robinson and White in their Ford Foundation study of civil society and governance. It draws on the sociological conceptualization of civil society as a realm situated between the state and other basic building blocks of society (individuals, families and firms) (Manor and Robinson et. al. 1999; Mercer 2002; Edwards 2004).

A wide range of civil society organizations might be expected to be active in education. Such organizations might include: faith-based or ethnicity-based organizations, parent/teacher associations, community based organizations, national non-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, teachers’ unions or associations, professional and parliamentary organizations, research organizations, organizations representing the rights of women or children, coalitions focused on debt relief or economic justice, as well as research and policy institutes, institutions of higher education and business associations. Some of these organizations will be service providers, others advocacy or representative organizations, or a combination of the two. In addition, we might expect some involvement of political parties in education sector activities - though to be considered “civil society organizations” they would need to be at arms-length from government.

"Governance" is an equally plastic term, probably best understood as the entire universe of activities and relationships between government and civil society that supports the effective, democratic and equitable management of human societies. In our case we utilize the concept of "governance" to signal that the state or national government is not the sole party involved in the design, regulation, ownership, and delivery of education. In each of our case studies, we highlight the extent to which there has been a change in the locus of governance in the education system (Carnoy 1999). We also note how levels of aid dependency and the existence of many international development partners affect the locus or scale of governance in each country.
Our focus, however, is primarily how formal civil society organizations coordinate themselves and seek to influence and engage state institutions in the educational policy arena.

Bringing together these two concepts, governance and civil society, our goal is to do an audit of the kinds of contributions civil society organizations are making to governance in the education sector. We will look for such contributions as:

- Mobilizing constituencies to participate in educational policy setting ("civic engagement").
- Improving transparency and accountability of governmental educational activities through monitoring and advocacy.
- Enhancing state performance by introducing new ideas or models.
- Enhancing state performance by providing services.
- Enhancing state performance by providing a flow of information from community to government and from government to community.
- Mobilizing constituencies to ensure that the educational rights of marginalized or neglected groups are protected, and to advocate for better legislative protection of such rights.
- Mobilizing international material and advocacy resources to support any of the above.

These activities might be undertaken by individual organizations, or coalitions of organizations. They may be widely endorsed or hotly contested; there is no expectation that civil society organizations operate with one voice or around a common set of priorities (Van Rooy 1998; Edwards 2004). The scope of their popular support, as seen in their engagement with local communities and local actors, will be an important research question (Orvis 2001; Lewis 2002). We will also be careful to ask how civil society participation in education sector programs is interacting with emerging institutions of representative democracy in each case country.

Finally, we plan to explore the existence, character and quality of linkages between "civil society" and the educational or social sciences research communities in each case country. Assessing the dynamics of such relationships is particularly important because the capacity of civil society to engage in evidence-based policy advocacy is frequently seen as one of the main limitations facing effective civil society engagement in public policy.

4. Civil Society and Education in the Context of SWAPS - a Literature Review

Little has been written about the quality and effectiveness of civil society participation in the planning and implementation of sector-wide reform initiatives. Most research on civil society and education to date has tended to focus on another, related issue: the potential for community-level management structures to improve the quality of educational services. Research on this topic has varied in its conclusions. Many donor organizations endorse the decentralization of educational systems and advocate for a stronger role for local communities (Birdsall, Levine et al. 2005). They argue that "greater participation of parents and communities in education of their children...plays a central role in stimulating education at a local level, in building pressure for improving quality, and in developing accountability. (DFID 2001:19). Empirical studies, however, have varied in their conclusions about the efficacy of community-level management. There are clearly many cases in which community participation fails to improve quality, proves more costly than centralized management, and reinforces local power structures (Bray 2003;
Rose 2003; Pryor 2005; Dyer and Rose 2005; Mfum-Mensah 2004; Barrs 2005; Chapman 2002, 2005; Davies 2002; Miller-Grandvaux et. al., 2002a; Miller-Grandvaux and Yoder 2002b; De Grauwe 2004). The relationship between new forms of community participation in education and the development of more participatory and engaged national-level policy making in the sector has not been much researched.

Increasingly however, both civil society organizations and official aid organizations have argued that civil society participation must go beyond the engagement of local level communities in school management. In 1999, in the lead-up to the Dakar conference on Education for All, civil society organizations themselves led the call for greater and wider participation in EFA plans and programs. A coalition of international NGOs and teachers’ unions, the Global Campaign for Education, was formed to act as an advocacy and capacity-development organization to support civil society participation in national and international education for all initiatives. The GCE now has representation at most international donor meetings on education (e.g., the Fast Track Initiative, the UNESCO-based Education for All Advisory Board, the Commonwealth Education Fund). It is closely linked to several regional NGO coalitions, including the African Network Coalition on Education for All (ANCEFA). These organizations are gaining widespread prominence in the education for development planning processes, and have stimulated the formation of many national-level EFA civil society coalitions. The goals of emergent national coalitions include the pooling of knowledge and innovation; stronger engagement in national policy-setting and monitoring of impacts; and advocacy for marginalized populations (CEF 2005). They are also clearly committed to using international campaigning to bring about domestic change (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mundy and Murphy 2001; ActionAid 2004; Miller-Grandvaux et al. 2002a: 51). However, questions have been raised about the extent to which national coalitions develop approaches that reflect local issues and interests, as opposed to replicating transnational goals set by international networks (Murphy and Mundy 2001).

For official development agencies, the advent of sector-wide programs and new aid modalities favouring direct budgetary support has also led to calls for civil society to play an important part in holding national governments accountable (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001). Donors expect civil society organizations to participate in and authenticate the development of Poverty Reduction Strategies and other national plans (Caillods and Hallak 2004; Buchert 2002). Not surprisingly, it has become routine for civil society organizations to have a seat at national meetings where education sector plans are discussed with donors (Kuder 2004; Murphy 2005). Indeed, under the Fast Track Initiative (one of the most important of the new mechanisms supporting donor harmonization and the use of sector modalities for aid), involvement of civil society in sector planning is a requirement (Rose 2005a; EFA/FTI 2004). Donor organizations continue to support strong decentralization and local community participation (often through direct funding of NGO or community schools). Doftori and Takala (2005) suggest that a major question facing donors is whether direct financial support for education NGOs can be justified alongside commitment to sector programs. Mundy (2005) points out that there has been limited attention to how the direct accountability enabled through community participation in school provision and management can support national-level civil society activism, advocacy and accountability efforts in the context of SWAps (Mundy 2005; Doftori and Takala 2005). For the most part, donors have not integrated or explored synergies between the direct support they provide for
INGO-led schools and their new sector-wide approach to bilateral aid (for example, see Kruse 2003: 44, on Netherlands).

Several recent national studies offer insight into the quality, effectiveness, and character of civil society participation in national sector-wide programs and policy processes in education. Case studies on the education policy process in Tanzania (Kuder 2004), Uganda (Murphy 2005), Zambia (Lexow 2003), Bangladesh (Mia 2004) and Malawi (Rose 2003, 2005b), raise serious questions about the quality and effectiveness of civil society participation in the planning and implementation of sector-wide reform initiatives. From these studies, it appears that civil society capacity to engage in evidence-based policy advocacy in education is weak. Formal organizations of civil society lack the habit of working together and often have no previous experience with policy analysis or advocacy. In some cases there are distinct cleavages between civil society organizations and their goals, for example between teachers’ unions and those NGOs that directly provide educational services using non-unionized staff. Without the analytical or organizational capacity to introduce new ideas and make credible criticisms, civil society organizations play little effective part in the governance of education sector reforms.

Many recent studies go even further to suggest that sector-wide programs and internationally set targets such as those established by the Fast Track Initiative may actually crowd out the development of effective local ownership and NGO participation (Kuder 2004, Rose 2005a, Murphy 2005, Caillod and Hallak 2004, Takala and Marope 2002, King 2004, Samoff 1999, 2004; Buchert 2002; Riddell 2002; Freeman and Dohoo Faure 2003). This happens in two ways. First, elaborate policy processes, such as Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks, are increasingly conducted by technical experts inside ministries and supported by experts from international organizations, with civil society organizations either disengaged, or not technically able to engage (see the 18-country study on education and PRSP's by Caillods and Hallak 2004; also Gould and Onajen 2003). PBA and SWAp initiatives may too often concentrate resources on building the policy capacity of national ministries, sidelining the voice of community and NGO sectors.

Governments may also attempt to limit or direct civil society participation. A stakeholder analysis undertaken by Miller-Grandvaux et al (2002a) Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi and Mali, provides detailed examples of the ways in which NGOs and INGOs are trying to gain a seat at the education policy table, pointing out that misunderstandings on both sides seem to block effective engagement. Lexow (2003), Kuder (2004), and Murphy (2005) point out a tendency on the part of governments to use civil society participation to legitimate plans rather than to generate them. Mia (2004) and Kuder (2004) offer examples of governments overtly attempting to block or control NGO participation. Such findings are echoed in recent empirical studies of civil society participation in PRSP processes and SWAp's more generally. For example, Tomlinson and Foster (2004), Gould and Ojanen (2003), and Brock et al (2002a, 2002b), found that civil society participation is often an afterthought, and sometimes blocked or restricted.

Most studies hypothesize a direct relationship between the effectiveness of civil society organizations in providing services to marginalized populations and the capacity of civil society to play an effective role in national policies and programmes (Archer 1994; Swift 2000; Miller-Grandvaux et. al. 2002a; Lexow 2003). However, many studies have also suggested a tension
between NGO's abilities to represent local communities or be effective service providers, and their new efforts at national-level policy engagement (Archer 1994; Bray 2003; Rose 2003). Such findings are echoed in the PRSP studies by Brock et al. (2002b) and McGee (2002) which conclude that NGOs engaged in national-level policy processes often neglect the development of their unique capacity to represent local concerns and relay information to and from the grassroots. In addition, Brock et al. (2002a) McGee (2002), suggest that civil society organizations rarely make use of national media or parliamentary members or their associations. Failure to engage formal democratic structures is particularly worrying in contexts where parliamentary debate and engagement in PRPS processes is also very limited (as is the case across Africa according to Draman and Langdon 2005).

More positive assessment, however, can be found in a recent evaluation of the Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF 2005), summarizing the activities of EFA-NGO coalitions it has supported in 16 Commonwealth countries. The findings of the CEF Global Mid-term review highlight the emergence of national coalitions that encourage a new way of working among NGOs and community organizations, whereby they share and pool learning and take on a stronger policy role. In many cases these new coalitions have introduced new and sophisticated forms of policy engagement - for example, education budget-tracking exercises, or preparation of an alternative budget. Some of the coalitions (Elimu Yetu in Kenya and Maarifa ni Ufunguo in Tanzania, for example) have produced important pieces of policy research on the costs of schooling and the quality of educational services reaching very poor or marginalized populations (Maarifa 2000; CEF 2005). Many of the CEF supported coalitions appear to have successfully engaged with parliamentarians, the media, and wider civil society networks engaged in debates about poverty, development aid, debt and macro-economic policies. Nonetheless, the CEF notes the following shortcomings:

- Development of a national coalition takes longer than the CEF program predicted. The strongest coalitions (e.g. Bangladesh) are clearly the oldest.
- Teachers unions are typically weak and sometimes contentious partners in the coalitions.
- Relationships between the coalitions and parent-teacher and school-based management committees are under-developed.
- The new civil society coalitions have little engagement with donors and donor frameworks - they do not aggressively advocate for more or better aid.
- Innovations and lessons from one coalition seldom diffused to other national coalitions - important opportunities for learning are lost.
- NGOs are still uncertain about the right balance between direct service-delivery as versus roles that support improvement in the publicly-provided education system.
- The coalitions themselves have not developed a clear programme to support the "scaling up" of their innovations for use in the public system.

We could find virtually no research that attempted to develop robust causal relationships between specific political, cultural and economic factors and the level, scope, effectiveness or character of civil society participation in education sector policy-setting in different national contexts. However, writing about SWAp more generally, Kruse (2003: ii) concludes that the level of civil society participation in SWAp processes "seems positively correlated with the
maturity and strength of civil society" which in turn is shaped by the historical existence or lack of stable democratic government.”(Kruse 2003)

In our desk review we discovered one other research team interested in civil society participation in education SWAps: a Finnish group led by Professor Tuomas Takala and Dr. Mojibur Doftori. Their team is currently undertaking research on partnerships effectiveness and impact in education sector programs in Bolivia, Kenya, Nepal, Tanzania and Zambia. We have initiated an exchange of research findings with this team.

5. Findings from the Desk Reviews

In the next sections, we briefly review our findings from a desk review of official documents and secondary literature related to sector-wide programs, educational reform, and civil society participation in educational policy in 7 countries (Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Mozambique and Bangladesh). Each review briefly situates current education sector reforms in the context of national political economy, and then discusses both the (limited) secondary evidence of civil society participation found in education SWAps, and any secondary literature on the character of civil society/state relationships in that country.

a) The Mali Case

Mali is a new (1992) but relatively vibrant and open democracy, with high levels of rural poverty and a primary gross enrollment ratio of 58.4% (World Bank n.d.). There is “virtually no organized political opposition,” and the government rules based on consensus and collective decision-making – although this does raise questions about the quality of political debate (OECD 2004: 15). This said, the country has free broadcast and print media (BBC n.d.). A relatively diverse constituency of NGOs act as a well-established voice in politics (Miller-Grandvaux et al 2002). Many local as well as international NGOs are involved directly in the delivery of rural health and education services to the poor. The literature suggests that Malian politics are still influenced by relationships of patrimonialism (Danté, Gautier et al. 2001), but offers little insight into the interface between these relationships and the growing NGO sector.

In 1999, Mali launched a 10-year sector-wide educational reform program, *Programme décennal pour le développement de l’éducation* (PRODEC). Amongst the main objectives of PRODEC is to increase Mali’s gross primary enrollment ratio to 95% in 2010, from 42% in 2000 (Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale du Mali 2001). At least 15 multilateral and bilateral donor organizations support this sector program through a sector investment framework (PISE, *Programme d’investissement sectoriel de l’éducation*), including the World Bank, Canada, Belgium, France, African Development Bank, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, USA, European Commission, Banque Islamique, and NORAD – with USAID as the lead donor (World Bank FTI n.d.). The EU, Netherlands, and Sweden fund PRODEC through budget support, while other donors are supporting sub-programs (World Bank Country Department for Mali 2003). Mali is one of CIDA’s 25 priority countries, and Canada is considering provision of budgetary support for Mali’s education sector program (CIDA n.d.).
Mali was one of the first West African countries to develop a widespread community schools movement. Between 1995 and 2002, the number of community schools rose from 176 to 2344, representing more than 1/4 of all primary schools in the country (CLIC n.d.; Tounkara 2001). External donors and their funding supported this rapid expansion of INGO and community-led schools. They also played a role in the decision by the Malian government to afford community schools legal recognition, funding, and pedagogical support (Boukary 1999; Miller-Grandvaux et al 2002). In the design and launch of PRODEC, Mali’s ten-year education sector plan, the Malian government recognized the important role that had been played by the NGO-led community schools movement; it called upon non-governmental actors to incorporate their educational innovations into the wider education system, and to participate in PRODEC design, implementation and monitoring committees (Tounkara 2001, Miller-Grandvaux et al 2002, Capacci Carneal 2004, Tounkara 2005).

However, there have been tensions within the community schools movement from its inception – over the balance between local relevance vs. compatibility with the formal system, and over the development of a parallel system funded by the poorest communities and external organizations (Capacci Carneal 2004; Miller-Grandvaux et. al 2002). Despite recognition by the government, the community schools movement has been opposed both by teachers’ unions in Mali and at times by the National Federation of Associations des Parents d’élèves (Tounkara 2001).

The Malian government also committed itself to a process of decentralization in PRODEC. In certain other West African countries, decentralization emphasizes the administrative deconcentration of authority from government ministries to their own sectoral field staff. In Mali, however, decentralization also has a strong emphasis on the devolution of resources and decision-making power to local authorities elected by the people (Land and Hauck 2003). Although the shift of resources and power from the ministerial and central state levels in education is far from complete (USAID 2002), educational structures at the commune, cercle and regional levels now have responsibility for both non-formal and formal education, and new school management committees have been set up (Diarra 2003, Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale du Mali 2004). We could locate little research on the changing character of relationships between NGOs and the newly-elected local educational authorities, but many INGOs appear to have played strong roles in building stronger community capacity to participate in school-level management in the 1990s. Decentralization has the potential to open up new avenues for local NGO participation. However, teachers’ unions, who have voiced their priorities strongly to the Malian government in the past, have been opposed to NGO-provided schooling (Tounkara 2001, Miller-Grandvaux et al. 2002) and particularly, to the hiring of contractual teachers.

In the mid-1990’s the formation of a national consortium of NGOs involved in education, Groupe Pivot Éducation, marked the beginning of civil society coalition-building in the education sector. Since 1995, there has been active civil society involvement in the education policy arena, often supported by external donor organizations (INGOs and bilateral). Mali has a national EFA/GCE coalition and hosts a regional GCE network ASSAFE (L’association du Sahel d’Aide à la Femme et à l’Enfance) and OEB/CEDEAO, an Observatory on Basic Education for the Economic Community of West Africa States (CCNGO/EFA 2001). These types of new EFA and GCE coalitions appear to have aims somewhat dissimilar to those of Groupe Pivot, in that...
they call more directly for public participation in national public policy-making and give less emphasis to the expansion and recognition of community schools. In addition to NGO coalitions, Mali is host to ROCARE, an educational research network that provides high-quality policy analysis. ROCARE played a significant role in the development of PRODEC and has been involved in evaluating the quality of education in community schools (Tounkara 2000; Tounkara et al. 2001). In addition, ROCARE operated a USAID-funded training and organizing program for national advocacy teams to make use of research results produced by national ROCARE offices (Tounkara 2005).

Overall, NGOs in Mali, as well as ROCARE, appear to have a well-institutionalized place in education policy discussions (Miller-Grandvaux et al. 2002; Tounkara 2005). This does not mean that their role is univocal or uncontested. In addition, we know relatively little about the role of other civil society organizations in education policy processes. Sector programming, aimed at extending Mali’s mass public education system, appears to open the door to greater partnership between NGOs and government. But government-led expansion might also threaten the autonomy of the NGO-led community schools movement. The sectoral reform program raises the need for stronger cross-community linkages between civil society organizations and for greater civil society capacity within recently-established local educational authorities. The literature offers little indication of the way in which NGOs and other civil society organizations are managing these competing demands.

b) The Burkina Faso Case

Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in the Sahel region of West Africa with an estimated population of 13.5 million inhabitants, of whom approximately 56% are under the age of 18 years. Since its formal independence in 1960, control of the state in Burkina Faso has alternated between a series of military regimes and nominally elected civilian governments. With a per capita GNP equivalent to about US $300 and a largely rural economy characterized mainly by labour intensive agriculture, Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world (CIDA, 2004). In 2003 an estimated 46.4% of its population lived within the internationally designated status of absolute poverty, and in 2005 Burkina ranked 175th out of 177 countries in the UNDP’s Human Development Index (UNDP, 2004).

Given the dearth of its resources and a birth rate of more than 2% per year, Burkina Faso has been severely limited in its capacity to expand and improve its educational system. Despite regularly allocating a large proportion of its public sector budget for education over the last three decades, by 2001 the gross primary school enrolment rate in Burkina Faso was estimated to be only 43% (with female enrolments at approximately 34%) (UNESCO, 2004). Even more starkly, the level of overall literacy in the country was estimated at 26% (Ibid.). By the end of the last decade, therefore, it was clear that the state in Burkina Faso was severely limited in its capacity to expand and improve basic education and that organs of civil society had to be increasingly engaged in processes of educational planning, finance, administration, and reform.
Basic education in Burkina Faso is officially regarded as comprising three components: a) primary schooling for children aged seven to 12 years; b) pre-schooling for children aged three to six years; and c) non-formal literacy training for adolescents and adults. Of these three, primary schooling receives the lion’s share of public expenditures. The main body of the primary school system consists of state-funded and administered “classical schools” (écoles classiques) that offer a conventional subject-based curriculum (e.g., history, geography, mathematics, literature) in the French language and have retained more or less the same structure since the 1960s. In recent years, in an effort to enhance the efficiency of the public system, two innovations have been adopted: multi-grade teaching in some rural areas where enrolment levels have been relatively low and early school leaver rates have been high, and double-cohort classes in urban areas where demand for schooling has tended to outstrip infrastructural capacity and the availability of teachers for large numbers of students. These modifications, however, have done little to redress the perennial and widely recognized weakness of state primary schooling: the gap between the rhetoric of schooling as a source of cognitive and affective growth, and the continuing reality of didactic, largely abstract curriculum content and authoritarian rote-oriented pedagogy (ADEA, 2003). Additional qualitative deficiencies include shortages of fully-trained primary school teachers, inadequate supplies of books and learning materials, insufficient pedagogical supervision and support, and persistently high levels of repetition and early leaver rates (MEBA, 2005; World Bank, 2000).

Partly in response to the weaknesses of the public system, there has been a steady growth of private schooling in Burkina Faso. Essentially, there are two types of private school: a) those that attract and are sustained by well-to-do urban families; and b) those that are deemed to be “last chance” schools for children who generally have been unable to pass either the primary school leaving examination or the secondary school entrance examination (Faure et al., 2003). In addition, within the last decade efforts to foster community-based schooling have made some inroads, largely through the assistance of international donors such as UNICEF and the Oeuvre Suisse d’Entraide Ouvrière (OSEO). Generally these schools differ from mainstream “classical” schools through their use of indigenous languages as media of instruction, their reliance on teachers who are hired by host communities rather than by the government, and by greater local community involvement in school management (Ilbouda, 2002).

Apart from primary schooling, the two other realms of basic education in Burkina Faso – pre-schooling and literacy training – are far less developed. Pre-schooling in particular has proceeded very slowly, largely because of resource scarcity and a general lack of conviction about the value of pre-school education (Faure, et al., 2003). In contrast, indigenous language literacy training has been steadily expanding since the mid-1970s, and has entailed the broadest forms of collaboration among civil society organizations, international NGOs, and the government’s Institut National de l’Alphabétisation (INA). Yet indigenous language literacy training remains hampered by questions about its long-term utility and status. On average one out every four persons who begins a literacy course abandons it before completion, and many who achieve a level of functional literacy at the end of their initial training eventually lapse into illiteracy for want of the need or the opportunity to practice these skills (Belloncle, 1998).

In 1996, the government passed la Loi d’Orientation de l’Éducation that gave priority to basic education as an engine of development. The following year, the government embarked on its
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that was finally adopted in June 2000. As stipulated in the PRSP basic education is a social sector priority that is essential to poverty reduction. To this end, the Ministère de l’Enseignement de Base et de l’Alphabétisation (MEBA) concurrently began to develop a 10-year plan, le Plan Décaennal pour le Développement de l’Éducation de Base (PDDEB) that was officially approved by the National Assembly at the end of 1999. The main goals of the PDDEB are: a) to achieve an overall 70% gross primary school enrolment rate by 2010, and a corresponding female enrolment level of 65%; b) to enhance the quality, relevance and efficiency of basic education through improvements in curriculum content, classroom pedagogy, and methods of assessment; and c) to achieve a 40% national literacy level by 2010 through the expansion and intensification of literacy programmes (MEBA, 1999).

As international donor agencies have endorsed the PRSP and the PDDEB, additional funds for basic education have been earmarked from debt relief arrangements under the terms of Burkina Faso’s Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) status, and from the recent Fast Track Initiative (FTI) that is associated with the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary school completion (UPC) by 2015. In addition, a key operational principle underlying the PDDEB is that the expansion and improvement of basic education will require ever-greater engagement of civil society organizations (CSOs) that are capable of working in concert with regional and central levels of government in accordance with the terms of the 10-year plan (Ilboudo et al., 2001).

In Burkina a vast array of civil society organizations has long been involved in various aspects of basic education – parents’ groups (les Associations des Parents d’Élèves [APE] and les Associations des Mères d’Élèves [AME]); teachers unions; religious organizations; national NGOs; and regional and international NGOs, almost all of which are heavily staffed by Burkinabè nationals. Their engagement takes many forms, ranging from administrative and pedagogical input, to financial, technical, and material support. Their relations with the state vary considerably as well. Many act in a partnership capacity, providing social services in adherence to ministerial norms and regulations. Others, however, scrupulously retain their autonomy from government authority, and on occasion some are openly critical of state directives (Pilon, 2002). Teachers unions in particular, of which there are eight in Burkina Faso, have frequently assumed an oppositional stance to the central government, generally in response to policy directions that are perceived as threatening to the status and livelihoods of teachers (Barro, 2002).

Ironically, however, despite the range of CSOs in Burkina Faso and repeated policy pronouncements regarding the significance of civil society in basic education, the central government has been slow to encourage the involvement of NGOs and community groups in educational policy-making, especially in the realm of formal schooling (Vellutini, et al., 2001). This was evident in the development of the PDDEB. Although the government worked closely with the international donor community in developing the 10-year plan, CSOs were largely excluded from PDDEB planning deliberations and decision-making. Similarly, most major multilateral and bilateral agencies have had relatively limited contact with CSOs outside the capital of Ouagadougou (Faure, et al., 2003).
Nevertheless, beyond the centralized forums of educational policy-making, CSOs have become increasingly visible and active. Most have established partnership arrangements with international NGOs (upon which they invariably depend for financial assistance) and this has contributed substantially to the development of nonformal basic education in the country. Under the auspices of the PDDEB the Cadre de concertation des ONG/Associations en éducation de base au Burkina Faso (CCEB/BF) was established to facilitate the coordination of NGOs working in basic education. With over 50 institutional members, its objectives are to maintain a profile of NGO activity, to exchange information and experiences, to harmonize nongovernmental activities in basic education, and to function as the collective voice of NGOs in dialogue with government.

In addition, in order to expand indigenous language literacy training and to foster supportive environments for wider retention and application of indigenous literacy skills, a competitive grants literacy fund – Fonds pour l’alphabétisation et l’éducation nonformelle (FONAENF) – has been established as a feature of the PDDEB. Overseen by a steering committee of representatives from government, international donor agencies, and civil society, the fund is an out-sourcing (“faire-faire”) mechanism whereby CSOs will continue to serve as the providers of literacy and other forms of nonformal education under contract with host communities and the MEBA (Diagne, 2001). A key premise of the FONENF is that literacy training centres can gradually evolve into comprehensive community education programmes offering diverse forms of education to suit the learning needs of diverse populations of all ages (ADEA, 2003).

While these developments reflect incremental decentralization and a broadening stakeholder base, the engagement of civil society organizations is nonetheless complex and painstaking, and cannot be regarded as a panacea for overcoming fundamental educational challenges. In part, this is because historically many Burkinabès have understandably regarded schooling not as an indigenous institution over which they have felt a strong sense of ownership, but rather as an exogenous system of modernity administered by the state and strongly supported by international agencies (Maclure, 1994). In these circumstances, efforts to pass on responsibilities for greater administration and financial support of schooling to local communities continues to be problematic, especially when many communities are poor and have high levels of illiteracy. Without the appropriate technical capacities, institutional foundations, and resource bases, many village societies in Burkina Faso are ill-prepared to undertake substantial ownership of schools to which they are enjoined to send their children (Faure, et al., 2003; Pilon, 2002). Moreover, in light of the broad range and agendas of CSOs and their often heavy dependence on foreign aid, the degree to which civil society cohesiveness in basic education policies and practices (e.g., through the CCEB/BF) can be fostered and maintained remains a moot point (Kere, 2002).

The implementation of the PDDEB, therefore, has generated a burgeoning conundrum for a resource-poor government and an external agency community that appears to have been slowly backing into long-term budgetary support. With the national economy unlikely to generate vast increases in public and private resources, Burkina Faso is unlikely to achieve its PDDEB targets in spite of the additional HIPC and FTI resources that are proposed for basic education (Global Campaign for Education, 2005). While educational privatization offers some fiscal relief, in general private schooling will remain relatively small-scale and will be beneficial mainly to affluent urban families. Expectations of civil society’s role in basic education are therefore high.
At the very least, substantial training and technical support for parents’ associations and other civic groups are essential if civic engagement in basic education is to be expanded and sustained. Nevertheless, given the abiding internal and external constraints affecting the quality of primary schooling, for the foreseeable future the expansion and qualitative improvement of basic education will continue to command substantial financial resources from the government of Burkina Faso and the international aid community.

c) The Kenya Case

Kenya, which became independent from British rule in 1963, is one of East Africa’s more politically-stable countries. The election of Mwai Kibaki’s multiethnic National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002 ended nearly 40 years of KANU (Kenya Africa National Union) rule and marked an important transition in Kenyan politics. The post-2002 political landscape has created greater space for participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) and led to the emergence of a stronger civil society. Nonetheless, relations between the state and print and broadcast media in Kenya are still not entirely free. As in many other African contexts, the shift to participatory democracy and political pluralism in Kenya has been problematic because ethnic and class cleavages continue to dominate political parties (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, Orvis, 2001).

Furthermore, there continue to be several pressing challenges facing the country, including corruption and poverty. About 57 percent of the population lives at or below the poverty level on less than $1 per day and Kenya’s GINI index is 44.9 (CIA Factbook, 2004), whereas its GNI per capita is US$460 (World Bank, 2005). Kenya’s Human development index (HDI) ranking is 154th of 177 countries (HDR, 2005). While poverty is predominantly concentrated in rural areas and arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) and urban slums; there are also widespread inequalities within regions. Transparency International rank’s Kenya 129th out of 145 countries on its corruption perception index, suggesting weak trust between citizens and the formal apparatuses of government (Transparency International Report 2004). CIDA suspended the Kenya country support programme in 1997, but has reinstated it as one of CIDA’s 25 priority countries with bilateral support to the priorities identified in the country’s PRSP. However, good governance continues to be a challenge, for example, in February 2006, allegations of corruption in the ruling government have led to several key ministers resigning from office, including the Education Minister.

One of the key pre-election promises that brought NARC to power in December 2002 was the provision of free and compulsory primary education (FPE) for Kenyan children. In January 2003, NARC delivered on its election promise and waived user fees for primary education. Following the implementation of FPE, 1.2 million out-of-school children were absorbed in formal primary schools and 200,000 in Non-formal education (NFE) centers. There are about 18,500 primary schools in the country and Kenya’s gross enrollment ratio for the primary level rose from 88.2% in 2002 to 104.8 % in 2004, and secondary level is 38.3 % (Ministry of Education, Public Expenditure Review and Medium Term Expenditure Framework, MOEST 2006). Even with the provision of FPE, however, there are still about one million children (mostly from arid and semi-arid areas and urban slums, girls, children in difficult circumstances, and those from marginalized/vulnerable groups) who are not in school (MOEST, 2006). NFE
centers therefore reach these out-of-school children, and it is estimated that about 350,000 children are currently enrolled in Non-formal Schools (NFS) and NFE institutions (MOEST, 2006). At present, however, the NFE sector is not yet fully recognized by the Kenyan government although the Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MOEST) defines NFE as “Flexible complementary delivery channels of quality basic education to children in especially difficult circumstances…” (MOEST, 2005a). The main challenges facing NFE relate to the low quality of education offered and lack of linkage with the formal education system. The sub-sector also suffers from inadequate teaching and learning resources, poor physical facilities and low prioritization by Government in terms of budgetary allocations (Gathenya, 2005).

Kenya’s national education sector plan, the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP) for the period of 2005-2010, was negotiated through consultation with “all stakeholders including communities, civil society, Community Based Organisations (CBOs), NGOs, other Government institutions, development partners and the private sector” (MOEST, 2005b). While KESSP offers official recognition of the partnership role of NGOs, CBOs and FBOs but we could find no further documentation on the nature or extent of their participation in the formulation or implementation of the KESSP. KESSP is made up of 23 investment programs that aim to help improve access and quality of education across the country. The broad objective of KESSP is to give every Kenyan the right to quality education and training no matter his/her socioeconomic status through the provision of an all-inclusive quality education that is accessible and relevant to all Kenyans (MOEST, 2005b). The MOEST takes the lead for KESSP’s implementation and also leads the donor coordination process. The education donor coordination group (EDCG) is presently co-chaired by Dfid and UNICEF. The World Bank/IDA (with a proposed amount of US$50million) and DFID (US$100 Million) are the main donors supporting KESSP through pooled funding. CIDA and UNICEF are other potential pooled fund partners. In 2005, Kenya became the 16th country to join the Fast-Track Initiative and the Education for All- Fast Track Initiative’s (FTI) Catalytic Fund will contribute to KESSP with the funds flowing directly to schools to allow for immediate local purchase and distribution of teaching and learning materials (World Bank, 2005). In order to support KESSP, the MOEST has been restructured, with the appointment of an education secretary along with five directors of education. The MOEST has also developed comprehensive horizontal and vertical accountability structures, including soon to be introduced mechanisms for school level accountability, through publicly available School Report Cards.

Civil society in Kenya has a long history of service provision in education. Much of the educational expansion in the first two decades after independence was a result of community organizations and churches. The Harambee (‘let’s pull together’) movement was instrumental in building secondary schools, furnishing them and employing teachers, through investments by parent associations, churches and private funding until the government took over the running of these schools in 1990s. Today, international and local NGOs are active in the development of Non-Formal Education (NFE) centers in Kenya, and they also provide facilities and resources for to primary schools in poor or marginalized areas of the country. Much of their work is done in partnership with local communities. For example, Action-Aid Kenya provides school facilities and learning materials to four primary schools within the Kariobangi slums, the Christian Children’s Fund has similar projects in Samburu and Oxfam in Kenya supports the non-formal education system enabling the children of nomadic herders to attend school. (Oxfam, 2005).
In recent years, INGOs and NGOs in Kenya have come together to form a national coalition to advocate for educational policy that meets the needs of marginalized communities and children. The Elimu Yetu Coalition (EYC), formed in 1999, comprises about 110 civil society organizations, professional groupings, education research institutions and other practitioners in the education sector. EYC is a member of the Africa Network Campaign on EFA (ANCEFA), the Global Campaign for Education (GCE), and is one of the thirteen partner organizations of the Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF) in Kenya. EYC has been actively involved in EFA planning and monitoring and has engaged members in budget tracking and expenditure monitoring activities. The coalition also supports policy-oriented studies. We do know that CSOs, and in particular Elimu Yetu has been invited to participate in major Government of Kenya policy setting activities, and that a task force of key CSO actors in education has been formed to work out the modalities of implementing FPE (CEF, 2003; 2005). The KESSP appears to be creating a new political space for CSO engagement in the education policy process, most notably through an education stakeholder’s forum that brings government officials together with representatives from NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, Unions, and private sector service providers. However, it is not clear from the literature if the participation of CSOs is largely limited to specific reform initiatives or has become institutionalized as an ongoing process of meaningful engagement that is able to contribute to education policy formulation and implementation in a more substantive way. Nor does the literature show how representative the new coalitions or consultation mechanisms are. Similarly while there is documentation on wage disputes and teacher shortages involving the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT), we could not find research documenting the involvement of teachers’ unions in advocacy issues around EFA.

In general, while organized civil society activity in Kenya expanded considerably following the political transition in 2002 (Ndewga, 2003) the existing literature on the current character of Kenyan civil society is rather slim. Tensions between service provision and advocacy roles played by INGOs and NGOs are certainly present, as are ethnic and class schisms within civil society as a whole. It appears that even with a multi-party system, ethnic and personal schisms continue to render the opposition party and parts of civil society ineffective, and consequently undermine solidarity (Matanga, 2000; Kibaba, 2004; Ogachi, 2002). Certain ethnic groups may be marginalized by civil society itself: for example, pastoralist/nomadic communities do not seem to be adequately represented. As in the Mali case, it is unclear how new forms of civil society/NGO coalition building interface with the broader social and political tensions in Kenyan society.

d) The Tanzanian Case

Tanzania is a newly democratic state (1995) with a strong socialist history. The Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has been in power since independence (1961), originally led by Julius Nyerere who fostered national self-reliance and African socialism. Facing economic crisis in 1985, Nyerere resigned and the CCM made a major shift towards a liberal trade-oriented market and a multi-party democracy. Although formal opposition parties were allowed as of 1995, the CCM has maintained dominance in politics at both the national and local levels. The new CCM leader, Jakaya Kikwete, was elected President of the country in December 2005.
Tanzania ranks a low 164/177 on the Human Development Index 2005, with most of its poverty concentrated in rural areas. In addition to poverty, its main concerns include its dependence on foreign aid (45% of its budget came from donors in 2003); high levels of debt; and a mounting HIV/AIDS epidemic. The country has seen a significant level of economic growth since 2002, but this growth has not been in the agricultural sector that supports the majority of Tanzanians. Tanzania’s primary gross enrolment ratio rose from 85.4% in 2001 to 109% in 2005 (Khainga et al, 2005). However, the gap in access to primary education is still great for vulnerable and marginalized groups, as well as at the secondary and tertiary levels, where gross enrollment ratios were 5.5% and 0.9% (URT, 2005).

In 2001 Tanzania initiated its Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP). The sector program called for the decentralization of the education system. In contrast to the traditional top-down management by Regional Administrations, the School Councils have now been vested with the responsibility of preparing budgets and school plans, managing funds and salaries and preparing financial reports. The ministries maintain responsibility for policy, standards and monitoring. Although this new arrangement hopes for more parental involvement, this may be thwarted by the composition of the School Councils, which favors representation from party-controlled village council members (Therkildsen 2000). The ESDP also encourages participation by a greater variety of stakeholders in the policy process, including donors, civil society and private sector representatives. Specific targets for the primary level are set out in the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). The PEDP has been the main focus for donor funding and coordination for the past five years, although donor support is found throughout the education sub-sectors. Foreign funding accounted for 96.6% of the Development Expenditure (actual) in 2003/04 (Khainga 2005), which amounts to 55.8% of the Total Expenditure in education. The last available data shows Canada as the lead donor, in coordination with the World Bank, the African Development Bank, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the European Council (World Bank n.d.). Tanzania is one of CIDA’s 25 priority countries, and Canada provides budgetary support to PEDP.

In Tanzania, the government has vacillated in the space it is willing to allow autonomous civil society actors and the media. Civil society participation in poverty-reduction and sector policies (PRSP, ESDP, PEDP, NSGRP etc.) has been highlighted in official policy rhetoric since 2000. Donors, particularly CIDA, SIDA and NOVIB, have been instrumental in supporting both civil society growth (through funding) and voice (through support for policy space). However, the literature is peppered with criticisms that the NGOs are predominantly urban-based and elite-led; and that there has been a marginalization of NGOs with more radical views, opting for those willing to “rubber-stamp” initiatives (Evans & Ngalwea 2001; Lange et al. 2000; Mercer 2003; Sumra 2005). In addition, official legislation requires that NGOs register with the government, and threatens deregistration of NGOs that are deemed too political or that undertake activities outside their stated mandate. In 1997, this allowed for deregistration of a successful women’s organization, BAWATA (Tripp 2000). In 2005, the government threatened to deregister the influential education advocacy NGO, Haki Elimu, for undertaking research and publication regarding Tanzanian schools that it deemed “political.” This may have been influenced more by certain Haki Elimu members’ sympathies with the opposition party than by the organizations actual research in education.
Civil society organizations in Tanzania are involved in educational service provision and in community based education projects, but there is limited research on this subject. Non-governmental schools (both private and community) have grown rapidly since the 1980s – a third of all secondary schools were run by non-government providers as of 1998 (Chediel et al. 2000); it is unclear how these service providers have been affected by the ESDP. Under decentralization, new school committees have been vested with the responsibility of preparing budgets and managing school funds. However, their capacity to do so has been called into question (Sumra 2005; Galabawa 2002). At the community level, participation still predominantly revolves around parental contributions to school construction (Therkildsen, 2000).

Tanzania has one of the most well developed national Education for All NGO coalitions in Africa. TENMET, the Tanzanian Education Network, was formed in 1999. It has grown from an initial membership of 31 organizations to represent 161 civil society groups involved in education in 2005. TENMET is linked to several other well developed NGO networks in Tanzania and played a role in coordinating the education NGO input into the PRSP and NGO led debt relief campaigns. TENMET is also formally connected internationally to GCE, ANCEFA and the CEF. The nine Steering Committee members of TENMET are purposively balanced to represent urban/rural, international/national, and regional actors (TENMET 2005a, 2005b). In addition to TENMET, Tanzania is host to Haki Elimu, an influential body founded by 13 prominent Tanzanians to advance public engagement in educational policy. The Tanzanian Teachers’ Union current involvement in the coalition appears to have been marginal. Furthermore it appears that the TTU has had only limited engagement in the formulation and implementation of the PEDP and has typically engaged government primarily around wage issues (Kuder 2004; Swai 2004).

TENMET coalition members have been active in research-based policy alternatives and policy monitoring. In 2001, NGO Maarifa ni Ufunguo published an empirical, participatory case study on the effects of school fees in Kilimanjaro, which was widely publicized internationally. The research was used by U.S NGOs in their successful bid to have US legislation introduced blocking US governmental support to any World Bank activity that supports user fees. The report contributed to the Tanzanian government’s decision to abolish school fees in 2003. Haki Elimu (mentioned above), has been active in monitoring the government’s adherence to achieving targets set in the ESDP and PEDP. Maarifa ni Ufungo, the secretariat of TENMET, has been one of the frontrunners in the introduction of civil society budget tracking and monitoring activities to enhance community level oversight of rapidly decentralizing educational services.

Overall, civil society involvement in education is growing, particularly in research and advocacy. This pairing allows for a different model of civil society than previously; one that allows for research-based alternatives and a strong watchdog stance. However, we could find no direct evidence of NGO or civil society monitoring of international donors. Great potential appears to exist for NGO-led activities that support community participation in local school councils and in
budget and outcomes monitoring. However, there is a significant lack of research on the interface between the local school councils or non-government schools and the national advocacy NGOs, as represented by Haki Elimu and TENMET.

e) The Mozambique Case

Figuring prominently in the current political economy of Mozambique is the legacy of a protracted liberation war from Portugal, a brutal 17-year civil war and transition from a socialist to a democratic governance regime. Since independence in 1975, the Frelimo party has maintained power. While development aid has increased substantially since the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992, institutionalized corruption emerged in this desk review as one of the most important issues facing the Mozambican state, despite the country’s international reputation as an “African success story” in terms of democratic transition, liberalization and growth (Hanlon 2004).

While ethnicity is not a particularly salient issue, regional and urban/rural cleavages have emerged as a result of disparate development trajectories between the southern (privileged) provinces and the marginalized provinces in the central and northern regions (Braathen 2003). Mozambique was the first African country to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC initiative. However, the country ranked in the bottom 10 in the UNDP’s 2005 HDR, suggesting that the country has much to do by way of poverty reduction. In 2002, aid as a percentage of GNI was 60.4 in Mozambique (Foster, 2005).

Education is identified as a priority sector in Mozambique’s 2001 PRSP. However, the 85% (2001-02) gross primary enrollment rate belies the fact that approximately 60% of children do not complete primary education (UNESCO). And again, rural children, girls and other vulnerable groups fare much worse in terms of educational access and completion rates.

As of 2004, there were 26 donors working in the education sector in Mozambique, of whom 18 were members of the SWAp (Killick, Castel-Branco and Gerster, 2005). Of these 18, 9 were classified as contributing to the education basket fund, although it was noted that not all of these donors are presently contributing to the fund. In 2004, the basket fund represented 5% of total education assistance (Killick et al. 2005: 48). The major education donors are the World Bank, AfDf, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (World Bank). The FTI Country Database indicates in one place that coordinating agencies are Canada, the World Bank and Dfid, but in another place (World Bank) Ireland is identified as the coordinating agency. No information could be found concerning which donors are the “top three” in terms of aid to the education sector.

In response to donor pressure, the government has been experimenting with a system of decentralized education planning (United Nations Capital Development Fund). Since late 2001, Mozambique has been a Fast Track Initiative country. The Education Sector Strategy Programs (ESSP) (1999-03 and 2004-08) that have been developed in consultation with civil society and donors, focus on promoting access to quality education, and also establish the context for donor harmonization, channeling of aid to priority areas, and the roles of various state and non-state (civil society) actors vis-à-vis the education sector reform process. Mozambique is one of CIDA’s 25 priority countries. Since the early 90’s the education sector has been highly
dependent on external aid. Takala and Marope (2002) indicate that throughout the 90’s around 40% of education expenditure came from external sources, whereas Buchert (2002) notes that in 2001 28% of education expenditure came from external sources, perhaps suggesting an improvement in the aid dependency situation of Mozambique.

Civil society activism is a recent phenomenon in Mozambique (CEF 2003). Pfeiffer (2004) notes that international NGOs and Pentecostal-influenced church movements are the main civil society groups active in the country. The majority of national and international NGOs are based in urban areas, with church-based groups dominating the civil society scene in rural areas. Pfeiffer (2004) argues that the international NGO presence has exacerbated social inequality by channeling resources primarily to local and national elites. Furthermore, the fact that church-based organizations are proliferating and thriving in poor communities throughout Mozambique, outside of the aid relationship, suggests a deepening of the marginalization experienced by vulnerable groups in the market economy.

Very few CSOs focus exclusively on education, with most favouring a multi-sectoral approach. In a NORAD study, Kruse (2002) suggests that the “traditional” roots and character of many CSOs renders them invisible to contemporary views of what a CSO is, or should “look like”. The lack of cohesion amongst CSOs and the weak capacity of both the state and civil society present formidable challenges to the establishment of education partnerships between these two sets of actors, as well as with the donor community.

Very little information was found concerning teachers’ unions vis-à-vis education governance in Mozambique. We do know there is the Organização Nacional de Professores (National Teachers’ Organization, “ONP”). Regarding Mozambique’s implementation of mother-tongue based bilingual primary education in parts of the rural countryside, Benson (2004) suggests that the “teachers’ unions”, as well as some communities caused resistance to this policy on the basis of the perception that it was “top-down” and non-consultative (59). However, Benson (2004) also notes that a “major NGO”, with familiarity in Bantu languages in adult bilingual literacy has taken over the “support and monitoring work” in various classrooms in two provinces (60).

Civil society in Mozambique formally (yet not necessarily substantively) participates in education governance through Commonwealth Education Fund and Fast Track initiatives, the PRSP, and successive national ESSPs. The Mozambican Movement on EFA (MEFA) is the founding member of the Southern Africa ANCEFA, a member coalition in the Global Campaign for Education. The MEFA steering committee is comprised of; a) Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade (FDC - chair), b) ActionAid-Mozambique, c) Forum of African Women in Education (FAWE) Mozambique, d) ONP, e) Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (OJM i.e. the Mozambican Youths Organisation), f) The Mozambican Presbyterian Church (ActionAid). However, the role of civil society in education governance seems limited to consultancy, with limited advocacy, service provision or monitoring and evaluation responsibilities.
f) The Zambia Case

Similar to Mozambique, Zambia’s political economy is heavily influenced by a transition from a single-party to multi-party, democratic regime (1991). A small, landlocked country in southern Africa, Zambia ranked slightly higher (166/177 opposed to 168/177 respectively) than Mozambique in the 2005 HDR. Important national development challenges include the HIV/AIDS pandemic (1 in 5 adults infected) (Christian Aid), regional and urban/rural cleavages and large external debt, despite qualifying for debt relief under the HIPC initiative. In 2002, aid as a percentage of GNI was 18.1 in Zambia (Foster, 2005). The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) has headed up the government since the national elections in 1991 (Rakner 2003).

Over the past fifteen years, Zambia has enjoyed sustained economic growth, and increasing foreign and domestic investment (Larmer 2005). In the 2002 PRSP, the chapter on Education emphasizes the importance of basic education and identifies the full implementation of the Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme (BESSIP) by 2005 as a key objective (World Bank, 1999). The BESSIP, which began implementation in 1999, seeks to ensure that at a minimum, every child achieves the seven year primary cycle. Supporting this goal, in 2002, a Free Basic Education (FBE) policy was implemented by the Zambian government (USAID). Between 2002 and 2005, the Gross Enrollment Ratio (Gr. 1-7) increased from 93.6% to 118.0% (Zambia Ministry of Education 2006). Similarly, the Net Enrollment Ratio (Gr. 1-7) increased during this same three-year time period from 77.7% to 94.7% (Ibid). In 2005 the completion rate to grade seven was 87.6% for males and 74.3% for females (Ibid).

The BESSIP represents one of the country’s main strategies for poverty reduction, and together with the Government of Zambia/MoE’s Strategic Plan for Education (2003-07), provides the policy framework for the education SWAp. The major donors to the education SWAp include the World Bank, United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, USA AIDf, EC, with Dfid the lead agency in the sector (World Bank). The education sector is heavily dependent on aid, for example in 2001 43% of the education budget was externally funded (Buchert, 2002). Zambia is among CIDA’s 25 priority countries (CIDA). At this point, we know that the following donors pool funds for education spending: Dfid, Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Canada, EC and USAID (DFID). However, no information has yet been found concerning which of these donors continue to fund projects in tandem with pooling funds.

Despite a history of truncated relations between the government and civil society, the former invited civil society participation in the development of the BESSIP in the late 90’s (World Bank 1999). International NGOs (e.g. Save the Children and Care), donors and mainly national (as opposed to local) NGOs/CSOs constituted the official civil society delegation during this process (Lexow 2003). The secondary literature provides little information on which local actors participated. While education policy formulation is still centralized, a recent study (Ibid) of the formulation of the BESSIP seems to suggest that CSOs are increasingly part of policy discussions (particularly at the national level). Nonetheless, CSO participation seems to be
confined to the policy development stage, and CSOs often lack the capacity and skills necessary to take part in policy discussions (Ibid).

Zambia is a member of ANCEFA and the Executive Director of the Zambia National Education Coalition (ZANEC) is the country representative (CEF Zambia 2005). Low levels of organizational and research capacity appears to characterize most national NGOs; the majority of CSOs are focused on service delivery (CEF Zambia 2005). Very few CSOs (be they international, national or local) focus exclusively on education. Care and World Vision are the two main international NGOs active in the education sector, with some emphasis on policy advocacy evident in their literatures.

There is a heavy concentration of CSOs involved in education delivery, and specifically within the community school movement, coordinated by the Zambia Community Schools Secretariat (ZCSS). There has been a dramatic increase in community schools over the past decade, with 38 such schools operating in 1996, 416 in 2000 and exploding to 3,200 by 2005, offering education services to more than 500,000 children (Muchelemba, personal communication). This is compared with 4,000 government basic schools that were serving 1,617,588 students in 2001 (Thompson, 2001:18). Over 600 community schools are receiving funding through USAID’s 2003-09 Basic Education Programme.

The number of community schools keeps increasing, with over 600 receiving funding in USAID’s 2003-09 Basic Education Programme. The Zambia Civic Education Association’s (ZCEA) activities coalesce around the objective of educating citizens on their rights and obligations, with a strong social justice component. In addition to ZCSS, there are three main CS umbrella organizations, focusing to varying degrees on education governance - the Non-Governmental Organization Coordinating Council (NGOCC); Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR); the Zambia National Education Coalition (ZANEC). CSPR seems to be the most coordinated, proliferate and influential of these coalitions, as evidenced by their media exposure, extensive participation in the PRSP process, attempts to engage remote rural communities, linkages with other regional networks and extensive publications.

Teachers’ strikes have become an issue in Zambia in recent years (GCE 2004). The reasons for the strikes have generally coalesced around issues of salaries being owed to them by the government and lack of government attention to problems of education quality due to staggering high student/teacher ratios (GCE 2004). The main teacher unions in Zambia include, the Zambia National Union of Teachers’ (ZNUT); the Basic Education in Zambia Teachers’ Union (BEZUT); and the Secondary School Teachers Union’ of Zambia.

Overall, CSO participation in education governance in the context of sector programs has been increasing. The literature emphasizes the advocacy and service delivery roles of civil society.
While CSOs engage to some extent in education monitoring and evaluation, there is a need for capacity building with respect to such activities. No discussion is made of any educational innovations taken up at the national level, from the work of CSOs as service providers.
g) The Senegal Case

Senegal is a stable society with good relations between its different ethnic and religious groups (Hermier 2004), although it has experienced some internal conflict in recent decades, within its southern Casamance region. Following independence from France in 1960, Senegal was ruled for four decades by the same socialist party -- although under different names -- and neo-patrimonialism was a prominent characteristic of the political landscape (Kuenzi 2003). The year 2000 marked a new era, when Abdoulaye Wade was elected president. Senegal has since been commended for its overall growth as a democracy (Kuenzi 2003), and the press and civil society actors enjoy freedom in their activities (Galvan 2001). A recent phase of decentralization, launched in 1996, assigned regions and communities major responsibilities for providing services -- such as health and education -- but the nature and amount of resources and authority transferred to them remains subject to debate (Clemons 2001).

Senegal has major economic challenges, including over-dependence on the production of a few primary commodities (Phillips 2002), limited investment, a poorly-equipped agricultural sector (Hermier 2004), and heavy aid dependence -- its net ODA/GNI was 13.9% in 2004 (OECD n.d.). Senegal qualified for HIPC debt relief (reaching its completion point in June 2004), and for participation in the G8 debt reduction initiative World Bank n.d.). Its partners in development include France, the IMF, the European Union (EU), the African Development Bank, USAID, Japan, Germany, Canada, and several UN agencies (World Bank n.d). Approximately 16% of its bilateral ODA in 2003-2004 went to education (OECD n.d.). Senegal is one of CIDA’s 25 development partners, and CIDA’s new program there will provide approximately 60 percent of its resources to basic education (CIDA n.d.).

Senegalese civil society is "extremely heterogenous;" the government has an official list of 316 NGOs, in addition to many associations, trade unions, media organizations, universities, research centres, umbrella organizations and 'tontines,' or “informal solidarity groups” (Hermier 2004: 2). Generally speaking, CSOs tend to be grouped according to “status or area of interest,” but they lack overall coordination and common platforms, and are heavily donor-dependent (Hermier 2004:2). Their structuring “remains closely linked to the various dialogue settings created as part of cooperation policy (such as the PRSP […]”) – rather than robust, pre-existing networks that can strongly influence decision-makers (Hermier 2004: 4, 7).

Senegal has a 10-year education sector program, the Plan décennal de l'éducation et de la formation, or PDEF. Launched in 1998, the PDEF’s basic education goals include universal primary education by 2010, and a reallocation of 49 percent of the national education budget to elementary education (Government of Senegal 2002: 41). Education features as an important part of Senegal’s PRSP, under the second of the PRSP’s four pillars/strategic thrusts (Government of Senegal 2002: 23-23, 41).

Senegal’s gross primary enrollment ratio is 79.9% and primary completion rate, 47.8% (World Bank figures for 2001-2003). A 2000 study of quality of basic education found the following problems: dilapidated infrastructures and shortage of desks; lack of textbooks; high repetition and drop-out rates; irrelevance of teaching programs (which had not changed in decades); the inexistence of a culture of evaluation in schools, departments and regions; and a lack of
pedagogical supervision of teachers (Niane 2004). There is considerable inequity in the allocation of public expenditures on education between poorer and richer households (Government of Senegal 2002). Finally, huge disparities in literacy rates exist between men (51.1%) and women (28.9%), between poor and less poor regions (e.g. Dakar 60%; Kolda region, 27.9%) and between urban (57.2%) and rural (24.1%) areas (Government of Senegal 2002).

In education, the Senegalese government’s *faire-faire* (“Making things happen”) strategy places a strong emphasis on state-civil society partnerships, and gives non-state actors the responsibility for designing and implementing NFE initiatives (Assié-Lumumba, Mara et al. 2005). NFE includes literacy programs and community schools (*écoles communautaires de base, ECBs*) (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). ECBs are designated for 9-14 year olds who are not enrolled in school or who have left school early, and literacy programs, for people above 14 years (Niane 2003).

*Faire-faire* uses an “outsourcing” approach, hiring CSO ‘*opérateurs*’ to implement NFE programs, seeking to reinforce civil society (Government of Senegal 2002, Kuenzi 2003). The *faire-faire* approach follows a detailed design that includes clearly-defined roles for various actors and processes for monitoring, evaluation, research, and technical support (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004: 39, 42-43; World Bank 2004). It has been commended for assisting civil society actors to organize themselves, express their priorities, and demand accountability (Nordtveit 2004; 2005; World Bank 2004). The *faire-faire* strategy has influenced other countries in West Africa (Ndiaye, Diop et al. 2004; World Bank 2004).

The government of Senegal has also actively supported the development of community schools (*ECBs*) since 1993 (Marchand 2000; Hoppers 2005). The MDCEBLN (the ministry charged with basic education and national languages) has provided a “complete [state] administrative frame at the central level” in support of ECBs (Clemons 2001), and has designated MoE inspectors specifically to provide pedagogical supervision to ECBs -- evidence of strong political will to promote these alternative models (Marchand 2000). Tensions, however, abound in state-civil society partnerships around ECB’s. For example, while the “outsourcing” approach has greatly multiplied the number of CSO *opérateurs* delivering educational services, the term *partnership* has been critiqued as “problematic because it is questionable whether the public and private sectors can share common goals and risks in a situation where the public sector is subcontracting the private sector to do a job” (Nordtveit 2005: 23). Outsourcing also has the potential to make CSOs act like businesses dependent upon government (Nordtveit 2005).

Diarra, et. al. argue that ECBs are considered a short-term experiment to provide learning for the continued reform of basic education (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000). They represent only a small minority of the overall number of schools within Senegal, and their students have very low rates of passage into the formal system. Indeed, ECBs are expected by government to become redundant by 2010, because UPE should be obtained by then, and any important pedagogical innovations mainstreamed (Diarra, Fall et al. 2000; Miller-Grandvaux and Yoder 2002).

This raises questions about the future role of CSO *opérateurs* and other CS actors mobilized within NFE initiatives. Certainly, they have gained considerable capacity and credibility as designers, implementers and managers of education programs. At the same time, it is not clear
that they are regarded by government as having the technical expertise necessary for a complementary role of input into policy (S. Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006). The national coalition of NFE opérateurs did participate in PDEF (the education sector program) design (S. Cherry, personal communication with CIDA field staff, February 13, 2006). However, it is not clear how community-level CSOs without a national-level structure can make their voices heard in such processes – although they do have a good deal of say about the content of NFE initiatives in their communities (Nordtveit 2004; World Bank 2004).

This said, NFE is not the only domain for participation of non-state actors within education. CSOs operate within formal, non-formal and informal sub-sectors, contributing towards access, quality, and management of education (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Their main sources of funding are UN agencies, NGO opérateurs who in turn receive their funding from donors, and governments via multilateral or bilateral co-operation programs with the Senegalese state (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Parents’ associations (APEs) are a major actor within formal education, particularly in support to quality, and have an active national-level federation, FENAPES – although it is seriously hindered by resource shortages (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Teachers’ unions have a major voice within education policy, and are consulted by the ministry on all important matters (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). The degree to which other civil society actors in formal education have a voice in shaping the wider system, and if/how they collaborate in doing so, is not well-documented. It is unclear whether these various civil society actors in the formal, non-formal and informal sub-sectors act in coordination.

The PDEF’s decentralization reforms envisage new relationships of sharing and negotiation being created between central government, local authorities, teachers, pupils and parents (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). Towards this end, PDEF educational governance structures have been created at regional, département and local levels, and each level must formulate and monitor education development plans along with non-state actors (Aide et Action 2002b). At the school level, management committees have been established to include representatives from local and MoE officials, civil society, and school staff. These committees are charged with implementing “projets d’école,” (school development projects). Projets d’école appear to have the potential to form the basis for bottom-up, collaborative education planning by state and non-state actors, but are too new to judge (Aide et Action 2002b; CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005).

Recent research suggests that there are serious challenges to implementing the government’s partnership policies in the new decentralized educational governance structure. In a study of Kolda region, elected local authorities did not understand their roles within the PDEF, and were not engaging in joint budgeting with education authorities and school directors (Aide et Action 2002a). Deconcentrated education authorities struggle to provide the necessary pedagogical supervision to schools (Marchand 2000; Clemons 2001; CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005) and to collect data for monitoring the PDEF (CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). There remains a great need for much stronger collaboration mechanisms and capacity, amongst local authorities, education authorities and CSOs at all levels of the system (Clemons 2001; Aide et Action 2002b; CREDA and Kamara/Lagardère 2005). It is also important that CSOs create a
strong role for themselves, in ensuring that the learning and innovations acquired from NFE are incorporated into the wider education system.

h) The Bangladesh Case

Bangladesh has gone through cycles of democracy and military rule since its independence from Pakistan in 1971. The current political landscape is a parliamentary democracy plagued by confrontational politics and poor governance (CIDA, 2003). Despite this volatile political situation, the World Bank (2005) notes strong economic performance, with annual GDP growth averaging 5 percent, although half of the population continues to live under the poverty line (UNDP, 2005). The country is ranked 139th on the UN’s 2005 Human Development Index.

Bangladesh has a long history of civil society activity, shifting between a focus on political activism and a social development agenda (Zafarullah and Rahman, 2002). Despite a large and diverse civil society, the literature focuses on domestic NGOs as the main actors in civil society. Approximately 2000 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs are currently working in development, 1882 of which are registered with the NGO Affairs Bureau to receive foreign funding (World Bank, 2005b). NGOs receive approximately 25% of total aid to Bangladesh (World Bank, 2005b), about 85% of which is given to the ten largest NGOs (Lewis, 2004).

Universal primary education is enshrined in the Constitution (Hossain, 2004) and the formal education system saw impressive expansion throughout the 1980s and 90s (Hossain, 2004). However, education expenditure remains the lowest in the region at 2.2% of GDP (CEF, 2005). Gross primary enrollment is 97.38% (2003) (BANBEIS, 2005). Net enrollment is estimated to be 84% at the primary level (with gender parity) and 45% at the secondary level (UNDP, 2005) (the official government figure for NER is 87.34%). The Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPME) estimates that the combined un-enrolled and dropped-out population of primary aged children is approximately 5.83 million (2003). Education’s share of the recurrent budget fell from 19.9% in 1998/99 to 18.1% in 2001/2002, although gains in government financing far outstripped increases in donor funding between 1990-2000. Total EFA primary program costs are estimated to be $338.8 million US for 2006, of which $122.1 million US will come from direct donor funding (EFA/FTI, 2004).

For many years, donors have directly supported the non-formal/NGO education sector, in particular the educational activities of BRAC, Bangladesh’s largest non-formal education service provider, in order to reach these children. Non-formal NGO-provided education represents approximately 10% of enrollments in primary education and receives approximately 12% of all donor funding to NGOs (World Bank, 2005b). Ahmed and Chowdhury (2005) estimate that 500 NGOs offer their own unregistered non-formal education programs, focusing specifically on girls’ education and hard-to-reach populations and reaching about 1.5 million students annually.

In 2003, Bangladesh developed a sub-sectoral approach to primary education. The main objectives of the Second Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP II) (2003-2009) are to introduce national standards of quality, increase accessibility and rates of completion, ensure accountability and transparency, and to decentralize education management (MoPME, 2005). External doors have been steadily moving towards a coordinated sector support program
based on the PEDP II. A donor consortium led by the Asian Development Bank and including the World Bank, NORAD, SIDA, CIDA, the European Council, DFID, the Netherlands, UNICEF, Aus-Aid and JICA has played a part in the evolution of the sub-sector program that strongly emphasizes the enhancement of government ownership and capacity to deliver universal quality primary education. However, the PEDP II has been criticized for neglecting the important and successful non-formal sub-sector, as well as for poor management of the plan and slow implementation.

Although MoPME has been somewhat apathetic towards government-NGO partnership, donor organizations have been encouraging government-led programs of support for the expansion of NGO-delivered non-formal primary schooling. A government managed NGO pooled fund was proposed by DFID, Netherlands and the EC in 2004 (CIDA, 2004). More recently, the World Bank launched the “Reaching Out of School Children” program (ROSC), to “fill the gap left by PEDP II by developing demand-side interventions” in the non-formal sector (World Bank, 2003:2). While this project is outside the sub-sector approach funded by donors, the World Bank considers ROSC to be consistent with and complementary to the PEDP II framework. Funds for this program will be channeled through MoPME to established NGOs. There are some concerns that conflict may arise between ROSC and PEDP II and that NGOs were not sufficiently involved in ROSC’s design (ELCG, 2004). Some studies indicate that many civil society actors feel that international pressure for NGO-government partnerships acts to undermine social justice goals and the grassroots character of development NGOs in Bangladesh (Haque, 2004), and restricts the ability of NGOs to undertake advocacy work (World Bank, 2005b).

Bangladesh was the first country in the Commonwealth to develop a national NGO-EFA coalition (CEF 2005). The Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE) acts as an advocacy body for education-providing NGOs, working closely with the sophisticated policy department of BRAC. CAMPE conducts research on basic education issues in Bangladesh, and is active in public engagement and policy dialogue. Its annual Education Watch reports have at times been controversial when they highlight government failure or contradict official statistics, but the reports are widely circulated and cited by donors and viewed by NGOs in other countries as a model for education NGO advocacy work. In fact, CAMPE has increasingly attracted donor funding, and is currently funded by the Swiss Development Corporation, the Netherlands, and NOVIB (CAMPE, 2005). CAMPE is a non-voting member of the Education Local Consultative Group, as well as the Global Campaign for Education and various regional education bodies.

Despite the success of CAMPE and BRAC, a considerable gap remains between NGOs and the government in terms of the former’s ability to participate in policy discussions. It appears that the MoPME continues to view NGOs mainly as subcontractors rather than policy partners (Haque, 2004). MoPME, in particular, is viewed as having a history of anti-NGO sentiment, more so than any other government ministry, and seems to be more resistant to NGO collaboration and participation in decision-making (personal communication, Ahmed, 11.24.2005). Thus, even though international organizations have been keen to reframe the relationship between government and NGOs as one of cooperation and complementarity, donors continue to engage in sub-sector financing of NGOs, as in the case of donor-pooled funds which provide direct budgetary support to BRAC’s Education Programme. Despite donor initiatives, many studies suggest that government continues to disregard NGOs as partners in policy
BRAC itself has begun to focus more of its energies on changing its relationship with the ministries of education, moving away from primary service provision and direct advocacy and seeking towards greater influence through new initiatives on the margins of the formal school system such as the opening of preschools and the development of in-service teacher training programs. The aim of these initiatives is to move away from NGOs working in a parallel system toward “partnership” with the government to improve the overall quality of education in Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2005).

Overall, this desk study highlights many of the conflicts facing NGOs involved in education in the context of sector-wide approaches to aid. NGOs face pressure from bilateral and multilateral donors to work with governments, but even in a context where NGOs have a strong and effective tradition of policy analysis and advocacy, they find difficulty in gaining a strong voice in national policies. This may be confounded by sector support programs, which tend to position NGOs as subcontractors to government, and limit the amount of direct funding available to NGOs. The Bangladesh case has been unique among our cases because direct program support has been given to BRAC.

6. Preliminary Analysis

These desk studies reflect our initial effort to put together a descriptive picture of the current role being played by civil society actors in education sector policy development and implementation across 8 case countries where sector wide approaches to educational aid have been introduced. Table 1 below sets out a very brief characterization of civil society roles in the education sector in each country, to assist in comparison across cases.

Across these cases one can see that roles played by civil society organizations in the education sector governance are in flux. On the one hand, there have been dramatic shifts in both government and donor policies. Education sector policies in almost every country now call for some form of “partnership” between government and civil society organizations, often as part of renewed efforts to rapidly achieve universal access to basic education. However, in contrast to the 1990s, the notion of partnership in current sector-wide reform policies refers to more than the expansion of a service delivery role for NGOs. National policies now also refer explicitly to the importance of civil society participation in the formulation of national education sector policies. Donor organizations increasingly refer to the role that civil society can play in holding governments accountable. In virtually every desk review, we could find evidence that governments and donor organizations are increasingly creating “invited spaces” for civil society organizations in policy deliberation in the education sector.

However from both sides, government and donor, the new call for partnership is often less than straightforward. Governments clearly seek ways to manage and sometimes to limit civil society participation in policy deliberation. In Bangladesh, where the oldest network for civil society activism in education, CAMPE, provides sophisticated policy analysis and the opportunity for government to learn from CSO/NGO innovations, the national Ministry of Education still appears to be resistant to engaging civil society organizations as partners in policy development and implementation. In Tanzania, where civil society groups have been among the most active
in holding governments accountable for basic education (most notably in research on school user fees), the government has banned one organization from publishing its research, which is viewed as critical and political. Many aspects of the other cases suggested that deep tensions and challenges are arising out of the dual advocacy/service-delivery roles now expected from civil society organizations.

The message from donor organizations can be equally ambiguous. Sector wide programs call for expansion of access to basic education – and often include a heightened role for NGOs and INGOs as service providers to meet expansion targets. At the same time, however, sector programs also seem to demand that international funding be delivered directly to governments, and controlled by them. Such policies institutionalize competition among CSOs for government subcontracts. They also threaten previous patterns of direct international funding to INGOs and NGOs, and thus the resource base upon which CSO independence and autonomy has rested. In countries like Mali and Burkina Faso, where direct funding to INGOs and NGOs led to the rapid expansion of community schooling in the 1990s, INGOs may struggle to reinterpret their activities in the new context of sector wide programs that call for government led expansion. In Senegal and Zambia, where the recent rapid growth of NGO nonformal education service-providers was spurred by new government programs, the lack of national coordination among civil society actors limits their effective participation in national policy deliberation. In Bangladesh, we found that BRAC has decided to decrease direct provision of nonformal primary education, seeking instead to infiltrate government schools with innovations by hosting preschools related to formal primary schools. In each case, the introduction of sector wide support has altered earlier patterns of CSO engagement in the sector.

Many of the desk reviews suggested that donor expectations of civil society autonomy seem to have moved ahead of donor willingness to provide core funding for policy and advocacy initiatives by civil society organizations. Yet direct funding from international donors has clearly been crucial to the development of active national coalitions capable of creating space for civil society participation in policy deliberations. In the Bangladesh case, donors provide BRAC with generous programmatic funding that allows it to run a strong policy analysis unit and to in turn support CAMPE. Much younger coalitions in Tanzania and Kenya have made effective policy interventions, using funding from the UK’s Commonwealth Education Fund (supporting national coalitions in 16 countries) and Dutch funding of the Global Campaign for Education’s Real World Strategies (to build coalition capacity in Africa). But these latter coalitions are extremely fragile – based on forms of funding that is short term and experimental, rather than programmatic and long term. As an illustration of the problems this can create, we found evidence that seemed to link the winding down of Dutch support to the EFA coalition in Kenya to a decline in its recent effectiveness and participation in KESSP. One obvious area for future donor intervention is in the funding of cross-national learning by CSOs engaged in new policy roles.

Nonetheless CSO’s across our desk studies also appeared to be actively creating new spaces for an expanded CSO policy role. They often introduce pedagogical innovation (e.g., BRAC’s nonformal primary model, and ActionAid’s Reflect adult literacy method). They sometimes develop critical stances on governmental policies or plans (as for example in Tanzania around user fees, and girls education). They have also created new kinds of opportunities for
communities to engage national and local educational policy makers – in particular through budget tracking exercises and alternative monitoring and reporting activities. National civil society/EFA coalitions are being formed in almost every context – including those in which the formal space for participation in policy deliberations has been very weak. Desk research was less clear on the extent to which CSOs play the role of popular mobilisers in the sector – field research is required to confirm our initial observation that popular mobilization occurs at best intermittently.

Two important variations apparent in our desk research also warrant further attention through field research. First, there is a clear difference in the shape of CSO engagement in the sector between Francophone African contexts, where strong CSO-led nonformal or community school movements exist, and Anglophone African contexts in which CSO service delivery is on a much smaller scale. However there was too little secondary information to allow us to gage whether these different CSO configurations produce different types or levels of CSO engagement in education sector governance. Second, there seems to be substantial variation between those cases in which CSOs offer sustained analysis and criticism of government actions (Tanzania, Bangladesh); and those in which coalitions seem to be more adaptive and focused on accommodation and partnership with government. Although our data set is limited, our case studies do not support the conclusions from a Uganda study of CSOs in all sectors by Lister and Nyamugasira, which found that contentious approaches to governance were taken mainly by International NGOs, while local NGOs are the accomodators. In the field of education, Tanzania and Bangladesh seem to suggest the strong potential for local CSOs to emerge as independent and contentious policy actors. Field research should help us to better understand why.

One area of considerable challenge for civil society organizations across our cases relates to the introduction of the dramatic decentralization reforms that are part of almost every sector wide program in education. Such reforms call for better district or local level structures for managing direct service provision, and often refer vaguely to some form of civil society participation in new local governance structures. CSO’s would seem to have a natural role to play in building local capacity for policy engagement in newly decentralized systems. Our desk research yielded little information on the extent to which decentralization reforms create invited space for institutionalized CSO roles in local governance processes. In some instances, CSOs seem to be creating their own space. In Mali, for example, some CSOs previously involved in the expansion of community schools now increasingly focus their energies on building the capacity of local parent associations. But the larger question is whether national CSOs can link effective national level policy engagement to new kinds of capacity building and engagement at local levels. Clearly there is room for more information about how CSOs hope to adapt themselves to contexts in which there are two scales for engagement in governance – local/district and national.

We would also highlight the fact that across the cases, (perhaps with the exception of Senegal and Bangladesh), teachers unions do not appear to be key players in sector-wide policy deliberation in the education sector, nor are they key players in the new CSO coalitions. Several cases offered suggestive information about other schisms in the approaches and views of different CSO groups. Here again, further field research is required.
### Table 1. Rough Characterization of Civil Society Configurations in Education Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>Character of civil society in education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Large innovative group of NGO-education service providers and strong CSO/education coalition (CAMPE) with sophisticated policy advocacy and analysis. Donors core programmatic funding for BRAC. However, government resistant to input from civil society on the reform of formal schooling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Expansion of NGO schools and introduction of competitive grants fund for literacy programs contributes to growth of CSO delivering educational services. But village communities still ill-prepared to play strong governance role in local schools; CSOs highly aid dependent and not co-ordinated. Teachers unions oppositional. Relations between CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Internationally linked NGO coalition since 1999 with about 110 CSO members. The coalition has hosted budget tracking and expenditure monitoring activities at community level and is invited to joint review and policy meetings. However there is little information on whether CSOs have a well–institutionalized role in national policy processes within KESSP, the new sector program. Small but emergent NGO education service providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Strong government - NGO partnership around scaling up of community schools model; innovative NGO education service providers increasingly support community-based management of formal schools. Little information on effectiveness of national coalitions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>National NGOs sidelined by strong compact between donors and government in the education sector (Buchert 2002). Main organized civil society actors = international NGO nationally and church based organizations in districts (Pfeiffer 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Rapid change in the education system opens up new spaces for civil society engagement in the sector. Government and donors have supported the growth of NFE CSO service providers. Decentralization reforms include new school management committees and &quot;projets d'ecole&quot;. Little information on national level coalitions or policy impact of new CSOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Among the most well-developed of the national EFA NGO coalitions, TENMET has been active in research based policy alternatives on such issues as school fees. Government recently banned policy research by another influential NGO advocacy group, Haki Elimu. At the community-level, participation still revolves around parental contributions to school construction, while new school councils risk over-representation by elites. Donors (esp. CIDA, SIDA and NORAD) encourage civil society engagement but provide limited funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Community schools movement grows after 1990, now boasts a secretariat. Church based NGOs play key role in move to multi-party democracy. Approximately 120 NGOs in education sector; growing and increasingly coherent organized civil society. Engagement between Zambian NGO EFA delegation and national education task force intermittent. Government-CSO relationships often characterized by skepticism (Lexow 2003). Global Campaign and Oxfam produced recent report criticizing IMF constraints on public service hiring as cause of teacher shortage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CASE STUDIES BY OTHERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>Character of civil society in education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Government sharply restricts NGOs, leading to small local level initiatives and a weak national coalition (Miller-Grandvaux 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Limited role of NGOs in service provision - government endorses national-level coalitions. Three coalitions compete with one another and have varying view of partnership and contention. Teachers unions involved. (Kendall 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>New national NGO coalition is dominated by international NGOs and weakly linked to grassroots. Study conducted in 2004 found civil society participation in national policy setting is very weak and disorganized, although they are at the table. One clear example of &quot;boomerang&quot; -- NGO coalition gets government and donors to put the education of children in the war-torn North into the education sector plan (Murphy 2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 1: Design of Field Research

The heart of the project will be the field-based case studies, in which researchers will seek to answer the following questions:

– Do civil society actors have the ability to be active policy advocates, holding their governments accountable to educational promises?
– Are they capable of introducing new ideas into the policy cycle?
– Are civil society actors prepared to undertake high quality policy research and analysis and/or are there opportunities for them to collaborate with independent policy or research institutions to do so?
– Do civil society organizations effectively represent and/or relay information back to local citizens and children?
– What can be learned from variation in civil society capacity across countries?
– What steps might be taken to support local capacity?

Field research will have three components:

i) Mapping civil society organizations engaged in education

We will begin by contacting NGOs, community based organizations, teachers’ unions and research organizations identified as active in education during the desk research phase of this project. Contact will be made with NGO umbrella organizations in the country. Interviews will be conducted with senior staff members around a set of questions designed to gain four types of information. First, we are interested in documenting their participation in education sector planning, implementation and monitoring/advocacy work. This is essentially an "audit" or history of their activities, and should allow us to characterize the scope and capacity of civil society. Second, we want to understand how their policy-level or governance work relates to their community-level activities or mandates - who do these organizations claim to represent and what role do they play in helping local level actors to engage in and express their educational aspirations? Third, we want to better understand how these actors behave in relation to one another - do some engage more frequently or effectively in governance activities than others? Do they perceive their goals and interests to be overlapping or in conflict? Finally, we want to understand how these actors interact and perceive their interactions with other key actors in the governance of the educational system - particularly with donor organizations and Ministry of Education officials.

In addition, wherever possible we will request permission to attend, as research observers, meetings among civil society organizations active in education. Our purpose here will be to better understand the character, capacity and interrelationships among civil society actors in education.

ii) Civil Society from the View of the Ministry of Education and Donor Organizations

This part of the field research will build on the analysis of Ministry of Education and donor organization approaches to the engagement of civil society organizations in education sector governance conducted during the desk based phase of our research. We anticipate interviews with 4-6 Ministry of Education officials, as well as with senior representatives from leading
donor organizations aiding the education sector. We will also request permission to attend and observe Ministry-led policy meetings and donor coordination meetings at which civil society actors are invited participants.

iii) Research Communities and their Linkages to Civil Society

In each country we will attempt to meet with scholars inside tertiary institutions and in social science research organizations to provide a rudimentary profile of capacity in the field of educational policy analysis and research.

iv) Triangulation

Wherever possible, we will try to gather information that allows us to compare civil society activities in the education sector to civil society engagement in other public policy arenas, such as health, environment, gender and debt relief. To gain such information we will ask informants in the civil society organizations we meet with, as well as from government and donor organizations to comment on the way in which civil society engagement in education compares to that in other sectors. We will also meet with scholars or researchers familiar with civil society activities in these other sectors.

Interview schedules will be created to guide semi-structured interviews with informants from each of the categories described above. We will also prepare a preliminary coding guide to assist with observation of meetings and events. Data from the field research will be entered into an ethnographic research database software program (N*6) by individual researchers. This will allow for coding and cross-case analysis.
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