Mozambique

Civil Society Participation and the Governance of Educational Systems in the Context of Sector-Wide Approaches to Basic Education

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Executive Summary

Figuring prominently in the current political economy of Mozambique is the legacy of a protracted liberation war from Portugal, a brutal 17-year civil war and transition from a socialist to a democratic governance regime. Since independence in 1975, the Frelimo party has maintained power. While development aid has increased substantially since the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992, institutionalized corruption emerged in this desk review as one of the most important issues facing the Mozambican state, despite the country’s international reputation as an “African success story” in terms of democratic transition, liberalization and growth (Hanlon 2004).

While ethnicity is not a particularly salient issue, regional and urban/rural cleavages have emerged as a result of disparate development trajectories between the southern (privileged) provinces and the marginalized provinces in the central and northern regions (Braathen 2003). Mozambique was the first African country to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC initiative. However, the country ranked in the bottom 10 in the UNDP’s 2005 HDR, suggesting that the country has much to do by way of poverty reduction. In 2002, aid as a percentage of GNI was 60.4 in Mozambique (Foster 2005).

Education is identified as a priority sector in Mozambique’s 2001 PRSP. However, the 85% (2001-02) gross primary enrollment rate belies the fact that approximately 60% of children do not complete primary education (UNESCO). And again, rural children, girls and other vulnerable groups fare much worse in terms of educational access and completion rates.

As of 2004, there were 26 donors working in the education sector in Mozambique, of whom 18 were members of the SWAp (Killick, Castel-Branco and Gerster 2005). Of these 18, 9 were classified as contributing to the education basket fund, although it was noted that not all of these donors are presently contributing to the fund. In 2004, the basket fund represented 5% of total education assistance (Killick et al. 2005: 48). The major education donors are the World Bank, AfDf, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (World Bank). The FTI Country Database indicates in one place that coordinating agencies are Canada, the World Bank and Dfid, but in another place (World Bank) Ireland is identified as the coordinating agency. No information could be found concerning which donors are the “top three” in terms of aid to the education sector.

In response to donor pressure, the government has been experimenting with a system of decentralized education planning (United Nations Capital Development Fund). Since late 2001, Mozambique has been a Fast Track Initiative country. The Education Sector Strategy Programs (ESSP) (1999-03 and 2004-08) that have been developed in consultation with civil society and donors, focus on promoting access to quality education, and also establish the context for donor harmonization, channeling of aid to priority areas, and the roles of various state and non-state (civil society) actors vis-à-vis the education sector reform process. Mozambique is one of CIDA’s 25 priority countries. Since the early 90’s the education sector has been highly dependent on external aid.
Takala and Marope (2002) indicate that throughout the 90’s around 40% of education expenditure came from external sources, whereas Buchert (2002) notes that in 2001 28% of education expenditure came from external sources, perhaps suggesting an improvement in the aid dependency situation of Mozambique.

Civil society activism is a recent phenomenon in Mozambique (CEF 2003). Pfeiffer (2004) notes that international NGOs and Pentecostal-influenced church movements are the main civil society groups active in the country. The majority of national and international NGOs are based in urban areas, with church-based groups dominating the civil society scene in rural areas. Pfeiffer (2004) argues that the international NGO presence has exacerbated social inequality by channeling resources primarily to local and national elites. Furthermore, the fact that church-based organizations are proliferating and thriving in poor communities throughout Mozambique, outside of the aid relationship, suggests a deepening of the marginalization experienced by vulnerable groups in the market economy.

Very few CSOs focus exclusively on education, with most favouring a multi-sectoral approach. In a NORAD study, Kruse (2002) suggests that the “traditional” roots and character of many CSOs renders them invisible to contemporary views of what a CSO is, or should “look like”. The lack of cohesion amongst CSOs and the weak capacity of both the state and civil society present formidable challenges to the establishment of education partnerships between these two sets of actors, as well as with the donor community.

Very little information was found concerning teachers’ unions vis-à-vis education governance in Mozambique. We do know there is the Organização Nacional de Professores (National Teachers’ Organization, “ONP”). Regarding Mozambique’s implementation of mother-tongue based bilingual primary education in parts of the rural countryside, Benson (2004) suggests that the “teachers’ unions”, as well as some communities caused resistance to this policy on the basis of the perception that it was “top-down” and non-consultative (59). However, Benson (2004) also notes that a “major NGO”, with familiarity in Bantu languages in adult bilingual literacy has taken over the “support and monitoring work” in various classrooms in two provinces (60).

Civil society in Mozambique formally (yet not necessarily substantively) participates in education governance through Commonwealth Education Fund and Fast Track initiatives, the PRSP, and successive national ESSPs. The Mozambican Movement on EFA (MEFA) is the founding member of the Southern Africa ANCEFA, a member coalition in the Global Campaign for Education. The MEFA steering committee is comprised of, a) Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade (FDC - chair), b) ActionAid-Mozambique, c) Forum of African Women in Education (FAWE) Mozambique, d) ONP, e) Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (OJM i.e. the Mozambican Youths Organisation), f) The Mozambican Presbyterian Church (ActionAid). However, the role of civil society in education governance seems limited to consultancy, with limited advocacy, service provision or monitoring and evaluation responsibilities.
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<tr>
<td>ANCEFA</td>
<td>African Network Campaign on Education For All</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Community Development Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEF</td>
<td>Commonwealth Education Fund</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education For All</td>
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<td>ESSP</td>
<td>Education Sector Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>FAWEMO</td>
<td>Forum for African Women Educationalists - Mozambique</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Liberation Front of Mozambique (Portuguese acronym)</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross Enrollment Ratio</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GOAM</td>
<td>Grupo Operativo para o Avanco da Mulher</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIFEMO</td>
<td>Libertacao de Feminino de Mozambique</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OMM</td>
<td>Organization of Mozambican Women</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Mozambican Movement on Education For All</td>
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<td>MINED</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MTFF</td>
<td>Medium Term Fiscal Framework</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NER</td>
<td>Net Enrollment Ratio</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARPA</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Action Plan</td>
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<td>PBA</td>
<td>Programme-Based Approach</td>
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<td>PES</td>
<td>Economic and Social Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PSRS</td>
<td>Public Sector Reform Strategy</td>
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<td>RECORDE</td>
<td>Education Sector’s Donors Coordination Meeting</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>The Mozambican National Resistance (Portuguese acronym used)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANCEFA</td>
<td>Southern Africa Network for the Campaign on Education For All</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNE</td>
<td>Sistema Nacional de Educacao</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>WB</td>
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This report presents a synthesis of the salient features of the desk-review case study I completed on the Republic of Mozambique. Framing the discussion are questions concerning the features, challenges and opportunities for the active and meaningful engagement of civil society organizations in the education policy process at the national level specifically, and sub-levels where appropriate. Very little information is as yet available concerning civil society actors in the education policy process in Mozambique.

With the dearth in information available I made a decision to expose, at some length, the political-economic, social and cultural contexts within which “civil society” must establish itself and flourish in Mozambique. I firmly believe that this represents an opportunity to bring together a diverse range of information that will in some ways shed light on the role of CSOs in the education sector in Mozambique, as well as offer a “snapshot” of the current conditions of civil society more generally and the government and donor community, thus presenting a brief “prospects” section where I bring the main areas of the report together and discuss their significance for future development assistance programming.

1. **Background**

Mozambique stretches along the east coast of southern Africa, sharing borders with South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Swaziland and Malawi. The country has long occupied a position of strategic importance, offering abundant trade routes to “African hinterland” (Weinstein 2003:142) during the colonial era and,

…as colonialism went into decline and the Cold War took hold in Africa, Mozambique’s proximity to Rhodesia and South Africa further consolidated its strategic importance, as the Soviet Union and the United States battled to maintain their spheres of influence in the region (143).

There are three major rivers flowing west to east that laterally divide Mozambique into three broad cultural and linguistic bands (Weinstein 2003:142). Ethnicity is not a salient issue in Mozambican politics and “in reality ethnic groups are highly fragmented”¹ (Weinstein 2003:142). However, there are three regional distinctions that are politically

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¹ The largest ethnic group in Mozambique is the Macua-Lowme, accounting for forty-seven percent of the population (Weinstein, 2003).
salient in the country – namely the northern, central and southern regions (Bertelsen 2003; Braathen 2003; Carbone 2003). Following an intense and protracted (1964-1974) liberation struggle, Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975. Established in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania in 1962, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (its Portuguese acronym being FRELIMO) assumed leadership of the newly independent country (Carbone 2005), and from 1977 to the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992 followed a Marxist-Leninist development path.

During the colonial era, the state directly administered the southernmost provinces (Weinstein 2002), while the administration of the northern and central provinces were the responsibility of private Portuguese companies who, according to Weinstein (2002), were “mostly a law unto themselves” (144). What this lopsided administrative structure (and the attendant lopsided development priorities of the colonial state) resulted in were disparate development trajectories between the southern provinces and the northern and central provinces in the country. Weinstein (2002) states that Frelimo has constantly had to struggle against the perception (shared to varying degrees across the country) that it has a “southern bias”, much the same as the former colonial power.

Furthermore, relative to the populations in the southern provinces, rural peoples in the central and northern provinces were largely disenfranchised due to their political, economic and social marginalization from the activities of the central state and the urban minority. Thus gross inequalities between urban and rural peoples as well as between southern-based and northern-based peoples, characterize the development challenge for the Frelimo party, a party that has held unbroken power in the country since independence. Moreover, the development challenges posed by regional divisions in Mozambique have persisted into the twenty-first century, despite the “successful” transition to a democratic, multiparty political regime with a liberalized export-led national economy (Negrao 2002; Weinstein 2002).

In terms of the colonial legacy, in the immediate post-independence era, Frelimo adopted the territorial divisions created by the colonizers: ten provinces sub-divided into 128 districts and they also “adopted many, if not most of its [colonial regime] capital-
periphery administrative structures” (Braathen 2003:5). The governance system inherited by Mozambique was a centralized one “in which the local government structures remained as tentacles of the central government” (Braathen 2003:5). The tight control of Frelimo over the political process in Mozambique is evidenced by the fact that the central government appointed all provincial governors and district administrators (Braathen 2003).

However, the pattern of government appointment of local and provincial administrators ended with the passing of a constitutional amendment – The Municipal Law 2/1997 - that provided a new institutional framework for “local self-governing municipalities”, as part of the decentralization agenda agreed to by Frelimo and Renamo as part of the General Peace Agreement of 1992 that formally ended the long and exceedingly violent post-liberation war² (Braathen 2003; Buur and Kyed 2005).

In summary, while it is true that during the anti-colonial struggle which was heavily backed by Zambia and Algeria, Frelimo mainly operated out of the country’s north, the party’s top leadership was exclusively from the southern region, with this pattern continuing to present (Bornstein 2000; Carbone 2005; Weinstein 2002). Therefore we can see that the perception of a “southern bias” that some argue characterizes the nature and composition of the Frelimo regime (see Weinstein 2002) in the current era, has long roots in the anti-colonial struggle and post-liberation war – “southern dominance inevitably came to be resented, even before the new regime was established” (Carbone 2005:424). Such antagonisms remain salient within the country’s current political economy, with such dynamics having specific implications for the development of civil society as will be discussed below.

1.1. Post-liberation/Civil War

Mozambique experienced a post-liberation war that raged across the countryside for over fifteen years (1977-1992) (Costy 2000). While there are two main diverging

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² I am following Bertelsen’s (2002) lead in using “post-liberation war” instead of “civil war”, to describe the fifteen years of violent conflict between the FRELIMO and RENAMO, waged largely in rural areas. I agree with Bertelsen’s argument that to refer to what happened as a “civil war”, is analytically flawed because the internist connotations of this concept do not accurately reflect the larger regional and global geopolitical setting (i.e., Cold War dynamics, African liberation movements against white regimes in neighbouring Rhodesia [Zimbabwe] and South Africa) of the “post-liberation war” (263).
perspectives concerning the extent to which the rebel guerrilla group Renamo was externally and internally supported; both perspectives include recognition of the extremely violent and brutal war tactics each side engaged in as well as the long-term negative socio-economic and political legacy of the horrendous war that left over one million people dead (Bertelsen 2003; Bornstein 2000; Hanlon 2004; Weinstein 2002).

One perspective emphasizes the role of external actors, including the U.S., the apartheid South African and the Rhodesian states, in supporting Renamo militarily and politically in their violent efforts to destabilize the single-party regime, whose explicitly “Marxist-Leninist” agenda was a particularly salient issue in the regional and international geo-political context of the Cold War. In contrast to this perspective, a second view argues that Renamo enjoyed considerably more popular support in Mozambique than usually publicized (Weinstein 2002).

In 1983 and 1986 there were two donor strikes resulting in the food aid being withheld. However foreign aid increased from US$359 million in 1985 to US$ 875 million in 1988 as a consequence of the states’ response to economic deterioration due to the war and falling world prices for primary agricultural products (the mainstay of the Mozambican economy), which involved the adoption of World Bank/IMF structural adjustment reforms. These reforms emphasized privatization and a transition to a market capitalism as the state “made its turn towards the west” (Hanlon 2004:749). However, as Hanlon notes the “learning about capitalism from donors… [involves the lesson that] capitalism is not about profit, but about patronage” (749). He provides the example of the process of business privatization in which “loans” are given that “need not be repaid according to who you know and donor whim” (Hanlon 2004:749).

1.2. Democratic Transition
As mentioned above, the first multi-party elections were held in 1994, with Frelimo winning the largest share of votes, and again doing so in the 1999 national elections. In the most recent presidential elections of December 2004, the incumbent Frelimo party was re-elected with Armando Emilio Guebuza seceding Joaquim Chissano as President.

3 It is important to note that Frelimo, the governing party in the single-party state of Mozambique had offered a safe haven to African liberation army soldiers that were opposing the white regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia from the late 70’s to mid-80’s (Bertelsen 2003).
In recent years, the government has been experimenting with a system of decentralized development planning that devolves administrative and political authority from the central to the provincial and district levels of government (United Nations Capital Development Fund, accessed January 14, 2006). Specifically, the Municipal Law 2/1997 established the legal framework for democratic elections in urban and semi-urban area although not for rural areas (Alexander 1997). In response to donor community pressure to implement decentralized governance reforms, and state recognition that there was an urgent need to re-establish its administrative authority in heretofore marginalized rural areas, Decree 15/2000 was implemented that saw “traditional leaders” and “secretaries of suburban quarters or villages” formally recognized by the state as “community authorities” (Buur and Kyed 2005:5). The recognition of “traditional leaders” as “community authorities” is particularly salient given that these individuals (regulos, as they are referred to in Portuguese) were immediately banned by Frelimo in the post-independence era.

While the donor community did not initially anticipate that the Decree would become the only piece of legislation to cater for some form of ‘representative organ’ in the rural areas, that was what it ended up being (Buur and Kyed 2005:12).

Furthermore since 2003, the implementation of “consultative forums” with representatives of “a variety of local stakeholders” have begun to be held across the country, and in particular in rural areas (Buur and Kyed 2005:12). These consultative forums have emerged out of the mass organizations of the party that had proliferated around the country, from urban barrios to rural villages as part of the “villagization” movement initiated as part of Frelimo’s socialist agenda (Bertelsen 2003; Bornstein 2000; Braathen 2003).

Buur and Kyed (2005) offer a rich discussion of the two decentralization initiatives (Decree 15/2000 and the Municipal Law 2/1997) and how taken together, they represent an “important break in legal terms with previous colonial and post-independence and local governance” (12). Additionally in 2003, the Lei dos órgãos locais do Estado known as the LOLE-law was passed, establishing a framework for regulating
sub-district levels that had “operated hitherto on a de facto basis, without official recognition (Lars and Kyed 2005:15).

The Decree 15/2000 and the LOLE law therefore provided the basis for legally institutionalizing the interaction (articulação) between local state organs and forms of civil society groups in the rural and semi-urban areas. Previous de facto collaborations had been varied but unsystematic, by and large, and within a legal grey zone (Lars and Kyed, 2005:15).

Following the political shift to a multi-party system, there has been a big push for the creation and successful implementation of a comprehensive national development plan for Mozambique. As detailed in the country’s PRSP (with the Portuguese acronym PARPA) in 2001, the education sector is highlighted as an essential component of national development efforts and poverty reduction strategies. In this regard a key objective is to ensure that every citizen achieves seven years of basic education. Further discussion of specific education policy initiatives is found below in section 2 “The Current Education Policy Landscape”.

1.3. ODA Flows and HIPC Debt Relief to Mozambique

Beginning in the immediate period following the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992, the donor community responded to the end of the long post-liberation war/civil war, with dramatic increases in aid dollars to Mozambique (De Zeeuw 2005; Hanlon 2004). However, according to some accounts (Donini 1995), the bulk of money was channeled to either projects implemented by urban based CSOs (some working in the rural areas) or government implemented projects, some of which could be in the rural areas (or claimed to be). I have only suggested that the needs of rural communities are addressed to any significant extent by CSOs or the government because according to some reports (DeZeeuw 2005; Disney 2002); there is a discernable urban bias in terms of who and what areas are benefiting most from the increased aid dollars the country has been enjoying for over fifteen years. Perhaps then, claims to represent rural areas in the development and implementation of social and economic projects with foreign assistance, may be more rhetoric than reality (may be a bit of a value judgment on my part!).
As the first African country to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC initiative and subsequently the Enhanced HIPC program, Mozambique currently has an external debt load of around $966 million (2002 est.) (CIA Fact Book). With an average annual GDP real growth rate of 7.7% (World Bank) the country’s economic outlook is hopeful. The country received US$ 933 million in aid in 2001, US$ 2,054 million in 2002 and US$1,033 million in 2003 (OECD, accessed January 4, 2006). As a percentage of GNP, official development aid to Mozambique represented around 25 percent in 2003, down from 60% in 2002 (Ibid). The bilateral share of ODA flows into the country was around 66% in 2003, with 6% and 9% of total bilateral aid going the education and health sectors respectively in the 2002-2003 period (Ibid). During this same year, over 55% of total bilateral ODA went to debt servicing (Ibid). Major donor countries in Mozambique, and particularly in the education sector are Canada, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. The US is also a main donor country to Mozambique, particularly in the areas of governance and health.

Mozambique ranked 168 out of 177 countries in the UNDP 2005 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2005). In 2001 an estimated 70 percent of the population was below the poverty line (CIA Fact Book), with over 80 percent of the workforce employed in subsistence agriculture. The main sector is the “service”, accounting for close to half of the GDP in 2003, with “industry” and “agricultural” sectors accounting for 32 percent and 21% respectively (CIA Fact Book). The main exports are cashews, sugar and cotton (Disney 2002).

In terms of development indicators, Mozambique had a average life expectancy of 40.7 years, an infant mortality rate of 101 (per 1,000 live births) and an under five mortality rate (per 1,000 children) of 147 in 2003 (World Bank, Mozambique Data Profile, accessed January 8, 2006) as of 2003 Mozambique had a national illiteracy rate of 53.6% (68% amongst female population) (World Bank, Mozambique-At-A-Glance), with an urban illiteracy rate of 36.7% (42% for urban women) and a rural illiteracy rate of 65.7% (81% for rural women) (Ibid).

1.4. The Corruption Curse and Implications for Civil Society
Perhaps unsurprising given the deep regional roots supporting a dense patronage network and the highly centralized nature of the Frelimo regime, even within a competitive,
democratic political system, the reality of high levels of state corruption remains a major
development and political challenge facing Mozambique in the current era (Hanlon 2004). Hanlon (2004) argues that the donor community is willing to tolerate “quite
blatant corruption if the elite rapidly puts into place ‘market-friendly’ policies changes”
(748).

Corruption grew in Mozambique during the 1990’s, within the context of rapid
implementation of externally-driven (IFIs and donor community) liberalization reforms,
particularly with respect to privatizing sectors and industries that had been
nationalized/collectivized during the preceding socialist era (Disney 2002; Hanlon 2005;
Weinstein 2002). Interestingly, as Hanlon (2004) suggests the rise in corruption over the
past fifteen years stands in stark contrast to Mozambique as a “paragon of integrity” in
the late 70’s (747). It is argued that Frelimo elite were divided between a “major corrupt
faction” and those who wanted to address high levels of state corruption (Hanlon
2004:747). In the end, Hanlon argues that donors decided to collaborate with the “corrupt
faction” as they “told them what they wanted [to hear]”, and also because the anti-
corruption elite in the party were also quite critical of World Bank structural adjustment
policies – something that the donor community was not disposed to align with! (748).

Braathen (2003) and others (Bertelsen, 2003; Posner, 2004), use either the term
“patrimonial” or “repatrimonialism” to describe an important characteristic of the
political regime in Mozambique. According the former, “repatrimonialism means that the
patrimonial features of state and politics become more salient” (11). She proceeds to
identify four features of “repatrimonialism” in Mozambique:
(i) political exclusion along vertical-territorial lines (in Mozambique exclusion of the
rural population),
(ii) personalization (virtualization) of power,
(iii) businessification of politics, and
(iv) privatization (and patronagisation) of the state.

Provocatively, Hanlon (2004) suggests that in the last few years Mozambique has
become a “criminalized state” (747), as the legal system has collapsed, with “court
rulings available to the highest bidder (747), money laundering has become widespread
and common, and several areas of the country have become “drug warehousing and
transit centers”, involving senior officials (Southern Institute of Security Studies, cited in
In early 2001 and again later this same year respectively, Carlos Cardoso, a newspaper editor in Mozambique and Siba-Siba Macuanua a head of banking supervision were publicly assassinated. Both individuals were committed to investigating and exposing several bank fraud scandals, involving the reported loss of over US$40 million (Hanlon 2004). Investigations into these killings were blocked at the highest levels of the state and the fact that even when some individuals were imprisoned they were “allowed to escape”, have prompted some (Hanlon 2004, Disney 2002) to speculate that senior Frelimo members were involved in large-scale bank frauds.

There is direct relevance of the rampant corruption that seems to be sweeping the Mozambican state and the activities of civil society in the country. Specifically I am referring to the role of civil society in appealing to the donor community to pressure government to address the problem of corruption in its ranks (Hanlon 2004). However, it is precisely because of the context of “deep and wide corruption in government, that civil society has less influence” (Hanlon 2004:753). Furthermore, Hanlon asserts that when it came to discussions around debt relief for Mozambique, USAID lobbied Nordic donor representatives in support of the claim that debt relief was more important than corruption. It is argued that the success of this lobbying is attributable to the need to maintain the “myth of the Mozambican success story” (Hanlon 2004:748; Weinstein 2002). Indeed, despite high levels of relatively undisguised corruption, at the donor Consultative Group meeting in 2001 (less than two months after Siba-Siba Macuanua was assassinated), Mozambique asked for US$600 million and received US$722 million (Hanlon 2004:748).

2. **Education Policy Landscape**

At independence Mozambique’s education system was weak and elitist in nature. However some momentum in terms of improving and expanding educational opportunities, and particularly literacy training, was gained within the context of the national liberation struggle (1964-74), a context in which education and literacy were priorities (Disney 2002). The immediate post-independence era saw major political and social transformations, with the expansion and nationalization of educational opportunities a cornerstone of such transformations. This led to an “education boom”
(Negrao 2002) involving a massive expansion in primary enrollments within the first five years of independence. By 1981, gross primary enrollment stood at around 95% (Mario, Buendia, Kouwenhoven, Alberto and Waddington 2002:19)\(^4\).

Educational development has been guided by the assumptions and strategies most commonly associated with the human capital development approach as well as the governments desire to consolidate control and maintain a centralized system of education delivery in Mozambique, specifically during single-party rule (Disney 2002). The first five years or so of education planning in Mozambique is significant because it was during this time that the question of education quality emerged and it was believed that good planning and strong control mechanisms were the key components to ensuring quality. Thus, as Mario et al., (2002) suggest, the emphasis on government control of the education planning process led to a considerable reduction in the participation of the population in education initiatives (19).

In 1982 a new national education system (Sistema Nacional de Educacao in Portuguese) (SNE being its English acronym) was established. While (Mario et al. 2002:6) indicate that the SNE creation had involved “public debate” (6), there are no further and/or specific details concerning the nature of such civil participation in this education policy process. The SNE focused on ensuring the constitutionally guaranteed right to education was protected. Within the SNE education was also viewed as an essential strategy for poverty reduction.

In 1983, as the civil war began to spread and intensify, the SNE was implemented and with it the policy of compulsory and universal 7 years of primary education as well. However, there was a mass migration out of rural areas as the civil war spread, with large numbers moving into urban areas, making it virtually impossible to develop an effective and efficient education system. By 1986, 45% of the schools in Mozambique, and particularly those in rural areas, had been destroyed in the war (Mario et al. 2002:3). In

\(^4\) This figure is extremely high, and is somewhat misleading I suspect. However, viewed in the context of a socialist political regime that emphasized the importance of providing health care and education to the whole population, it is not surprising that such a statistic would appear in a government document, especially considering the exclusive leadership by Frelimo of the country since independence. It must be remembered too, that this is a gross enrollment rate figure, and that the net enrollment rate is much lower, and therefore more close to par with NERs of other “least developed countries” in sub-Saharan Africa.
1988, the primary gross enrollment rate had plummeted to 59%, from a high of 95% in 1981, with the net enrollment rate decreasing from 40% in 1981 to 32% in 1988 (MINED 1989, 15-19) (cited in Mario et al. 2002:6)

This deepened the gap between demographic growth and the capacity of the school network and, consequently, led to the long-term postponement of the introduction of compulsory and universal education that was a fundamental objective of the education reform of 1983 (Mario et al. 2002:6).

In the MINED’s 1989 report in which the SNE was assessed, the ministry concluded that there were several problems, beyond the challenges posed by the rapid increase in rural to urban migration and the destruction wrought by the war, that thwarted the efficiency of the SNE during its implementation phase. The excessive centralization and the poor management capacity of the education system were singled out in this report as barriers to the successful implementation of the SNE. In terms of pedagogical and logistical challenges to the efficiency of SNE associated reforms, MINED’s report highlights the large number of untrained and/or poorly trained teachers working in the education system. Specifically, the key problem identified, was that the new primary school curriculum had yet to be incorporated into the teacher education programs in the country (Mario et al. 2002).

In 1990, at the Conference of Donors, the Ministry of Education (MINED) presented “Education in Mozambique: Problems and Perspectives” (Mario et al. 1999). This document greatly influenced the development future education policy frameworks.

Mozambique’s participation at the Jomtien Education Conference in 1990 marked the beginning of the revitalization of education process in the country (Mario et al. 1999). Since 1994 the government has emphasized education as a fundamental human right and necessary for poverty reduction, social stability and national development.

The government…defined as priority the development of “actions resulting in the guarantee of peace, stability and national unity, by the reduction of absolute poverty levels in the improvement of people’s life, with an emphasis on education, health, rural development and employment” (Mario et al. 2002:7).
The 1995 National Education Policy and Strategies for Implementation document highlighted the importance of education for national development. Furthermore, education continued to be a priority area emphasized during the most recent (2004) presidential elections.


In their analysis of education sector studies from 1991-1998, Mario et al. (2002) indicate that there were “recurring themes” in the sector study documents they examined. These themes are included here as while these reports are between 5-10 years old, that many of the challenges identified persist today, albeit in some instances, to smaller degrees (Sack, Cross and Moulton 2004; World Bank 1999). Therefore, by way of “painting with broad strokes”, a sketch of the education landscape in Mozambique, as it emerged from Mario et al’s (2002) analysis of education sector documents, is offered below.

First, concern over educational attainment per capita (level is among the lowest in the world), and internal and external inefficiency is noted as a recurring theme in the sector documents. The gaps in enrollment rates between urban and rural areas, and along class (socio-economic) lines was also mentioned repeatedly as an area of concern for the government. Compounding these problems is that basic and secondary education is “rigid and promotes outdated teaching methods” (Mario et al. 2002:29). Furthermore, a smaller yet perhaps significant theme is highlighted that involved the argument put forth in at least two of the education sector studies, that,

...cultural values, involving, among others, the role of traditional education, might negatively influence the perceived value of formal schooling, thus lowering the enrolment, especially at more advanced levels of the educational system (Mario et al. 2002:29).

Second, the low institutional capacity of the MINED and the centralization of the education system were highlighted as barriers to the efficiency and effectiveness of education sector reforms. There was also concern over what was seen as the shifting emphasis on tertiary education and the “very strict regulations for the establishment of private schools” (Mario et al. 2002:30).

Third, a major theme emerged around issues of the quality of education “delivered” via the public education system. Specifically a large proportion of the reports
indicated the need for more and better trained teachers, and for more care to be taken facilitate regional and gender parity in the distribution of teachers, especially in primary schools throughout the country (Mario et al. 2002:30). Due to reduced state spending in the education sector as part of macroeconomic “adjustment”, and the accompanying decrease in administrative staff in the sector, as well as the geographic (among other forms) isolation of some communities, teachers often are under-supervised, not to mention “under-supported”.

Fourth, with respect to learning/teaching materials, there was a common theme around the lack of distributional and production capacity of the system to meet demand. Furthermore, concern is expressed because “teaching materials are inadequate because they lack awareness of the multilingual environment of Mozambique” (Mario et al. 2002:31). Indeed there is quite a bit of literature debating the issue of bilingual education in Mozambique.

A further theme presented by Mario et al. (2002) concerns the need to respond to the evolution of the majority of enrollments in non-formal and adult education literacy and post-literacy courses, to the current situation where there has been a steady rise in enrollments in evening classes in primary and secondary education (31).

Finally, Mario et al., (2002) indicate that discussion and highlighting of the importance of community involvement in education emerges as a theme from their analysis of education sector documents in the 90’s.

2.2. The Education Sector Strategy Program(s)

Beginning development in 1997 and implementation in 1999, the Education Sector Strategy Program(ESSP) 1999-2003 – “Reviving Schools and Expanding Opportunities”- the process around this education policy framework has been a collaborative one, involving donor, civil society and agencies/institutions working in the education sector in the country (World Bank 1999). However, as Mario et al. (2002) suggest the consultations with civil society were “considered by some as still insufficient” (8). The mandate of the ESSP is to provide,

… increased and equitable access to higher quality education through improvement in the management of education in order to promote economic and social development in Mozambique (World Bank 1999:2).
The ESSP seeks to ensure the quality and relevancy of the education available. Thus, the ESSP “has as its priority the increase of access to educational opportunities at all levels of education, having as a primary target the rapid progression to universal primary education, particularly promoting the increase of the enrolment of girls”, (MINED 1998:1). In summary the three main objectives of the ESSP are: i) increased educational access; ii) improved quality of education and iii) to ensure sustainability of educational improvement (i.e., expanded access and quality).

While not a World Bank initiative per se, IDA contributions to ESSP activities at the primary and secondary levels as well as strategic planning for other sub-sectors (i.e., technical and vocational education reforms, a project for which is currently in the World Bank pipeline), are a result of the approval and support of the World Bank for the ESSP. Furthermore, the ESSP complements the Bank’s “Country Assistance Strategy” framework for Mozambique and specifically the Government’s objectives of poverty reduction through:

(a) Promoting rapid, broad-based private sector led growth
(b) Capacity building and developing human resources
(c) Strengthening development partnerships (World Bank 1999:3).

In the current era, as education SWAp(s), the ESSP(s) 1999-2003 and the current one, 2004-2008, continue to guide the education reform process, the decentralization of MINED as well as the nature and destinations of donor (both bilateral and pooled) funding to the sector in Mozambique (Mundy & Bhanji 2005: World Bank 1999).

Since 2000, CIDA has been considered a major bilateral donor to Mozambique in the areas of education, agriculture/rural development, HIV/AIDS and governance (CIDA 2004). CIDA is currently supporting the ESSP with close to $29 million dollars in funding for the period 2003-2006. Future CIDA sector-wide support of the Mozambican government will be in the form of “pooled funds” and “some PBAs” (Mundy and Bhanji 2005:11), with other donors, as well as “support to decentralized projects that target the most vulnerable” (CIDA 2004:7). Support to the education sector in Mozambique will comprise half of the bilateral programming resources (CIDA 2005:9).
The specific areas of support for CIDA funding reflect the priorities of the Mozambican government as outlined in the PARPA. These priorities are improved educational quality, increased access to primary education and the strengthening of institutional capacity (CIDA 2004:10). Specifically CIDA’s support is channeled to the following: i) the education sector pooled fund; ii) provision of educational materials, including textbooks; iii) literacy programming; iv) gender equality in education and v) HIV/AIDS prevention education programs in schools (CIDA 2004:10). Under the ESSP, CIDA has committed $20 million to support for education materials Phase I (2003-2005) (cited in Mundy and Bhanji 2005:11).

Under the ESSP, civil society seems to be given some responsibility for monitoring and evaluating progress in the education sector made through ESSP activities. Under the “Summary Program Analysis – Participatory Approach” section of the ESSP Project Appraisal Document (World Bank 1999), the following appears,

The program is demand driven and based on the perception of the benefits of more and better quality education by Government and civil society (World Bank 1999:33).

In terms of the future prospects for ESSP impacts, Mario et al. (2002) suggest that the sustainability of the outcomes of the ESSP should be guaranteed, on the one hand, through the continued processes of inquiry and links with the society and, on the other hand, through the restructuring of MINED based on decentralized procedures. This will imply greater accountability and commitment from the different institutions of the education system, which will require strengthening of the capacity at all levels (9).

Since late 2001, Mozambique has been a Fast Track Initiative country. The ESSP is the education sector plan guiding FTI activities in the country. However, the Memorandum of Understanding (2001) by MINED does not mention civil society at all.

HIV/AIDS is a priority area for action as specified in the PARPA (Mozambique’s PRSP), due to a high prevalence rate in the country (estimated 13%), although it’s important to note that this rate of infection is relatively low compared with other sub-Saharan African countries (example: Zambia’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is estimated to be around 20%). In terms of the impact on the education sector, it is estimated that by
2012, 17% of the teaching force will die due to AIDS-related illness (CIDA 2004:13). Over the past 2-3 years, concern has been raised by state and non-state actors over the fact that Mozambique is not training sufficient numbers of teachers to meet future needs. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any information on teachers’ unions in Mozambique.

Dependence of the education sector on external funding has remained high since the early 90’s⁵. Major bilateral donors to the education sector include Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. Other international agencies supporting education in Mozambique include the African Development Bank, the European Commission, the Islamic Development Bank, various United Nations agencies - most notably UNESCO and the UNDP - but also including the World Bank (UNESCO Education Portal; Takala and Marope 2003). For example, the Bank has funded education sector projects, for example the construction and rehabilitation of schools, textbooks, teacher development and sector management and planning.

Tables 2 and 3, show flows of ODA to the education sector in Zambia and ODA to basic education respectively.

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⁵ There is some discrepancy in the figures available regarding the % of the education budget that is externally funded. For example, Takala and Marope (2003) estimated that 41% of all education expenditure in Mozambique comes from external sources, whereas according to information accessed through the UNESCO Education Portal, 28% of the education budget was externally funded in 2004.
Table 1: ODA to Education (US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount ($ million)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (1999-2003)</td>
<td>58.1</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 2: ODA to Basic Education (US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount ($ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>32.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>24.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>26.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (1999-2003)</td>
<td>23.6</td>
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There are two main ministries that deal with education in the country. The Minister of Education is Alcido Nguenha (2000-). The Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology is Lidia Brito (2000-2005). Additionally, the Ministry of Planning and Finance now also has a role in the education sector as it is responsible for disbursing FTI and other donor funding as per the negotiated bilateral and multilateral agreements. The administrative structures remains relatively centralized, although decentralization efforts are currently underway.

2.3. Sampling of Key Education Statistics

Primary Gross Enrollment Ratio: 85% (2001/02) (UNESCO)
Lower Primary (grades 1-5) Net Enrollment Rate: 75.3% (2004) [compared to 44% in 1997] (UNICEF)
Girls’ Primary GER: 87.3% (2001)
Primary Completion Rates: 40% (2003) (Ibid)
Girls’ Primary Completion Rates: 20% (in rural/northern regions) to 35% in urban/southern areas (Ibid)
Girls’ Survival Rate to Grade 5: 44.1% (02/03) (World Bank)
Private Primary Enrollment as a % of Total Enrollment: 2.0 (2001) (UNESCO)
Out-of-School Children Total: 950.8 (thousands) (02/03) (UNESCO)
Out-of-School Girls: 518.2 (02/03) (World Bank)

Secondary Net Enrollment Ratio: 10.8% (2001) (Ibid)
We can see from the above statistics that there is a drastic decrease in both GER and NER at the secondary level! We also see a relatively high increase in the proportion of private enrollments at the secondary level compared to the primary level. This may be due to the very limited spaces available at the secondary level. However, low enrollment at this level may also reflect the non-compulsory nature of secondary education, and prevailing attitudes that education is not relevant to the needs of the majority rural population (Disney 2002; Ibraimo 2003).

2.4. Girls’ Education

In terms of equality, rural girls are the most disadvantaged in terms of accessing quality education. Further evidence of the large disparities between the socio economic status of girls and women in Mozambique, is found in the gaps in literacy rates between women and women. According to information from the CIDA website (accessed September 12, 2005), Mozambique has a literacy rate of 42%, with 60% of the male population considered literate, whereas 28% of the female population was considered literate (World Bank and UNDP 2004).

According to Ibraimo (2003), there are a number of NGOs/CSOs working directly with issues of and for the promotion of women’s empowerment, with education being a priority area to identified. The “Forum Mulher” is a non-governmental confederation of women activists and NGOs in Mozambique, although because of language barriers, I am unable to provide further details concerning this confederation.

At the national level the “Grupo Operativo para o Avanco da Mulher (GOAM)”, is a body of the Council of Ministers that overseas the inter-sectoral integration of gender related plans and programs, specifically in the areas of education, health, employment, markets, financial resources, legal status and social protection (Ibraimo 2003:9). Furthermore, the GOAM seeks to include in its activities, representatives from line ministries, the mass media, academia, NGOs and religious groups (Ibraimo 2003:9).

3. Civil society in Mozambique

In order to understand the broader social, political and economic context for civil society in Mozambique, it is important to appreciate the impact of the country’s post-independence history, and the establishment of three new political systems in less than thirty years.
As previously mentioned, an urban bias characterizes “civil society” in the country, both in terms of the representativeness and the activities of non-state groups.

Frelimo’s loss of legitimacy in rural areas was due to the oppressive character of its one-party hierarchy, unpopular villagization programmes and failure to provide improved life opportunities in rural areas due to its urban bias” (Buur and Kyed 2005:8).

In response to the local governance/regulatory vacuum the elimination of “traditional leaders’” authority vis-à-vis the state, created, the central state embarked on a process of establishing “dynamizing groups” whose ostensible objectives were to enhance civic participation in the areas in which they functioned (Buur and Kyed 2005). In the late 70’s when these groups were formed, along with villagization initiatives during this same time and into the 80’s as the war intensified, that “in a context marked by fear and suspicion, coercion became an ever more important component of mobilization and discipline (Alexander 1997:4; Hanlon 1984) By way of conclusion then, Buur and Kyed (2005) state “…there is a very meager history of state-encouraged open ‘consultation’ or ‘participatory’ democratic engagement in rural Mozambique” (6-7).

However, over the past fifteen years Mozambique has moved dramatically away from a state-centered development model, thereby opening up spaces for civil society as well as market liberalization (Pfeiffer 2004). As part of the PARPA, decentralization initiatives aim to devolve administrative and budgeting responsibilities to provincial and district levels across a number of sectors, including education. As noted above, traditional leaders have now been formally recognized and “re-accepted” into the administrative structure of the Mozambican government, with new responsibilities accompanying their “new” status as “community authorities”.

Within this new “civil society-friendly” environment, two main groups dominate a) international NGOs and b) Pentecostal-influence churches and other church-based organizations (Pfeiffer 2004). Pfeiffer argues that the international NGO presence has exacerbated social inequality by channeling resources primarily to local and national elites. Furthermore, the fact that church-based organizations are proliferating and thriving in poor communities throughout Mozambique, outside of the aid relationship, suggests a
deepening of the marginalization experienced by vulnerable groups in the market economy.

In the early 90’s civil servants saw their wages decrease drastically and in less than a five year time span (1991-1996), the wage of health care workers and teachers were a third of what they had been in 1991 (Hanlon 2004:751). In tandem with the reduction in state spending in the health, education and other civil sectors, international donors and NGOs were hiring “technicians” and “paying them high salaries to work for them instead of the government (Hanlon 2004:751; Donini 1995). The behaviour of donor agencies and international NGOs here is also linked by Hanlon (2004) to the problem of state corruption, in that donors gave money to key civil servants to “steal time” and do outside work rather than the government work they were getting to do (752).

A study by Kruse (2002) for NORAD on civil society in Mozambique, found that “there is no clear separation between the formal and the informal, the rural and the urban, the modern and the traditional, those inside and outside the ‘state system’” (Rebello, Thue, Stensrud and Sissel 2002:3). The extremely weak institutional capacity of the state is evidenced by the fact that an estimated 60 percent of the population lives according to traditional norms and structures, with “little notion of the state, formal laws and their rights” (Rebello et al. 2002:3). Thus, governance is often the purview of traditional (i.e., non-state) leaders and structures at the community level. Interestingly in urban areas, many of the civic associations that have formed “reveal their rural roots” (Rebello et al. 2002:3) through the common practice of having members of the traditional power elite in key decision-making positions.

So, while there does seem to exist, extensive “traditional”/non-state groups/organizations, most remain invisible because they do not fit the mold of what a civil society association “looks like”. The more visible civil society organizations tend to be concentrated in the urban areas and characteristically have a “corporate management and staffing structure and pay market salaries” (Rebello et al. 2002:3). The implications of this may be that such “corporate” organizations have the “cream of the civil society crop” in terms of skills, capacity, motivation and connections, with the subsequent
draining of expertise from more traditional, or at least smaller and less well-funded organizations that remain unable to compete.

The governance culture in Mozambique has historically tended to be “closed and non-consultative” (Rebello et al. 2002:3). Thus civil society activism is a recent phenomenon and both the state and non-state actors are relatively “green” at it – indeed, Kruse (2002) notes that civil society in Mozambique is still in its’ infancy (4). However, in the government’s Five-Year 2000-2004 Plan, one of the key objectives is to facilitate increased participation by citizens, communities and civil society in the formulation and evaluation of government policies and in satisfying their needs (Rebello et al. 2002:4). Strengthening this commitment to “inviting” civil society participation in state affairs, the government’s Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARPA) identifies the need for broad initiative and action of citizens and their institutions (families, companies, associations, clubs, NGOs, CSOs etc) (Rebello et al. 2002:4).

The Public Sector Reform Strategy (PSRS) states that there needs to be better definition of the roles, responsibilities and rights of various public, private and civil sector actors. There is currently weak institutional capacity on the part of the government to establish and strengthen mechanisms for civil society participation and this is compounded by the persistence of a highly centralized governance system, despite efforts to decentralize decision-making and finance to district/community levels. The Kruse (2002) study indicates that there is variation in terms of the openness of state ministries to civil society. The ministries of Planning and Finance (decentralized planning and budgeting process), Health (relations with churches and NGOs and positive proposals for closer collaboration with traditional medicine and communities), Agriculture (Land Campaign and promotion of voluntary associations), and Education (not-for-profit service providers and community involvement) are considered to be most favourable to CS participation.

Kruse (2002) notes that agrarian, domestic violence, HIV/AIDS, the needs of vulnerable groups, poverty-reduction/well-being are the main “issues” around which civil society organizations (“formal” and “non-formal”) are mobilized. The activities CSOs engage in tend to focus on the dissemination of information (health, legal, rights) and other educational activities as well as some advocacy work and some degree of
engagement with the state, although this latter activity is largely dependent upon the
degree of participation “invited” by the government. In summary, Rebello et al. (2002)
notes that:

There is no historical experience to draw on, the legal
framework is archaic, government attitudes range from
suspicion to ambivalence, the vast majority of the population
is illiterate, uninformed, and extremely poor (4).

This quote succinctly sums up the somewhat bleak context for the development
and strengthening of civil society in Mozambique. However, the contributions of USAID,
NORAD and CIDA to civil society and governance capacity-building bode well for the
future of civil society in the country.

3.1. Women’s Organizations

Jennifer Disney’s (2002) dissertation provides a compelling comparative analysis of
women’s organizing in post-revolutionary Mozambique and Nicaragua, a period in both
countries characterized by “liberal capitalist democratization and a transition from mass
organizations of the party-state-government to autonomous organizing civil society” (9).
The key issue concerning women’s organizing in Mozambique, identified by Disney
(2002) is that of the degree of ideological and organizational autonomy that women’s
groups demonstrate. While space does not permit a detailed discussion of Disney’s
findings, it is important to highlight the limited autonomy of the Organization of
Mozambican Women (OMM is its’ English acronym) in either of these dimensions.

The OMM is the national level women’s organization in Mozambique, growing
out of two earlier women’s groups established during liberation war – the Libertacao de
Feminino de Mozambique (LIFEMO or the “Women’s League”) and the Nestacamento
Feminino (Women’s Detachment) (Disney 2002). The main objective of these two
groups was the mobilization of women around the liberation movement. Carlos Cardoso,
a well-known Mozambican journalist who was assassinated in 2001 while investigating
allegations of large-scale bank fraud during the privatization of the country’s central
bank, referred to LIFEMO or the “Women’s League” as a “leaders’ wives’ club” (cited in
Disney 2002:80).
Following the death of the chief of the Women’s Detachment (Josina Machel, the wife of Mozambique’s first president after independence, Samora Machel), the organization became the OMM under new leadership. The important point however, is that the OMM, like its predecessors, was created and sustained by the Party (Frelimo).

3.2. Civil Society Participation in National Planning Documents

According to Ibraimo (2003), the most important national planning documents are: a) the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARPA as it is referred to in Mozambique); the Medium Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF); the Economic and Social Plan (PES); the Sector Integrated Programs (SIPs) and the Public Budget (9). The PARPA specifies objectives and sets out strategic programs for implementation in priority sectors for the achievement of poverty reduction targets. The financial implications of these sector programs find expression in the MTFF – a medium terms (5 years) budgeting instrument (Ibraimo 2003:9). Mozambique currently has in place SIPs in the education, health, agricultural and roads/infrastructure sectors. The advantage of SIPs is that these documents present in tandem, the sector priorities and programming as well as their financial implications. Furthermore, Ibraimo (2003) suggests that the SIPs process invites the participation of “civil society and international organizations”, however she does not specify beyond dissemination activities, in what capacity such non-governmental groups engage in other ways in the SIPs policy process (10).

And finally, the PES and the Public Budget are both instruments that are used for the purposes of evaluating progress made as per the PARPA/PRSP. While the PES’s have usually been developed for use at the national and provincial levels, Ibraimo (2003) notes that some “sub-provincial entities have started to develop this planning tool”. According to Ibraimo, these PES’s represent a potential entry point for lobbying/advocacy efforts – in the case of this author, she is particularly interested in identifying spaces for civil society participation in the gender budgeting process.

3.3. International Civil Society Organizations

Save the Children is a major international NGO with programs ongoing in Mozambique (Save the Children, accessed October 10, 2005). Details of Save’s education program is provided in the section below “Civil Society and Education”. However, in addition to this program Save is involved in facilitating economic opportunities through lending and
savings programs, targeting women traders. Additionally, Save operates several health related programs, which involve support for government health extension services in isolated communities, HIV/AIDS programs aimed at mitigating the impact of this deadly disease on orphans and other vulnerable children (OVCs), as well as hunger prevention programs.

Indeed, according to Save’s website, it has been a leader in terms of drawing attention to the growing problem of OVCs in the country. Currently, orphans represent 6% of the population (Ibid). In the future, Save plans to continue to strengthen their role in responding to this rapidly unfolding crisis, claiming,

Communities are appreciative of the support in registering children, advocacy for free school and health care while also providing tangible material assistance such as school materials, housing repair assistance and seeds/seedlings for community care gardens (Ibid).

4. Civil Society and Education

The ESSP development process formally seeks to facilitate civil society participation in conjunction with donor-MINED partnership. The cost of the ESSP has been broken down to ¾ met internally, through financing partnership among the government, NGOs, communities and ¼ met by donor funding (Mario et al. 2002). While Coordinating and Consultative councils have been established and given the responsibility of preparing technical reports, there is not any information on who, or if civil society representatives participate in these.

Mozambique is also a partner country in the Commonwealth Education Fund and the CEF Strategic Plan for 2005-2007 details efforts to promote civil society engagement in EFA processes through this initiative. The PARPA 2001 identifies four main problems in the education sector: i) limited educational access; ii) poor quality of teaching and learning; iii) high rate of inefficiency as evident in the high drop-out and repetition rates and; iv) high cost of expanding access and maintaining quality of education (i.e., sustainability concerns) (CEF 2005).

The main international partners in the CEF initiative are Action Aid Mozambique, Save the Children – UK and Oxfam UK. Action Aid Mozambique is the lead agency. The Mozambican Movement on EFA (MEFA) was consulted by the CEF coalition to identify
priority areas and assess how best the CEF could support MEFA activities (CEF 2005). Following this the CEF management committee was established, with representatives from the three international partners as well as the Community Development Foundation (CDF) (also the chair of MEFA) and the Mozambican Presbyterian Church (CEF 2005).

Between 2003 and 2004 (the provisional CEF strategic plan phase), MEFA, FAWEMO (Forum for African Women Educationalists Mozambique) and Magario (a national NGO) received funding through the CEF for their activities. These activities tended to focus on efforts to increase civil society capacity to participate effectively in the design and implementation of national and local education plans and to create and strengthen broad based alliances and coalitions (CEF 2005). Additionally, some activities were intended to help support the monitoring, evaluation and advocacy work of civil society with respect to education policy development and implementation (CEF 2005).

As an example of the success the CEF has had in support of the establishment of links between MEFA and national, regional and international partners, MEFA is the Southern Africa ANCEFA (SANCEFA) founding member and moderator since 2001 (CEF, 2005). These coalitions are also part of the Global Campaign for Education coalition of organizations around the world engaged in efforts to hold governments accountable to commitments made regarding the EFA framework targets. As part of the work of SANCEFA, a Virtual Resource Center, run by MEFA has been established that acts to disseminate information concerning non-formal education – an area where CSOs are concentrated in Mozambique (and elsewhere in the region). A further example of increasing international linkages is the partnership between CEF, OXFAM-GB and MEFA in the support and coordination of Global Campaign Week.

4.1. The Education Sector and the PARPA

Mozambique’s PRSP, or “PARPA”, as it is know (Poverty Reduction Action Plan) was approved in 2001. Within the PARPA, education is one of six priority areas, considered “fundamental” to achieving goals of human development and broad-based growth as set out in the document (3). The participation of civil society and the private sector (these are distinguished in the document) in the selection of priority areas as well as the development of sectoral strategies and programmes (PARPA 2001:3).
While the participation of civil society and NGOs (again, these are separated in the official document) in education sector policy and programming consultations is emphasized, the PARPA also indicates the implementation role of “civil society, religious institutions and NGOs” in the areas of adult literacy and adult education.

According to the PARPA most sectors do not have “standardized and permanent” consultation models. However as part of the PARPA process, sectoral consultations were convened, bringing together civil society, NGOs, donors, trade unions, religious bodies and the private sector with the aim of creating “consensus on objectives, priorities, specific targets and sectoral strategies to combat poverty” (PARPA 2001:97). Following consensus at the sectoral level, consultations with these groups/actors moves to provincial and central levels. It is at these levels that official objectives, priorities and targets “for the fight against poverty” are defined (PARPA 2001:97). It is important to note that the health and education sectors, relative to other sectors involved, carried out the most extensive consultations in developing their sectoral plans. The main reason for more comprehensive consultations in these sectors is attributed in the PARPA to their larger human resource base and consequently greater reach to the grassroots (PARPA 2001).

With specific reference to the consultations with civil society concerning education sector policy and programming as established in the PARPA, the document claims that,

participatory planning is also a long-standing tradition in the education sector…all levels, from top to bottom, take part, starting with the schools, where the process is supervised by management, with the participation of teachers” (Annex 1:ii).

Following consultations at the school level, District Directorates of Education receive the information collected during these meetings. The Directorates are then responsible for synthesizing the information from all territories under their jurisdiction and producing discussion papers that must be “approved by the sector technicians, the representatives of other public institutions such as Finance, as well as other government bodies who work directly with communities”(PARPA 2001: Annex: ii).

Sectoral planning processes at the central level seem to be less participatory, although the PARPA states
Notwithstanding the *modus operandi* of sectoral planning, involving these different hierarchical levels, there is frequent participation by non-governmental entities and organizations, as well as donors and the private sector, which contribute to the various stages of development of the Plan (PARP 2001 Annex: ii).

Basically, at the central level, provincial sectoral plans are “brought into line with guidelines established at macro-level for the sector” (PARPA 2001, Annex: ii).

Overall, the PARPA seeks to highlight the institutional spaces that have been created for civil society participation in education sector policy and programming. For example, the main institutional instruments that are used by the government for managing the change in the education sector are meetings with the a) Consultative Council, b) Coordinating Council of the MINED, c) Education Sector’s Donors Coordination Meeting (RECORDE), National Meeting with Provincial and District Directors of Education “to which non-governmental bodies are regularly invited” (PARPA 2001, Annex: ii). Additionally, the MINED consults with NGOs and other civil society groups around education policy and programming, for example the Strategic Plan for Education in which NGOs and major international donors to the education sector participated in the development of.

Perhaps it is somewhat surprising then for the PARPA to state, with reference to two main findings that emerged from the consultation process about the process, that

A certain frustration was noted in relation to the frequency of consultation meetings on various issues. As a result, an emphasis was placed on the need to give priority to implementation and the execution of actions by the State (PARPA 2001:102).

In Mozambique, Save the Children works with communities, local authorities and NGOs/CSOs around the promotion of girls’ education and specifically to address the high drop-out rates of girls through targeting the root causes for early school leaving. Save’s education program involves the development of school councils, teacher training, school construction, health and nutrition and curriculum development (Ibid).

4.2. Teachers’ Unions

Very little information was found concerning teachers’ unions vis-à-vis education governance in Mozambique. We do know there is the Organização Nacional de
Professores (National Teachers’ Organization, “ONP”). Regarding Mozambique’s implementation of mother-tongue based bilingual primary education in parts of the rural countryside, Benson (2004) suggests that the “teachers’ unions”, as well as some communities caused resistance to this policy on the basis of the perception that it was “top-down” and non-consultative (59).

Historically, unions in Mozambique were regarded as arms of the government and representative organizations of workers\(^6\). As such, unions received substantial government support. The ONP received government support in the form of salaries for central office staff and elected representatives, automobiles and properties. As an arm of the government the ONP developed strong national, provincial and district networks, although their functioning was dependent on continued government support.

With the shift to multiparty democracy and the liberalization of the economy, the ONP has suffered from decreasing material support from the government. While strong organizational networks and machinery exist, lack of financial support is currently limiting the capacity of the ONP to advocate on behalf of teachers in the country. In response, the ONP has tapped into funding opportunities through the Alberta Teachers’ Association, the British Columbia’s Teachers’ Federation and some Scandinavian teacher organizations.

5. **Final Thoughts**

There has been discussion more recently in Mozambique of the need for education sector programmes and sector-wide approaches to move beyond limited numbers of government and agency representatives. Interestingly, Buchert (2002) also discusses that in recent years (to 2002), there has been exceptionally strong continuity in leadership at the senior ministry (education) level and that there have been concerted efforts to provide management and training across the middle-level management positions (80). Furthermore that this training has been both substantive in terms of management techniques, and behavioural in terms of strengthening commitment to national development through team-building efforts, creation of incentives, and delegation of responsibility and decision-making powers (80). Perhaps these efforts and the skills and

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\(^6\) I am indebted to Tim Johnston of the Alberta Teacher’s Association for the information on the ONP presented here.
attitudes such training fosters, may make valuable contributions to opening up spaces for civil society and government partnership and dialogue.

In terms of donor harmonization and assembling agencies around common purposes and procedures, such efforts have been quite successful because there have been relatively few political or organizational hindrances. It seems as though this may be largely attributable to the relative newness of the aid relationship in Mozambique because of the disruption caused by the long internal war. The important point here though is that Buchert (2002) claims that the “solidified work with the international agencies in Mozambique also seems to have sidelined the national NGOs in the education sector” (80).

Similar to the Zambian case study, CSOs in Mozambique have played an important role in providing civic education programs in the post-war period. Furthermore, there seem to be more CSOs pursuing multi-sectoral approaches rather than strictly focusing on the education sector. This is particularly evident in terms of the high concentration of CSOs in HIV/AIDS education and prevention/treatment programming.

Challenges facing CSOs in the education sector include capacity development, making sure local and national CSOs are not dominated by external agendas, and defining roles of national and international CSOs, government and donors.

Unfortunately, there is very little general information on civil society in Mozambique, and particularly, CS participation in the education sector, thus constraining the depth and breadth of this summary analysis. Despite the relative newness of civil activism in Mozambique, it is remarkable that civil society has been able to emerge as a regional leader with respect to EFA processes and particularly as the lead member of SANCEFA, a member in the Global Campaign for Education.

It is interesting that despite the fact that so-called “traditional” networks and leaders were banned at independence by Frelimo, and the way the prolonged war displaced people and devastated communities, traditional networks have persisted (Bertelsen 2003). Negrao (2002)

It would seem that while government explicitly supports civil society participation in education policy development and implementation, as detailed in the PARPA and ESSP, this reflects more the intentions, rather than the reality of such processes. There is
not any information regarding structures in place to support the engagement of civil society in the governance of education. I believe that the lack of such structures is evidenced in the rather broad and unspecified activities that, for example CIDA and NORAD, indicate with respect to “supporting civil society capacity building”.

It seems that a particular area of CS weakness, is in terms of the low level of interaction with donors. We see this most clearly in the case of the FTI Memorandum of Understanding which specifies the government of Mozambique and donor relationship, yet makes no reference to civil society.

A main problem I can identify, albeit with limited information, is that civil society is much disorganized, except for a few rare examples (MEFA; SANCÉFA), and rather ad hoc. As Kruse (2002) details, there is difficulty in assessing CS capacity and activities because of the blurry separation between “formal” and “informal” CS groups (Negrao 2003) and consequently the difficulty in pinpointing who or what exactly constitutes “civil society” in Mozambique, or whose interests civil society organizations might represent.

In terms of making recommendations, I would highlight the need to find ways of reaching the “traditional” groups that lay beyond commonly held notions of what civil society is and is not, and formally recognize the need to support the activities of these groups. I think this is particularly salient because, as previously mentioned, half (if not more) of the population live “outside” the state in the sense that many do not have a sense of their rights, responsibilities, or those of the state (Negrao 2003). Therefore, I believe that targeting groups that exist in such contexts, and supporting their efforts to enhance their “constituents’” wellbeing, may be an effective (albeit it highly complex) strategy for mobilizing all segments of civil society in Mozambique.

Overall, civil society in Mozambique needs greater public space for engaging in policy discussions, implementation and monitoring at the government level. Language is an area that has emerged in this desk review as a barrier to the full participation of “civil society”, and particularly citizens in remote rural area, who often do not speak and/or read Portuguese.
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