STRATEGIES AND SUCCESSES IN
INFLUENCING EDUCATION POLICY CHANGE:
A CASE STUDY OF THE TANZANIAN EDUCATION NETWORK (TEN/MET)

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
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Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the
University of Toronto

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STRATEGIES AND SUCCESSES IN INFLUENCING EDUCATION POLICY CHANGE: A CASE STUDY OF THE TANZANIAN EDUCATION NETWORK (TEN/MET)
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Abstract

Civil society networks have emerged as potentially important actors in the education policy of Southern countries since the new millennium. This thesis explores the Tanzanian Education Network’s (TEN/MET) ability to successfully impact education policies and policy structures in Tanzania. It documents key examples of the network’s policy influence in education. Drawing on civil society network and social movement theorists, the thesis explores both intra-network and relational strategies TEN/MET used to affect change. Three stand out among them: the leveraging of a common voice, the iterative use of complementary and contentious relations in the domestic sphere, and the leveraging of international pressure to affect change domestically, also known as boomerang strategy.
Acknowledgements

One learns through writing a thesis how collective an activity it is – how it too is the result of a network of people. This thesis would not have been written without the contributions and generosity of civil society leaders, donors and government officials, who gave me both their time and knowledge while I was in Tanzania. It would not have come to fruition without the input of my thesis supervisor, Karen Mundy, who helped me to find the gaps and think beyond the taken-for-granted assumptions that underpin much of civil society and international development; and my second reader, Daniel Schugurensky, with his insight and patience. It would not have been written without the support of my friends, particularly Patricia Poulin, Natalie Poulson, Li Koo, Chris Fraser, Jeff Myers, Joanne Johnston, Kate Rogers and my partner James Anstey, who spent many an hour listening to my ideas, commenting on my work, and providing much needed sanity-breaks. Finally, the love and support of my family, both in Toronto and Alberta, provided the much-needed encouragement to keep going until the last page. I thank you all from the bottom of my heart.
## List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAWATA</td>
<td>Tanzania National Women’s Council (banned in 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEDC</td>
<td>Basic Education Development Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BESSIP</td>
<td>Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme (Zambia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania’s main political party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEF</td>
<td>Commonwealth Education Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGCE</td>
<td>Canadian Global Campaign for Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWBE</td>
<td>Coalition for Quality Basic Education (Malawi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>Education Sector Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith-Based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FVEDC</td>
<td>Folk and Vocational Education Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support (One example of a PBA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE</td>
<td>Global Campaign for Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross Enrollment Rate (Ratio of all students in [primary] school to all [primary] school-aged children in the population, as a percentage.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country (IMF designation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMG</td>
<td>Independent Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMSC</td>
<td>Inter Ministerial Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization (e.g., United Nations organizations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA</td>
<td>Kiswahili term for the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty, following the PRSP (i.e. PRSP II)</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (previously known as the Ministry of Education and Culture - MOEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOEVT</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (previously known as the Ministry of Education and Culture - MOEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>Programme-Based Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEDP</td>
<td>Primary Education Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETS</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDP</td>
<td>Secondary Education Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAp</td>
<td>Sector Wide Approach (One example of a PBA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAN</td>
<td>Transnational Advocacy Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN/MET</td>
<td>Tanzanian Education Network / Mtando wa Elimu Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEDC</td>
<td>Tertiary and Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsh.</td>
<td>Tanzanian shilling (1275 Tsh. = US$1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTU</td>
<td>Tanzania Teachers’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPE</td>
<td>Universal Primary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URT</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Chapter One: 
Introduction

Purpose

This thesis examines a civil society network’s strategies for encouraging education policy change, through the experience of the Tanzanian Education Network /Mtando wa Elimu Tanzania (TEN/MET), a network of roughly 200 civil society organizations involved in education on mainland Tanzania. The proliferation of networks of civil society actors is a fairly new phenomenon in the international development arena, let alone in the field of education. It has come at a time when the education policy table in developing countries has expanded to include not only government representatives, but also international donors and civil society actors. However, very little has been written about civil society networks, particularly in education, and even less on the actual impact that these networks have on successfully influencing policy change.

In the spring of 2006, I was presented with opportunity of studying this phenomenon in Tanzania. A colleague and I were commissioned by my professor, Karen Mundy, in collaboration with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to study the role of Tanzanian civil society organizations (CSOs), in general, in the governance of the education sector, in comparison to those in Mali, Kenya and Burkina Faso. My thesis topic at that time focused on the advocacy framing of these individual CSOs.

While conducting my field research, however, I began to be more interested in the manner through which these individual CSOs collectively decided to advocate for change in education policy. Several new education-related networks had emerged in Tanzania around the millennium, dealing with issues like early-childhood or disability education, or representing geographical regions. However, each network I interviewed professed to work in collaboration with the Tanzanian Education Network - TEN/MET. It seemed a natural progression to look more specifically at the advocacy work of TEN/MET and its members. As well, in a comparison of my final report (Haggerty, Manion & Mundy, 2007) to those of my colleagues (Cherry & Mundy, 2007; Sivasubramaniam & Mundy, 2007; Maclure, Kabore, Meyong, Lavan & Mundy, 2007), it emerged that TEN/MET presented the strongest case of CSOs affecting change in education policy. It appeared to
be the most cohesive working CSO network in education among the four countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Tanzania (Mundy, Cherry, Haggerty, Maclure & Sivasubramaniam, 2007). I began to question why and how TEN/MET has been able to achieve its numerous successes, in contrast to these other civil society networks.

**Research Questions**

The thesis addresses and analyzes the following overarching question:

How has TEN/MET been able to successfully impact education policies and policy structures in Tanzania?

In order to answer this question, it was necessary to break it into two components. First, I needed to establish that TEN/MET had successfully impacted education policies and structures in Tanzania. Although it became clear to me over the course of my research that TEN/MET had successfully impacted government policies and policy structures in the field of research, very little of its contributions in this area had been documented. As such, the first smaller question I explore within is:

What are the key education policy changes in which the Tanzanian Education Network (TEN/MET) influence has been important?

Following on this question, I began to draw out the strategies that the network itself engaged in to affect policy. My second question therefore follows as:

What strategies have allowed TEN/MET to influence key policy changes in the education sector in Tanzania?

**Methodology**

A qualitative case-study methodology was adopted to undertake this research, with the idea of gaining “an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those involved. The interest is in process rather than outcomes, in context rather than a specific variable, in discovery rather than confirmation” (Merriam, 1998, p. 19). Some theorists have noted that case-studies are undertaken in educational research with a variety of intents (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1994). The intent of this particular case-study can be described as “interpretive” (Merriam, 1998); the purpose is to garner insight into
an issue and/or create or affect policy. This contrasts with other rationales for undertaking case-studies, some of which are done solely for their own “intrinsic” worth, others to compare several cases together in a “collective case-study” (Stake, 1994), and others still to use for “evaluative” purposes (Merriam, 1998). The story I relate is of course important in its own right, with one raison d’être being to descriptively document the emerging role of TEN/MET in Tanzanian education policy. However, it is my hope that the empirical evidence will help to readjust the civil society network theories it relates to, and will serve as an example from which other education networks can take lessons.

Merriam (1998) describes a case-study as a circle with a heart in it. The circle represents the limits of the case study, which in this case are TEN/MET and its members. The heart of the matter is the research question, namely how TEN/MET has contributed to education policy change, and what strategies it employed in this regard.

As previously mentioned, I first gathered the data used in this thesis to form the Tanzanian part of a larger cross-country comparative study led by Dr. Mundy, on “Civil Society Participation and Governance of Educational Systems in the Contexts of Sector-Wide Approaches to Basic Education.” The cross-case study, funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), consisted of eight country reviews and four field-research cases (see Appendix A: Permission to use Data, Design of Field Research, and Participant Consent Form). I was the main researcher for both the Tanzanian desk review and analysis of the field-research, but was fortunate to have the accompaniment and insight of my colleague Carly Manion for the interviews in the field.

This larger case-study on Tanzania focused on an overview of Tanzanian civil society in education, in the context of sector-wide approaches to aid. It consisted of a) “mapping the civil society organizations engaged in education,” b) “civil society from the view of the Ministry of Education and donor organizations,” and c) “research communities and their linkages to civil society” (Mundy, 2005, p. 2). One of the findings of this report, when compared to the other country case-studies of Kenya, Mali and Burkina Faso, is that not only is education civil society in Tanzania a more recognized and legitimised force in education policy, but that the main networks involved in
education issues were more cohesive, and appeared to be more effective in the area of governance (Mundy et al., 2007). This thesis attempts to build from this knowledge.

Interviews were undertaken with representatives from 49 civil society organizations, of which 43 were either TEN/MET members or networks affiliated and/or working with TEN/MET. Most of the interviews were conducted in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, although we were able to speak with a few CSO representatives from Lushoto, Moshi, Mtwara and Longido. Predominantly, a snowball sampling was done, where interviewees directed us to other CSOs they felt were important for us to speak with. However, as we wanted to speak with as diverse types of CSOs as possible (as seen in Table 1), we also did a small random sampling for some types of non-government organizations (NGOs), such as sub-national NGOs. We also interviewed five bilateral donors, four international organizations (IOs), and two government officials, whom I draw upon when appropriate for this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Networks</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Affiliated with TEN/MET)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subnational Networks</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TEN/MET members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National NGOs</td>
<td>13 (9)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TEN/MET members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subnational NGOs</td>
<td>13 (12)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TEN/MET members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO/Regional NGOs</td>
<td>13 (11)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TEN/MET members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based Organizations</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TEN/MET members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ Unions</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TEN/MET members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Affiliated with TEN/MET)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Committees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Partners</td>
<td>9 (5, 4)</td>
<td>14 (7, 7)</td>
<td>9 (5, 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Donors &amp; IOs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td><strong>89</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this thesis, interviews are cited by their categorical designation: “C” denotes CSOs (e.g. Interview C14), “G” denotes government representatives, “D” denotes bilateral donors such as CIDA, “IO” denotes international organizations or multilateral organizations such as the World Bank or United Nations organizations, and “R” refers to researchers. As well, I collected and analyzed electronic and paper documents, including research papers, workshop manuals, annual reports, and media-focused advocacy campaigns. These additional sources of evidence have contributed to the ‘construct validity’ of the case-study (Yin, 2003).

Following my return to Canada, the interviews were transcribed and then coded for themes. For the larger case-study, I had been asked to briefly identify the interventions that civil society had made in the governance of education. For this thesis, I expounded upon each of these interventions, looking in depth at the actors and events surrounding them, as well as their connection specifically with the TEN/MET. Almost all interventions (certainly all those presented in this thesis) were the result of actions undertaken by the network or by those in close association with the network. I then re-examined the interviews, looking for the strategies that had been employed in achieving these interventions. I similarly looked at the research papers, workshop manuals and media articles I had collected, in order to triangulate the data.

**Positionality**

My academic background in International Development and my years spent living overseas in Asia as a white woman speaking a disproportionately-valued language (i.e. English) had a substantial effect on my awareness of my position as a researcher, and as an interloper in another country. I am aware that this thesis would likely be a different one if written by a Tanzanian woman. Although a case-study methodology does not call for a critical examination of one’s position, I think it is crucial that researchers who profess to contribute to the creation of knowledge be cognizant of the power that is invested in this position. This is particularly the case in another cultural context where one needs to be sensitive to the power imbalances between researcher and researched. These imbalances are informed by each individual’s position as educated or not-educated, white or otherwise, female or male, from the South (i.e. developing countries) or North (i.e. the so-called developed nations) and the historical baggage that comes with each of
these attributes. During my time in the field, my colleague and I drew from the work of indigenous scholars and feminist scholars (Smith, 1999; Harding, 1987; Hales, 2004; Glesne, 1999) to help address these issues in the research. This included approaching interviews with the attitude that the participant is the expert, and trying to analyze the data for this thesis from the civil society participants’ perspective. It is my greatest hope that the participants, particularly TEN/MET members, will recognize their opinions and voices at the centre of this thesis.

**Limitations of the Research**

Given finite time and resources, this research has several limitations. In contrast to a full audit, this thesis only provides a snapshot of the successful policy changes and related advocacy activities that TEN/MET has been involved in over the past seven years. It also focuses on advocacy, even though many of TEN/MET’s members have been substantially involved in service provision. Although service provision could be included as a type of education policy change, it has been excluded in order to limit the scope of this thesis.

The sampling of CSOs is biased towards the urban and more developed areas (such as Arusha and Dar es Salaam), where most Tanzanian CSOs are located. I was unable to gain the perspectives from the less-researched central, southern and western regions of the country, which also tend to be poorer, have fewer CSOs and are less externally-connected. As well, semi-autonomous Zanzibar is beyond the confines of this study, as it has its own aid and education policies and policy processes, which are different from mainland Tanzania.

**Significance**

This thesis documents how civil society organizations, working as a team through a civil society network, can have a significant effect on policy – an effect that is likely much larger than possible by one organization working alone. The documentation of TEN/MET’s work, and the theorizing of what makes it successful, contributes to a further understanding of the achievements and challenges of civil society networks in the current environment of education policy and international development.

I also hope that this work adds to broadening the empirical research on advocacy for education policy change. Education has traditionally been seen as a self-contained
arena under the dominion of the national government. Over the last few years, new actors such as civil society and the private sector have been increasingly recognized as important players in the formation of education policy (Mundy & Murphy, 2001; Dale, 2000), yet little empirical research has been done to date on the actual experiences of these actors. Less still has been done on the contributions of civil society networks in the field of education (with James, 2002; Commonwealth Education Fund [CEF], 2007a; and, Miller-Grandvaux, Welmond & Wolf, 2002 as notable exceptions).

Overview

Chapter Two lays out my conceptual framework for this thesis. It covers major relevant themes such as civil society networks and the governance of education. Chapter Three starts with an examination of the historical evolution of Tanzanian context, elucidating important political and education events, and major shifts in the governance of education. Chapter Four then documents the Tanzanian Education Network itself, including its history and its current membership.

My research questions are then addressed in the following three chapters. Chapter Five looks at the specific policy changes that TEN/MET has been plausibly associated with, and draws out several of the strategies that TEN/MET has used to influence policy change. Chapter Six and Seven then go further in depth to examine the relational strategies that TEN/MET has employed. The former examines TEN/MET’s intra-network relations, pointing out factors in its strategy of portraying itself as the common voice of civil society in education. The latter looks at the complementary and contentious strategies TEN/MET members have used to engage the government, both in government-invited spaces and in spaces the network has created. It ends by examining the boomerang strategy, used by TEN/MET to leverage international support in changing domestic policy. Chapter Eight offers conclusions on the above, and highlights several directions for future research.
Chapter Two:
Towards a Conceptual Framework

In this chapter, I will examine the concepts that lie at the heart of this thesis: namely, civil society, civil society networks, and the governance of education. Although each of these concepts has come into vogue over the last twenty years, they are hard to define and quite plastic. However, it is in the confluence of these terms that the Tanzanian Education Network plays out its existence in education policy. The chapter concludes with my conceptual framework for this thesis.

Civil Society

The term ‘civil society’ can be dated back to Ancient Greece, with re-emerging interest between 1750 and 1850, although modern interest in the concept, in both Tanzania and the world, has blossomed in the last ten years (Edwards, 2004). This emergence in interest has coincided, or perhaps even been the precipitator of, a growth in civil society organizations (CSOs) and their activities throughout the world (Anheier, Glasius & Kaldor, 2001). Despite this growth, the term ‘civil society’ itself is often seen as a “fuzzy and contested concept” (Anheier et al., 2001, p. 11), being defined in a variety of ways to suit the ends of academics, policy-makers, and social movement actors (Edwards, 2004; Van Rooy, 1998). For the purposes of this thesis, I will borrow the definition from the larger study from which my data is drawn, which defines civil society organizations as organized groups or associations which “are separate from the state, enjoy some autonomy in relations with the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests, values or identities” (Manor, Robinson & White, 1999, p. 4).

Edwards (2004) has identified three broad sweeps through which civil society has been viewed. The first equates “civil society as associational life”, where organized citizens become a necessary check on state power (Anheier et al., 2001, p. 13). Drawing upon the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, this “ideal-type category” (Keane, quoted in Edwards, 2004, p. 20) has been used by Putnam (2000) in his conceptualization of “social capital” within a community. It assumes that the more numerous the groups, the stronger a civil society. The second view is “civil society as the good society”. This conception appears to be the one most drawn upon in the development literature, where civil society
actors are assumed to be able to represent local contexts and the public ‘good,’ and advocate on behalf of marginalized groups (CEF, 2005; Mercer, 2002; Edwards, 2004; Anheier et al., 2001). However, this view does not take into account that individual organizations may have other vested interests, and may not be acting out of simple altruism (Edwards, 2004). The third conception views civil society as a public sphere or space, as opposed to objects. It draws on Habermas’s idea of a discursive public sphere, as well as the Gramscian idea of creating a new space for counter-hegemony and contention (Edwards, 2004; Mundy & Murphy, 2001). Much of the literature on civil society often draws on several of these conceptions. This thesis primarily takes the view of the first conception of civil society, although both the second and third conceptions also at times can be seen as a useful way of examining TEN/MET.

Civil society can include a variety of groups; in education alone civil society organizations can encompass community schools, student groups, parent-teacher associations, teacher unions, community-based associations, and subnational, national and international NGOs (Swift, 2000). Although this thesis focuses on national actors, and therefore does not include interviews with parent-teacher and community-based associations, these groups are included in the general definition of civil society. In addition to the above associations and NGOs, there has also been a rise in the coordination of civil society actors to form civil society networks working together towards common goals (Perkin & Court, 2005), as will be further discussed in the following section.

The growth in civil society over the last two decades has been accompanied with the growth in enthusiasm for the potentials of civil society. In the development and aid literature, it appears that donors, such as USAID, CIDA, the World Bank, and UNESCO, have bought into the idea of civil society as a good thing, for it “espouses the values that we hold” (Anheier et al., 2001, p. 15). In this normative view, civil society is said: to contribute to the democratization of society; to be representatives of marginalized groups; to be up-holders of the public good; to be innovators of new education methods; to fill in the gaps left by governments; to hold governments accountable and be a strong voice in policy change; and, to be norm setters and disseminators. Although these may be true of
some civil society groups, it is naive to assume that because civil society is good, all civil society groups must henceforth be good (Edwards, 2004; Mercer, 2002).

In spite of these positive ideals, there has been a mounting criticism against whitewashing civil society organizations in the above manner. Mercer (2002) points out that although civil society claims to promote the public interests, democracy and marginalized groups, they are not elected representatives, to which Smillie adds the observation that they have, in fact, “multiple accountabilities” (1997, p. 575) to select interests. As well, funding has overwhelmingly gone to NGOs, (not other CSOs), and predominantly to urban NGOs, run by elite members of society (Orvis, 2001; Mercer, 2002). This may make some of them little more than lobby groups (Edwards 2004). In turn, there are fundamental differences between “people-oriented NGOs, government NGOs and corporate NGOs” (Kamat, 2004, p. 165). In addition to the threats of an agenda being determined by the elite (not the voices of the poor), Edwards (2004) also notes that transnational advocacy campaigns may be dominated by Northern NGO networks, leaving little room for voices from the South. In filling in the gaps in social services and being innovators in new methods, civil society may be contributing to the neo-liberal agenda by being “agents of privatization” (Archer, 1994, p. 232). There have been increasing trends of professionalization and depoliticization of NGOs, which may compromise their ability to advocate autonomously (Kamat, 2004; Smillie, 1997). There are also serious questions surrounding the current capacity of CSOs to do critical research or constructively contribute to the policy forums, which leads to questions around their advocacy capacity (Perkin & Court, 2005). It is a complex arena in which CSOs operate.

A civil society network is not just a sum of its members. It can take on a life of its own independent of the needs and wants of its individual nodes. However it is also likely to be affected by the strength and weaknesses of the same. As such, the above positive and negative aspects of civil society actors, in relation to the civil society network TEN/MET, will be touched upon throughout the course of this thesis.

**Civil Society Networks**

Although a plethora of material exists on civil society and its strengths and follies, to date there has been comparatively little research on civil society networks. Yet, civil society networks are playing an increasingly important role in education and
development. As James and Malunga (2006) have pointed out, prominent commentators now proclaim that:

“Networks are the most important organizational form of our time.” (Miller, 2005, p. 215)

“Civil society networks have become the partners of choice for many international development agencies seeking to maximize the reach, scale and impact of their programmes.” (Ashman, 2005, p. 3)

“Information networks contribute, to a large extent, to the transformation of social structure in the information age.” (Castells, 2000, p. 17)

Civil society networks¹ have been succinctly defined as “a group of organizations that come together to work towards a common goal” (CEF, 2007a, p. 6). As Gerlach similarly expresses, “Networking enables movement participants to exchange information and ideas and to coordinate participation in joint action” (2001 in Juris, 2004, p. 349). Manuel Castells, perhaps the pre-eminent writer on networks and the network society, points out that although networks are old forms of social organization, they are now powered by new information technologies, enabling them to take on new prominent roles that redefine relations of production/consumption, power and culture (2000). This is due to an increased ability to a) build horizontal ties between diverse actors; b) have free and open flows of information; and, c) collaborate through decentralized organization and democratic decision-making (Castells, 2001). As such, networks involving civil society or social movements have the potential to present alternatives to the current state of political affairs, (Castells, 2000; 2004), including impacting the governance of education.

In the field of education, there have been only a few pieces of research directly addressing civil society networks. James (2002) examines the Malawian Coalition for Quality Basic Education (CWBE), in a three-network study on ‘what makes CSO coalitions effective’. Miller-Grandvaux, Welmond and Wolf (2002) touch upon the dynamics of civil society networks in examining the roles that NGOs play in basic education in Africa (Malawi, Mali, Guinea and Ethiopia). Similarly, the weaknesses of education networks in Zambia are mentioned in an examination of the role of CSOs in

¹ The form of organization known as a civil society network goes by a variety of names, including coalitions, alliances, forums, campaigns, collaborations, committees and movements. These names are often chosen based on the attached cultural meaning each has in a particular context. For example, the term coalition in Mozambique is seen as elitist, and so they have opted for ‘movement’ (CEF, 2007a). I have chosen the term network because it is used by the Tanzanian Education Network, the subject of my study.
the Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme (BESSIP) (Lexow, 2003). Recently, the Commonwealth Education Fund has produced three reports, summarizing the experiences of the sixteen national education networks it finances (including TEN/MET), which generally highlights the work these networks have done around Education for All, as well as the funding dilemmas of these organizations (CEF, 2005, 2007a, 2007b).

Expanding out from education, there is a significant and growing literature on civil society networks. ‘Network analysts’ have developed quantitative analyses of the structures and interactions of nodes within networks (see Anheier & Katz, 2004; Castells, 2001). The social movement literature has embraced the concept of networks, as seen in Social Movements and Networks (Diani & McAdam, 2003). As well, interest has emerged in Transnational Advocacy Networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), and their work in the area of education (Mundy & Murphy, 2001). The above examples constitute only a small sample of the growing literature on civil society networks. Perhaps the greatest synthesis of this literature can be seen in the work of Perkin and Court (2005), who have undertaken an extensive literature review of over one-hundred articles relating to civil society networks, evidence and policy processes in international development. To date, however, little of this work has expanded into the education field.

Relevant to my focus on a civil society network’s success in affecting changes in education policy, Perkin and Court have identified ten commonly cited ‘keys to success’ in how civil society networks can influence policy. These include:

- **Clear governance agreements**: setting objectives, identifying functions, defining membership structures, making decisions and resolving conflicts.
- **Strength in numbers**: the larger the numbers involved the greater the political weight.
- **Representativeness** is a key source of legitimacy and thereby influence.
- **Quality of evidence** affects both credibility and legitimacy.
- **Packaging of evidence** is crucial to effective communication.
- **Sustainability** is vital, since **persistence over a period of time is often required for policy influence**.
- **Key individuals** can facilitate policy influence.
- **Informal links** can be critical in achieving objectives.
- **Complementing** of official structures rather than duplication makes networks more valuable.
- **ICT**: New information and communication technologies are increasingly vital for networking.

(Perkin & Court, 2005, pp. vi, 25-28)

Many of these same keys to success are also identified in James’s findings on Malawi (2002), who draws one of his three civil society network cases from the education field. To these keys for success (which he notes are also key variables in failure), James adds the importance of forming support around a clear issue, and having dual strategic objectives (i.e. simultaneously focusing on advocacy and building the capacity of one’s members to undertake advocacy). Finally, he observes the importance of developing positive relations with the government and donors, as well as highlighting the importance of funding.

Although the above literature was useful in conceptualizing why a civil society network, such as TEN/MET, could effectively engage in the education policy, it fell short of the mark in listing strategies that networks like TEN/MET use to influence policy change. The internal functions and dynamics of a network, as described by the network literature, are only one part of the puzzle in how civil society networks effectively engage in change. They do not describe the dynamic choices and relations that culminate in strategic moves that actually change policy and governance structures. For a conceptual framework to address these issues, I turn to the social movement literature on opportunity structures.

**Domestic and International Opportunity Structures**

Opportunity structures deal with the “changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system” (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996, p. 2). Emerging from the work of political process and social movement theorists (such as Keck, Sikkink, Finnemore, McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, Tarrow and Tilly) this notion looks at the broader context in which social change can take place. These opportunities may be either formal in nature, such as the legislative framework in which organizations operate, or informal, such as whether issues are given voice in media or government.

Opportunity structures can be found in both domestic and international arenas, and one arena can be affected by the other. Sikkink defines international opportunity
structures as the “degree of openness of international institutions to the participation of transnational NGOs, networks and coalitions” (Sikkink, 2005, p. 156). However, one could easily extend this to the degree of openness of bilateral donors, such as CIDA, to work with local and transnational groups. In contrast, domestic opportunity structures refer to how open the domestic political bodies are to domestic social movements or CSOs. Here it is important to recognize that the division between domestic CSOs and international CSOs is not a clear one in Tanzania, as both groups are represented in TEN/MET. In this case, the focus is not on whether it is local or international CSOs or networks who partake in activities, but rather on the target of their activities, whether it is the domestic government, bilateral donors, or international institutions.

At the domestic level, opportunity structures can appear in a variety of forms. One way that civil society activists have themselves characterized these opportunity structures is whether they occur in “invited” or “created” spaces (Clark, Harrison, Miller, Pettit & VeneKlasen, 2002). Invited spaces are those where participation is pre-determined, perhaps through the invitation of the government or donors, where the agenda may have already been determined. These invited spaces would be characterized by social movement theorists as mostly open domestic opportunity structures; that is to say, the inviter is open to the invitee’s participation, giving the invitee (i.e. civil society) a space or arena in which to act. However, the degree of openness can vary, depending on the power of the government to limit and/or control the participation of the invitees.

Created spaces are areas of engagement that the civil society network has created itself, opening up the possibility to develop an independent agenda. Here, social movement theorists would likely argue that created spaces can occur in either open or closed domestic opportunity structures, where the government may or may not be willing to listen. Clark et al. (2002) state that civil society participation in invited spaces often requires clear demands and power on the part of civil society actors, whereas created spaces may require more civil society resources but can result in stronger negotiating positions. These concepts of invited and created spaces; and, open and closed opportunity structures, form the frame on which to hang the contentious and complementary strategies that TEN/MET engages in to bring about change, and will be revisited in Chapter Seven.
Sikkink (2005) has highlighted how the international and domestic opportunity structures interact, depending on whether either is a structure that is open or closed to change (see Figure 1 below). For example, if domestic opportunities are closed, perhaps because of a repressive regime, and international opportunities are also closed, there is little chance that social change can take place (i.e. Box A). One example of this in Tanzania’s history may be during the socialist era, when civil society organizations in Tanzania were co-opted into the party politics. During that time, little room was available for local dialogue with the government, and communication was difficult in the international arena. In contrast, if international and domestic opportunity structures are open, there is possibility for significant cooperation between international and domestic actors for change (Box D). Finally, if domestic opportunity structures are open, but international opportunity structures are closed, as is the case when governments make international agreements with non-democratic international institutions (e.g. IMF or WTO), change is difficult to achieve at the international level (Box C).

**Figure 1: Dynamic Multilevel Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Opportunity Structure</th>
<th>International Opportunity Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Closed A. Diminished chances of activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Open B. Boomerang and “spiral model”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Closed C. Democratic deficit/ defensive transnationalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Open D. Insider/outsider coalition model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sikkink, 2005, p. 156

One of the most interesting interactions that Sikkink and Keck identify is known as the “boomerang” (Box B), occurring when the domestic opportunity structure is closed, but the international opportunity structure is open. For example, the domestic government may be inaccessible or deaf to the voices of civil society, creating a closed opportunity structure. In this case, domestic CSOs may “bypass their state and directly
search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 12). This has been most documented in the case of human rights campaigns, although indigenous rights and environmental campaigns have also been influenced in this way. Amnesty International often uses information collected by national human rights NGOs to externally pressure governments to change, in order to improve the government’s international image. A clear example of this was after the 1976 military coup in Argentina, when national and international human rights NGOs cooperated to provide key information to the United Nations and Western governments on the systematic practice of disappearances and torture. Foreign diplomats then confronted the military government with these allegations. Over a period of five years, the military government moved from initial refusal to accept human rights allegations, to cosmetic cooperation, to concrete improvements in its human rights record in response to these international pressures based on local information (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

The boomerang, as a strategy, may become increasingly relevant with the growing influence of civil society networks for two reasons. Firstly, the improvement in communications technology over the last decade has allowed sub-national and national CSOs to bilaterally connect with CSOs in other countries. Secondly, domestic civil society networks are often partially composed of international CSOs who often are also members of international civil society networks with far-reaching nodes. It is this boomerang strategy that is particularly relevant to TEN/MET, as will be shown in Chapter Seven.

**Repertoires of Contention, Movement Frames and Norms**

One dimension that theorists have added to opportunity structures is that of “repertoires of contention”, or the range of strategies and tactics that are available or acceptable within a specific political opportunity structure (McCarthy, 1997; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). In turn, the strategies or repertoires of contention used may affect the very opportunity structure that they occur in, as when a campaign that focuses on increasing civil society voice in meetings succeeds in entrenching the right to participate in these meetings. In this thesis, however, I have tended towards using the term “strategies of engagement” instead of “repertoires of contention”. This is because not all strategies are actually contentious. As other authors have documented, both
complementary and contentious strategies of engagement are by used by civil society actors in the domestic and international arena (see Klees, 1998; Stromquist, 1998; Mundy & Murphy, 2001). As well, the civil society network literature has not yet embraced the social movement terminology, nor necessarily should they, and so the term strategy appears to me more apropos.

Two other inter-related concepts that social movement theorists have highlighted are “movement frames” and “norms”. Movement frames are “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). Although I do not draw much upon the term in this thesis, it is another way of expressing what one of my participants has termed a “common platform for action” (Interview C79). Norms are the basis from which movement frames operate. In a whole issues cycle, from the time a problem is identified, through to when it is resolved and ceases to be a problem any longer, norms form the backbone of the cycle. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) posit, first there is a norm emergence, when only a few people call for change. A movement grows until it reaches a tipping point, following which there is a “norm cascade” where many people adopt the call for change. Finally, through the ‘habit’ of experiencing this norm, the norm is internalized, and the movement therefore changes the actors themselves (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). As will be suggested, this final step of internalization, through ‘habits’ of trust and engagement, may play a part in the sustainability and cohesion of a civil society network.

**Governance of Education**

“Governance”, as it relates to civil society, is a term that has gained increasing attention from researchers in the last few years. It can be understood as “the entire universe of activities and relationships between government and civil society that supports the effective, democratic and equitable management of human societies” (Mundy, 2005, p. 3). Given such a broad mandate, it should be recognized as a very plastic term, molding itself to many purposes, from looking at international decision making (global governance) to the way that parents influence education in a particular district. The education sector is one of many sectors that can be examined as an arena of governance. For the purposes of this thesis, I have focused on ways that civil society can
affect the governance of education through contributing to discussions at the education policy table, influencing policy through advocacy and pressure from outside the policy arena, and affecting the structure of the education policy process.

One may ask, isn’t the governance of education the work of the government, not civil society? Traditionally, the governance of education was perceived as confined to the government’s space. Not only was it the government’s dominion, the formation of education policy was seen as an internal affair of the linear kind, where the government simply decided on a direction at the policy table and then acted upon it (Robertson & Dale, 2006; Sutton, 1999). Where external pressures were taken into account by governments, other actors were rarely invited to the policy and planning table, where policy was presumed to be made.

In recent years, policy researchers have recognized that policy is not made in such a simple linear manner, nor are government decisions made without the input of other actors. First, policy researchers now agree that often a multitude of factors can affect which policy is taken up, and in what form. The Overseas Development Institute’s (ODI) ‘Research and Policy in Development’ (RAPID) has compiled a list of over thirty different models of how policy can be formulated, including theories on “tipping points”, “communication tools: tell simple and surprising stories”, and “informal shadow networks” to name a diverse few (ODI, 2005). Decisions are not made solely as a result of discussion at the policy table. In fact, it is notoriously difficult to draw out causal relationships in the formation of policy. Researchers now recognize that the media’s coverage of events, attempts to lobby of Members of Parliament (as opposed to only the Ministry of Education), and public advocacy campaigns can all contribute to the formation of policy in education. International events (such as 9/11), international agreements (such as the Millennium Development Goals), or the actions of neighboring countries (such as Uganda’s decision to declare universal primary education), can also subtly influence policy in a country such as Tanzania. Although these phenomena have long affected education, what appears new to the research is the recognition of the complex manner in which these factors interrelate to affect the formation of policy.

Second, whereas the term “education policy” usually refers to the policies themselves, the term “governance of education” encompasses this and the changes to the
structure of education policy processes, such as who is at the policy table. It has been recognized that often other players outside the government can have an impact on policy, both at the policy table and outside. Southern countries have long experienced this influence on their policy from donors promising aid and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank or IMF, who have placed policy conditions on their funding.\(^2\) Both Northern and Southern civil society organizations, including networks, are increasingly looked to for policy guidance, through both policy advocacy and evidence-based research on policy design, monitoring and evaluation (Keohane & Nye, 2000; Mercer, 2002, 2003; UNESCO, 1990, 2000). This call for greater participation in policy processes, such as educational policy, has come from all sides of the international development arena, including from multilateral organizations, donors, governments and civil society organizations themselves. Touted under the rhetoric of “partnership” in the literature (Mercer, 2003), and a key feature of the neo-liberal search for accountability to clients and new public management approaches (Robertson & Dale, 2006), it is supposed that governments, donors and civil society will cooperatively work with each other ‘at the (policy) table’.

Whereas the literature on the term “governance” openly recognizes the multi-faceted and multi-actored nature of policy (Keohane & Nye, 2000; Manor et al., 1999), the literature on “education policy” has only slowly taken on these widening dimensions (Farrell, 1997). For this reason, although I’m concerned mostly with the formation and structures of education policy, I use the term “governance of education” to more flexibly address the various ways through which TEN/MET has impacted education policy and the education policy arena.

*Advocacy for Policy Change as a Form of Governance*

Much of TEN/MET’s work in the governance of education, including its activities around monitoring and introducing new ideas, can also be characterized more generally as advocacy for education. Advocacy is defined by Swift as “influencing decision-makers to design, adopt and change policies and practices in favour of poor and marginalized people” (2000, p. 4). In education, advocacy CSOs typically put forward normative

\(^2\) For example, the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Policies specified that governments like Tanzania should reduce spending to the social sectors, necessitating policy changes in education and health (Mundy, 1993).
statements or opinions on how the education sector should be improved – as opposed to actually providing education services (such as running schools or projects). CSOs appear to articulate their opinions by: producing statements on the need for the education system to change; participating in policy dialogue; or holding the government accountable through research or budget tracking. Through these activities targeting education policy, they are engaged in the governance of the education sector. Advocacy CSOs may do advocacy work exclusively, or may also have branches devoted to service provision. They may be international, national or local organizations.

Literature on the advocacy activities of civil society organizations has largely focused on international NGOs, transnational advocacy networks (TANs), and social movements (see Anheier et al., 2001; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; McCarthy, 1997; Smith, Pagnucco & Chatfield, 1997). Mundy and Murphy (2001) have documented the increasing importance of advocacy work in education at the international level. As mentioned earlier, there have been several empirical studies on education civil society networks in other countries, which include references to education advocacy (see James, 2002; James & Malunga, 2006; Miller-Grandvaux et al., 2002; CEF, 2005, 2007a). To date, however, there has been little academic research that has looked at education advocacy in Tanzania, let alone civil society networks’ efforts in this area. This research will help fill this gap.

My Conceptual Framework

In this thesis, I look at specific education policy interventions where TEN/MET has been credited with making an impact on national education policies (or at least being plausibly associated with these changes). From these examples, I try to elicit the strategies that TEN/MET has employed. These strategies of engagement are conceptualized very closely to the social movement literature’s view of “repertoires of contention”, but go beyond its definition in recognizing that strategies can be contentious and/or complementary. Several of the strategies that I examine include the use of advocacy and research, media, intra-network relations, collaboration with other networks and linkages to international movements.

I compare the strategies of engagement used by TEN/MET to those mentioned by Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002), commenting on their similarities and where
the civil society network literature falls short in explaining success. The specific keys to success that I comment upon include:

- Clear governance agreements (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002)
- Strength in numbers (Perkin & Court, 2005)
- Representativeness (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002)
- Quality of evidence (Perkin & Court, 2005)
- Packaging of evidence (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002)
- Key individuals and Informal links (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002)
- Information and Communication Technology (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002)
- Forming support around a clear issue (James, 2002)
- Dual strategic objectives of advocacy and capacity building (James, 2002)

I also go beyond these factors to examine TEN/MET’s strategies in its political relations with government and international actors. These political relations are the keys to success that the above authors quickly surmise as “Complementing of official structures rather than duplication” (Perkin & Court, 2005), and “Attitude of Government and Donors” (James, 2002), giving only a few pages mention to an area that I believe is vital to the success of civil society network’s advocacy for education policy change. The current civil society network theorists’ conceptions of the political relations are too simplistic to catch the nuances of TEN/MET’s relations with the government and other actors.

The civil society network literature, as outlined above, gives insufficient regard to historical or political factors shaping networks relations with other actors. Civil society networks are dynamic entities involved in a dynamic process of change. Opportunities for change are affected by the historical context; or in other words, cumulative historical events shape the present opportunity structures in which civil society networks make decisions (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The strategies that civil society actors choose to harness for change are based on the particular domestic and international opportunity structures in which the network operates (Sikkink, 2005).

I draw on the social movement theorists to describe TEN/MET’s relational strategies in regard to its domestic and political opportunity structures. In particular, I assess the complementary and contentious strategies that TEN/MET has employed in situations where the domestic opportunity structures are both open and closed. When the
domestic opportunity structures are open, I look at complementary and contentious strategies TEN/MET has employed in both “invited” and “created” spaces, as defined by Clark and colleagues (2002). When the domestic opportunity structures are closed, I document the use of a strategy similar to Sikkink’s boomerang strategy (2005). Returning back to the civil society and civil society network literature, I assess the prospects and risks of each of these strategies.

Finally, not only do opportunity structures change over time, they are also changed by civil society actors in an iterative process. Throughout the thesis, I suggest that civil society networks develop ‘habits’ of trust through their collaboration over time, similar to the way in which norms are formed and internalized over time (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). These habits of trust develop into a norm of expecting a common voice within the group. This common voice may help to open domestic and international opportunity structures, as donors and governments recognize civil society networks as legitimate voices of significant stakeholders. In turn, donors and governments continual engagement with civil society networks at the policy table, in both complementary and contentious relations, develop into an expectation of future engagement. In other words, it is internalized, as a norm, that civil society networks engage with donors and the government at the policy table. These are iterative processes, where past experiences of participation strengthen future possibilities of participation, thereby slowly opening the very opportunity structures in which civil society networks operate.
Chapter Three:
The Tanzanian Context: Politics, Education and Civil Society

In order to understand TEN/MET, one must have a grasp of the historical and political context in which the network operates. In this chapter, I first examine the political and educational history of Tanzania, bringing the reader up to current education policies and challenges. Next, I look at three ‘big shifts’ that have occurred at both the national and international level, shaping the current education policy environment in which TEN/MET operates. Lastly, I look at civil society actors in Tanzania, of which TEN/MET is one example, highlighting the historical and current political opportunity structures which shape Tanzanian CSOs.

An Historical View of Politics and Education Policy

The United Republic of Tanzania, located in East Africa, has a population roughly the size of Canada’s. Its natural beauties include Mt. Kilimanjaro, the Serengeti, and Lake Victoria, making it a well-trod destination for tourists from North America and Europe. The United Republic consists of both the Zanzibarian islands and the mainland, although Zanzibar has a semi-autonomous governing structure, including a separate education system. For this reason, this thesis only focuses on the education arena of mainland Tanzania. The country is widely respected for its peaceful status and its generosity with refugees. On the other hand, it is one of the poorer countries of the world, ranking 162/177 on the Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2006). It is a country in the midst of great change.

In the span of 50 years, the Tanzanian state has undergone a transition from a colonial protectorate to being on the forefront of African socialism and self-reliance, to more recently transforming into a democratic, decentralizing government with a liberal, trade-oriented economy. Despite these changes, one can see several continuities throughout its history as well. From independence in 1961 to the present, it has been under the direction of the same political party, the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CMM). It is characterized simultaneously as having a history of international actors attempting to

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3 The trade union Tanganyika African National Union [TANU], led by Nyerere, originally brought independence to mainland Tanzania (known as Tanganyika) in 1961. When Zanzibar joined Tanganyika to create Tanzania in 1977, TANU and the then ruling party of Zanzibar merged to form the CCM.
influence domestic policies, and yet has maintained a highly nationalized view of
It has experimented with different forms of decentralization, and yet in operation still
takes a top-down approach to governance (Hyden, 1999). With over a third of its
population living below the basic needs poverty line (URT, 2005), it has continuously
attempted to break through the confines of poverty. A brief historical overview of the
past one-hundred years will give the reader a sense of both these continuities and changes
that have affected the education system in the country. It will also bring to light the
interplay of domestic and international forces, both governmental and non-governmental,
which are now shaping the current widening arena of the governance of education in the
country.

Colonialism to Independence (1890-1961)

Although people in Tanzania have received some form of education through their
communities for time immemorial, schooling – in the form we often think of today –
began in Tanzania with the colonial powers of first the Germans (1890-1918), and then
the British following World War I (1918-1961). Seeing the country as primarily a
resource base, the German government’s small school system was set up to produce
clers and tax collectors for government administration. Missionaries also began to
establish schools to serve the European population and to act as proselytizing agents.
Their effect can be seen today, as in the 1990s a significant proportion of private
secondary schools were run by faith-based organizations (Kuder, 2004; Therkildsen,
2000; Marlow-Ferguson, 2002).

The British took over the country’s administration after World War One, although
Tanzania remained a second priority compared to neighboring Kenya, where the British
had developed a greater white colony and accompanying education system. The British
presence, however, entrenched English as the main language of the elite, which continues
even today. Because Britain had not substantially developed the education system during
this period, when the Tanzanian people gained independence in 1961, the pool of
educated people from which they could draw a civil service was extremely low. In 1954,
less than 10% of children went to school. In 1959, two years before independence, the
country had only 70 people with university degrees, of which 20 were teachers (Marlow-Ferguson, 2002).

**Independence and Socialism (1961-1984)**

The Tanzanian people were led to independence in 1961 by Julius Nyerere, who was one of those educated 70, holding a PhD in adult education. He is known to this day as the “Father of the Nation”. Nyerere was influential in the development of an African socialism. He authored the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which transformed the idea of national development from ‘developing things’ towards ‘developing people’. Under the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party led by Nyerere, Tanzania became a socialist country centered on national self-reliance and African values.

Education was one of the focal points of the nation’s development in the 1960s and 1970s. Through a nation-wide adult literacy campaign, the introduction of a Universal Primary Education (UPE) campaign as early as 1973, and the abolishment of school fees, incredible gains in both equity and access were achieved (Buchert, 1994; Kuder, 2004; Swai, 2004; Cooksey, Court & Makau, 1994). By 1977, Tanzania had achieved Universal Primary Education – a formidable feat given that only 24% of the population attended primary school at independence (Mundy, 1993). Nyerere also cemented Kiswahili as the national language and language of instruction in primary schools, which created a sense of national identity and unity among the various ethnic groups in the region. This national identity has helped to minimize many overt ethnic or religious tensions that have plagued many of Tanzania’s neighbours (Miguel, 2004; Barkan, 1994). In addition, Nyerere focused the education system on the concept of “Education for Self-Reliance” (Nyerere, 1969). Although this ideal was never achieved, the idea has had lasting impacts and is still referred to by those in the education system today.

Nyerere’s focus on equity and unity, both within the education system and without, has helped to form a stable and peaceful society; a society that was a low risk for bilateral donors to direct their funds. As well, in the context of the geopolitics of the Cold War, Tanzania’s incarnation as a peaceful country (with its home-grown form of socialism), meant that both eastern bloc and western powers were eager to fund initiatives that may have swayed the country in their particular direction (Samoff, 1990). In contrast
to a country such as Canada, where domestic education policies are mainly decided without international input, this created an arena where Tanzania’s national government was obliged to acknowledge the views of bilateral donor governments in the creation of its own education policies. However, at the same time Nyerere’s socialist style resulted in a top-down form of government at all levels, which tended to concentrate major decisions in the national executive. This is to say that although bilateral donors have been present at the policy meetings, and do have input into policies such as education, they have a limited amount of actual decision-making power due to the strong centralist tendencies of the Tanzanian executive (Lawson & Rakner, 2005; Mmari, Sundet & Selbervik, 2005).

It has also been suggested that the socialist approach has reinforced traditional patrimonial social relationships between political leaders and rural communities. Although formal bureaucratic structures have been developed, and are contributing to decision-making in the country, many of the decisions still are made through personalized regional networks. Kelsall (2002) argues that it is the confluence of the modern “air-conditioned” politics of the bureaucrats (as is expected by international donors), and the “veranda” politics of personalized regional networks that results in policy decisions at the national and subnational level. This approach has had lasting effects on the manner in which policies are informally and formally carried out today, such as is seen in the education policy field (Hyden, 1999; Kelsall, 2002; Barkan, 1994).

_Crisis and Decline (1985-1995)_

Despite the positive social advances made in the 1960s and 1970s, the economy remained weak under socialism. The early 1980s brought greater economic problems in the aftermath of the OPEC crisis, a situation that was exacerbated when Tanzania engaged in war with Uganda. The combination created a serious economic crisis, causing President Nyerere to step down from office in 1985. Like many developing countries during this time, Tanzania’s economic situation led to a number of IMF structural adjustment policies in 1986, which contributed to the erosion of the social services, including education (Gould & Ojanen, 2003).

In this context, the CCM party began a gradual political and economic shift from economic and political socialism to encouraging trade-oriented market liberalization in the late 1980s and developing a multi-party democracy in the 1990s. Other political
parties were formally allowed to exist in 1992; the first multi-party elections took place in 1995, and have consistently occurred every five years hence. However, the CCM has managed to maintain power at both the national and local level at every election to date. It has been in continuous power, albeit under a huge policy shift from socialism to capitalism and democracy, since 1961 (Mercer, 2003).

During this same period, the growing popularity of neo-liberalism (also known as the Washington Consensus) saw bilateral donors began to shift their aid away from funding national governments towards development projects, often run by NGOs or businesses (Klees, 1998; see Stiglitz, 2004), which had several effects on the education system. One major effect was the growth of civil society organizations, including international NGOs, as the providers of education services that were previously provided by the government. In the context of a lack of resources and an increasing demand for secondary level education, the Tanzanian government began to encourage private and non-profit secondary schools; by 1997 more than a third of all secondary schools in Tanzania were run by non-government providers (Lange, Wallevik & Kiondo, 2000).

Another effect was the lack of a cohesive education policy between the early 1980s and 1995 (Kuder, 2004; Samoff, 2003). In 1995, the Education Training Policy was developed, but had very little in the way of an implementation plan between then and 2000 (Kuder, 2004). During this period, consultants were hired by bilateral donors to develop a national education plan to accompany the policy, but these were rejected as having little national ownership. A well-publicized report (Helleiner et al., 1995) criticized the government-donor relations as imbalanced, suggesting that they undermined sovereignty and government ownership (Hyden 2005).

By the end of the 1990s, it became clear that the Tanzanian education system was in a crisis. The government had reintroduced school fees at the secondary level in the 1980s and the primary level in the 1990s. In the context of a financial crisis, structural adjustments and neo-liberal ideals, it had also cut funding to education. The primary enrollment rate slowly fell from its 1977 ‘universal enrollment’ to a low of 63% (GER) in 1998 (World Bank, 2007). Of those enrolled, many dropped out between grades one and seven. Due to the low numbers as well as the expense of secondary education, only 6% of the population went on to secondary school (GER, 2004), compared to Kenya’s
enrollments of 48% or Uganda’s 19% during the same year (World Bank, 2007). Less than 1% of the population made it to University. HIV/AIDS began to affect the country as well, creating both orphans and increasing the shortage of teachers. Children with disabilities and those from marginalized groups, such as the nomadic Masai, had little chance of receiving an education in this environment. Those that did receive an education did not necessarily learn well, as teaching styles focused on rote-learning, and it was often the case that the teacher was absent from the classroom (Sumra, HakiElimu & Tanzania Teachers’ Union [TTU], 2004; HakiElimu, 2005).

The Big Shifts – Creation of the Current Education Environment

Tanzania’s case was not unique; a similar pattern was experienced in many developing countries. Approaching the new millennium, poorer governments, donors from richer governments and civil society organizations all over the world began to reassess the lack of progress they had made in areas such as education and the structure of their relations and funds. Shifts began to occur in three important areas, culminating in a new strategy to address the education crisis in Tanzania and elsewhere.4

Big Shift #1: Education and Poverty Goals

A normative shift in education occurred as clear common goals were first set at the international and then national levels. In 1990, world leaders agreed upon six basic goals to reach by 2015 ranging from early childhood to adult literacy, known as Education for All (EFA). After ten years of inaction around EFA, due to lack of commitment and funding, international CSOs such as Oxfam and ActionAid mounted pressure on world leaders to follow through on the promises made in 1990. World leaders agreed to financially commit to support EFA at the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000. At the same time, education was identified in a broader set of ten international goals known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including universal primary education by 2015 and gender equality at the primary and secondary level by 2005 (Mundy & Murphy, 2001). These initiatives can be seen as part of a broader move away from neo-liberalism and towards a new development consensus, referred to as the Post-Washington Consensus (see Stiglitz, 2004).

4 These shifts not only affected education, but many other sectors of international development. However, the goals set and the manner in which relations were restructured differed from sector to sector.
In addition to the above shifts by world leaders, international civil society actors, predominantly INGOs, also underwent their own reform. The 1990s had seen a significant surge in the membership of INGOs around the world (Anheier et al., 2001). These organizations, as mentioned previously, had been involved in educational service provision throughout the 1980s and 1990s, under the rubric of neo-liberal support where non-state involvement was encouraged. However, in the late 1990s, these groups began to shift their viewpoint from service provision to what has become known as a “rights-based approach”, calling on governments to fulfill their duty to provide a child’s right to free basic education, as premised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (CEF, 2007b). This provided a moral imperative through which to pressure Northern governments and international organizations to provide the necessary resources to help Southern governments, such as Tanzania, fulfill their duties.

At the national level, Tanzania developed both an overarching plan to address its challenges, known as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2000, as well as sector plans that were in line with the PRSP (URT, 2000). In the second PRSP of 2005, known as the National Strategy Growth and Reduction of Poverty (or MKUKUTA in Kiswahili), education became a major component in one of three clusters of focus (URT, 2005). Regarding education, Tanzania developed the comprehensive Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) in 1998, which outlined its country-specific goals for the whole sector (URT, 2001a). Because finances were limited and the needs identified were so great, in 2001 a costed plan in the primary sub-sector, the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP), laid out the goals that Tanzania wished to achieve and the manner in which it planned to achieve them (URT, 2001b). This plan and those subsequent focused on expanding enrolment, improving quality, increasing equity and strengthening education management. One of the most important of these was the goal of Universal Primary Education, echoing international sentiments in the international EFA and MDG documents mentioned above. To help achieve this goal, and with the funds

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5 The development of the PRSP is one of the necessary requirements of the International Monetary Fund for poor countries such as Tanzania to receive debt relief as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). There is a whole literature surrounding this topic, spanning many countries and much criticism (see Caillods & Hallak, 2004; Tomlinson & Foster, 2004; James 2002).

6 A similar costed plan at the secondary level, known as the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) was developed in 2004 (URT, 2004).
available because of international commitment to Universal Primary Education and influence from civil society, the government announced that it would abolish school fees at the primary level – an event that led to 1.6 million more children in school the following year (UNDP, 2005). In a few short years the primary education Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) rose from 66% in 2000 to 109% in 2005 (URT, 2005; Khainga et al., 2005).

These plans and goals, at both the international and national level, included measurable targets from which civil society could hold the government accountable to implementation and the donors accountable to financial support. It provided goals to strive for and celebrate their achievement, as in the case of enrollment, infusing a new sense of progress into the education sector. It also provided a common template from which civil society actors could demonstrate the gaps at the national level that needed to be filled to achieve the international goals. In particular, using these goals as targets, Tanzanian civil society today continues to document and press for greater change in the areas of: a) enrollment for children with disabilities, orphans and other vulnerable children, b) improvements of the teaching quality, including advocating for better teacher training in child-friendly and gender-sensitive pedagogies, and c) advocating for more teachers and resources to keep pace with the surge in enrollment (HakiElimu, 2005).

**Big Shift #2: All on the Same Plan**

The second shift that occurred was the recognition that all players involved in a sector, such as education, must work together towards a common plan outlined by the national government (such as the Education Sector Development Programme). This shift was based on the premise of putting local stakeholders, primarily governments, “in the driver’s seat” (Buchert, 2000, p. 406; Buchert, 2002).

Financially, donors changed from funding individual pet projects, uncoordinated with other donors or the government, to directly supporting the government’s plans, through aid modalities known as Program Based Approaches (PBAs) in general (Lavergne & Alba, 2003), or if targeting only one sector such as education, Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAp) (Buchert, 2002). These aid modalities involved many donors.
pooling their money in a common basket, which the government then allocated to the targets outlined in plans, such as its education sector plan. For the first time, donor aid could be used to pay recurrent costs in the education budget (such as teachers’ salaries), whereas historically donors had confined themselves to only funding the smaller development budget in education (i.e. building classrooms, desks, etc.). Donors who did not pool their money, such as USAID and JICA (the United States and Japan’s aid agencies), ‘harmonized’ their projects to be more in line with the sector plan – in Tanzania’s case, the Education Sector Development Programme.

Involving all players in a common plan also affected the work of civil society players, who were expected to contribute to the new plans and goals. In contrast to Tanzania’s 1995 ‘Education and Training Policy’ (URT, 1995), which has no reference to civil society or local participation, the Primary Education Development Plan outlines that civil society is a “key stakeholder”, with roles in “planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluating education” (URT, 2001b, p. 3). More specifically, civil society organizations are expected to “facilitate meaningful community participation . . . collect and communicate educational information . . . [and] conduct analysis and advocacy” (URT, 2001b, p. 22). This echoes the Education For All document signed at the World Education Forum in Dakar the previous year, which states that “at all levels of decision-making, government must put in place mechanisms for dialogue enabling citizens and civil society organizations to contribute to the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of basic education” (UNESCO, 2000, para. 54).

**Big Shift #3: Determining Policy with More Actors**

The third major shift was the expansion of the education policy table to include donors and civil society in the actual policy deliberations, contrasted to the historical situation where only the government was supposed to determine policy. Although civil

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7 These donors are generally referred to as ‘like-minded’ donors, and in Tanzania consist of DFID (U.K), CIDA (Canada), and the Scandinavian/Northern European countries. Since my research, they have progressed towards another Program Based Approach modality called ‘Direct Budget Support’, meaning that aid goes to the Treasury, with the Tanzanian government deciding where to direct its funds, such as in the budgetary processes of Northern democratic countries. Donor countries that have not followed this system are the United States, Japan and Germany.

8 The weakness of this system, of course, is that if donors decide to change again, or to provide less development aid, there may be many teachers that do not receive their salaries. The system relies on constant moral pressure (usually by CSOs) on Northern donors to consistently provide funds.
society actors had been periodically consulted in the 1990s, for the first time civil society actors were invited to have direct regular input into the education policy documents – to theoretically be treated as equal ‘partners’. The idea was that governments needed to be in the ‘driver’s seat’ in determining the direction of their country, but that donors needed to have some watch over the use of their funds, and that civil society could provide the government with both a greater connection to the voices of the grassroots and expertise in areas the government was not as strong (such as in gender equity or working with marginalized children) (Swift, 2000).

The structure through which this tripartite relationship of government, donors and civil society were to work in basic education was known as the Basic Education Development Committee (BEDC), established in 2001 under the Primary Education Development Plan. BEDC is one of three sub-sector committees, the others being in Tertiary and Higher Education (THEDC) and Folk and Vocation Education (FVEDC), which feed into the decisions of the Education Sector Inter Ministerial Steering Committee (IMSC) (the highest level of government responsible for the management of the ESDP). Civil society actors have been given seats in both the BEDC meetings and its five Technical Working Groups, namely “Enrolment expansion”; “Quality improvement”; “Institutional arrangements”; “Resource allocation, cost effectiveness and funding”; and “Cross-cutting issues” such as gender, environment and HIV/AIDS (Dyer, 2005; Mushi et al., 2004). BEDC is responsible for formulating the education plans, budgets, and audit and performance reports pertaining to pre-primary, primary, secondary, non-formal and teacher education. It also has played a large role in the first Education Sector Review (2006), hosted by the IMSC, which was slated to become a yearly event in Tanzania. The government also invited select BEDC members, including TEN/MET, to co-write the Aide-Memoire (URT, 2006) summing up Tanzania’s progress towards its education goals, as well to co-write the upcoming Ten Year Sector Plan.

What remains unclear in the above mentioned documents, both locally and internationally, are the structures through which CSOs in education would organize to participate in the governance of education. Would the strongest individual organizations

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9 Unfortunately, detailed lists of participants and the frequency of their participation has not been sufficiently documented by BEDC, although TEN/MET has been recommended to the government that this be addressed and improved in the near future (TEN/MET, 2006b).
be chosen to represent all CSOs in education? Would the government selectively choose organizations that it would work with? Following this are questions about the nature of civil society’s contribution to governance. Would this contribution be token suggestions on improving the government’s already established plans for education? Would civil society help form these plans from the beginning? Would civil society challenge the government to follow through on its implementation? Would it help implement? Would it monitor? Several education civil society actors in Tanzania answered these questions by the very act of forming the Tanzanian Education Network/Mtandao wa Elimu Tanzania (TEN/MET).

**Civil Society in Tanzania**

Before explaining TEN/MET’s role in education, it is prudent to understand a little about the political opportunity structures in which a Tanzanian civil society network operates. Tanzanian civil society is characterized as both young and quickly growing. Although civil society actors were active in Tanzania’s independence, and it was in fact a trade union that played the pivotal role in the independence movement, these same organizations were absorbed into the socialist party in the 1960s and all but disappeared as autonomous actors from Tanzanian society. Civil society organizations became the arm of the CCM instead of autonomous bodies of citizens. However, with the 1990s influx of funding for development projects, and the new opportunity for autonomous existence, the number of civil society organizations blossomed. Although numbers do not exist for CSOs in total (including parent and student associations, unions, etc.), the number of registered non-government organizations rose from 800 in 1995 to 2900 in 2000 (Mercer, 2003; Lange et al., 2000).

Despite this growth, and in contrast to the prominent role that policy documents proclaim for it as shown above, civil society in Tanzania has been characterized as weak. In addition to its new existence, the possible cause of this weakness has been attributed to several phenomena that affect the political opportunity structures in which it operates. The first reason suggested is that government’s acceptance of civil society participation has been initiated not from the CSOs themselves, but at the persuasion of external forces such as donors (Evans & Ngalwea, 2001). It is a participatory approach that has come from the top-down, not the bottom-up. This leads to a situation where some CSOs may
not have a strong citizens’ base, or where the government may try to interact with CSOs that are willing to “rubber-stamp” initiatives, while marginalizing CSOs with more radical views (Evans & Ngalwea, 2001). In addition, the concerns that CSOs decide to address may be more directed by the availability of foreign funds than by the actual needs of their constituencies, as Vavrus (2004) has suggested in the case of gender-related NGOs. These factors limit the ability of CSOs to equally take advantage of political opportunities when they appear.

A third origin of the weakness may be the government’s restrictive legal framework for civil society, which can also be framed as a more closed or restricted domestic opportunity structure (although signs of opening are present). Dating back to the Kenyan mau mau rebellion in the 1950s, the British government passed the Societies Ordinance, which allowed it discretion to dissolve or refuse registration to societies it did not like (Iheme, 2005). Although rarely used, this Ordinance remained on the books throughout the transition to independence, socialism and then democracy. In 1996, the government used it to deregister the Tanzania National Women’s Council, BAWATA, accusing it of acting in a ‘political’ manner when it encouraged more women to register to vote (Iheme, 2005; Hyden, 1999; Mogella, 1999; Tripp, 2000; Kelsall, 2001). Since the advent of democracy, CSOs and the government have engaged in drafting an NGO Policy, which was eventually adopted post-2000 after numerous iterations. The NGO Policy is significant in that it is the first major government-civil society policy collaboration in thirty years (Mogella, 1999). Law changes to accompany this new policy, however, were slow coming, and when the government presented its NGO Bill in 2002, civil society pressed strongly to have the Bill amended. This was seen by several CSO representatives and scholars as indicative of the government’s reluctance to give up its control. It was only in June of 2005 that an Amendment to NGO Laws finally put non-government organizations out of the reach of the Societies Ordinance. The Amendment also gives legal personality to registered NGOs and ensures that both NGOs and government are represented on the NGO registration board (Iheme, 2005).

It is in the context of a weak civil society, mitigated by significant government interference and control, that TEN/MET operates. This context potentially limits the network’s ability to take advantage of political opportunities. Given such a scenario, one
would not have high hopes for such a civil society network. However, it is exactly TEN/MET’s success despite this context that makes its case all the more interesting and compelling.
Chapter Four:  
Who is TEN/MET?

The Tanzanian Education Network/Mtandao wa Elimu Tanzania (TEN/MET) was formed in 1999 by a group of 39 civil society organizations involved in education. The central aim of the organization is to link various civil society organizations, such as non-government organizations (NGOs), community based organizations (CBOs) and faith-based organizations (FBOs), in their advocacy towards quality education for all in Tanzania. Striving for an informed collective voice, their mission states:

TEN/MET will work with education CSOs (NGOs, CBOs and FBOs) to influence education policies and practices to promote quality basic education as well as accountability and transparency to communities, to ensure that meaningful learning is enhanced to all children, youths and adults without discrimination. (TEN/MET, 2007a, p. 33)

History of TEN/MET

From 1999 to 2007, the network grew from 39 to over 200 active and potential members (TEN/MET, 2007a), representing roughly half of the estimated 400 education CSOs operating in Tanzania (Interview C25). These 200-odd members are listed in Appendix B. Active membership is based on paying membership dues, which are rated on a sliding scale, with international NGOs required to contribute the most, at 100,000 Tanzanian shillings (Tsh.) (roughly US$100), national and regional CSOs contributing half that, followed by Regional/District CSOs at 25,000 Tsh., and other CSOs and CBOs contributing the least at 10,000 Tsh. (TEN/MET, 2006a). In 2007, it had 90 active (fee-paying) members (TEN/MET, 2007a). However, this should not indicate that the other potential members are not supportive of TEN/MET, nor that TEN/MET excludes their voice on this basis. One small CSO I interviewed was a potential member because although it wanted to contribute, it simply could not afford the minimal amount required to become an active member (Interview C56).

10 The Secretariat has chosen to use the terms ‘active’ and ‘potential’ members, which I replicate here. It appeared important to the network, and to potential (non-fee paying) members interviewed, to consider the potential members as legitimate TEN/MET actors. This was not just a strategy to bolster TEN/MET’s numbers; it also added a dimension of equity – where dues paid were not as important as a member’s voice. This was particularly important for smaller resource-strapped organizations who wanted to belong to the network.
For the first few years of its existence, TEN/MET was housed within one of the well-known local NGOs called Maarifa ni Ufunguo (which is Swahili for “Knowledge is the Key”). The Secretariat at that time was held by Maarifa ni Ufunguo. Following this, it moved to Dar es Salaam to be closer to the government’s centre, within a well-known national NGO called HakiElimu for a while, and then occupied a small office in the ActionAid building (Interview C73). Several members suggested that some of the coordinators during this time were weaker than the current coordinator (Interviews C66; C73). In the last few years, TEN/MET has set up its own office, with an independent Secretariat in Dar es Salaam. Several participants noted that this was an important step towards TEN/MET gaining legitimacy as a network representative of all its members, so that it would not be mistaken as a prop or affiliate of its host (Interviews C73; C87). This strategy also allowed a direct link from TEN/MET to the Ministry of Education, as the Ministry (and donors) were now clear as to as to whom to address their concerns or questions (Interview C73).

Financially, TEN/MET’s work was made possible through the infusion of funds from 2002 to the present through the Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF), a joint project of ActionAid, Save the Children and Oxfam, funded by the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID). CEF began experimenting with supporting education networks in developing countries in 2001, and provided 80% of TEN/MET’s funding (with the remaining being made up by the contributions of its active members, particularly a well-funded national CSO called HakiElimu\(^1\)). In its 2007-2010 Strategic Plan, TEN/MET identified funding as one of the main threats to its future, since the CEF was slowly wrapping up its contributions during this period (TEN/MET, 2007a).

**Organizational Structure**

It should be made clear that TEN/MET is a network of civil society organizations, not a self-contained organization. As its Secretariat is very small, consisting of only a

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\(^1\) HakiElimu is a bit of an anomaly in this case study, as well as the three other African countries researched (and not part of this thesis). The Tanzanian national NGO not only receives ample funding, but has ensured that its funds are not tied up in specific projects. Instead, it receives general budget funding for its multi-year programme from the Embassies of Sweden, Norway and Ireland, the Dutch organizations Oxfam, Novib, and Hivos, and the Ford Foundation. This not only allows it to engage in a wide array of projects, it also ensures that it can channel funds to TEN/MET – an action that many other CSO network members find difficult because of set funding allocations.
coordinator and three other paid staff, the network relies on its members to implement any activities the network decides to take on. The general direction of the organization is decided at the Annual General Meeting, including changes to its membership, policies and constitution. A Board of Directors is elected at this meeting, although TEN/MET has devised a two-year term for its Board members. Every year, half of the Board turns over, while the other half continues in their position. This allows for new blood while guaranteeing a smooth transition (Interview C73).

Balance of power within the Board was an issue that was consciously decided upon. Of the ten members elected, only three can be from international NGOs. The rest are composed of a mixture of representatives from national and district NGOs. There was also a conscious effort to gain representation from each of the six zones of mainland Tanzania. For example, the 2006 Board consisted of: five non-Dar-es-Salaam based organizations, two Dar-based organizations, and three Dar-based INGOs. There appeared to have been an effort, conscious or unconscious, to include CSOs that represented a variety of educational issues. For example, Board member WOWAP dealt with gender issues in education, while Mzeituni was a disability focused organization and the Tanzanian Episcopal Conference (TEC) brought in the perspective of a faith-based organization. One of the few perspectives that has not yet been represented on the Board is that of the Tanzania Teachers’ Union, although it has worked closely with TEN/MET on research and advocacy, as will be seen in the next chapter. In addition to being geographically balanced, there have been both male and female representatives on the Board since its inception.

The implementation of plans set down by the Board is coordinated by the Secretariat. TEN/MET currently has a very small secretariat in order to keep operational overheads low, as well as contributing to a less-hierarchical teamwork environment, lending itself to TEN/MET’s collaboration with members (TEN/MET, 2007a). Given its small Secretariat, it is imperative that TEN/MET acts as a coordinating and consolidating body, as opposed to an implementing organization. Its members each do their own

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12 The five non-Dar-based organizations were BDF (Bagamoyo), LUDEA (Ruvuma), MIICO (Mbeya), Pamoja Trust (Kilimanjaro), and WOWAP (Dodoma).
13 The two Dar-based organizations were the Tanzanian Episcopal Conference (TEC) and Mzeituni, who focuses on disability issues.
14 The three Dar-based INGOs were Aide et action, Save the Children UK and VSO.
activities, which it is hoped are then fed into TEN/MET to use in its advocacy work (TEN/MET, 2007a).

**Membership**

TEN/MET members include a diverse range of organizational forms and come from disparate areas of the country. This diversity is also reflected in the composition of the Board. Drawing on the 2005 data contained in TEN/MET’s first attempt to compile an Education CSO Directory, one gets a sense in Figure 2 and Table 2 (below) of the demographics and geographic location of TEN/MET members. In total numbers, the Directory listed 21 subnational networks, 21 INGOs, 38 national CSOs, and 83 subnational CSOs (see Appendix B). There were an additional 37 CSOs for which it was difficult to determine subnational or national status, although an educated guess would place the majority of them as subnational NGOs. As is apparent in their mission statement above, these CSOs also constitute a wide variety of civil society organizations, including NGOs, community based organizations (CBOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), regional and thematic education networks, and the Tanzanian Teachers’ Union.

A potential weakness in the network is the dominance of education CSOs with headquarters in the Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Dar es Salaam regions. Several participants raised concerns that TEN/MET’s voice is therefore biased towards these regions, which tend to be the richer, more educated, and more connected areas of the country, related to historic trade ties (Dar es Salaam and coastal areas) and the influx of both tourist and missionary influences (Kilimanjaro and Arusha region). As one INGO representative pointed out, some areas in the North of the country may have several CSOs operating in the same district, while other districts in the poor southern regions may have no CSO representative for their area (Interview C73). TEN/MET has tried to address this in the composition of its board, by electing members from across Tanzania.
Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of Education CSOs in Tanzania

Small dashed circle: 0-9 CSOs; Small circle: 10-19 CSOs; Large circle: >20 CSOs
Data source: Figures from Table 2 below.
Map source: Edited from <http://www.state.gov/cms_images/map_tanzania.gif>
Table 2: Number of Education CSOs in Tanzania by type and location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>INGO</th>
<th>National CSO</th>
<th>Subnat’l CSO</th>
<th>Regional/Thematic Networks</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from TEN/MET, 2006a.

All organizations are invited to contribute to TEN/MET, through providing feedback on government documents, attending meetings or organizing events on behalf of the network, or giving input into joint TEN/MET documents. However, the Secretariat noted that communication with members is a major challenge. In fact, one of the unattained goals of its 2004-2007 Strategic Plan is to establish clear communication with 50% of its members (TEN/MET, 2007a). One interviewee cited that the Secretariat received feedback on government documents and joint TEN/MET documents from only 5% of its membership (Interview C25). Although some of the reasons had to do with the capacity of the organizations to respond, much of it had to do with an inadequate and underdeveloped communication infrastructure in the country. For example, only the major cities have internet connections, and even then, only the richer CSO offices (particularly INGOs), have their own internet connection. Other CSOs must go to the internet cafes to download, read and print documents. Reading a document at the internet cafe costs roughly $1/hour in a country where many people live on less than $1/day, while printing a document up is similarly prohibitively expensive. Some of TEN/MET’s
communication is therefore done through the regular post, which adds up to untimely responses to time-sensitive documents.

As a result, there appeared to be select ‘movers and shakers’ in the network, while other members quietly stayed on the sidelines. The TEN/MET members most often mentioned by other members, donors, government officials and CSOs outside the network included: HakiElimu, Maarifa ni Ufunguo, Amani Child, FAWE-Tanzania, Aga Khan Foundation, Oxfam, ActionAid, Save the Children, and CARE International. In contrast to the demographic of TEN/MET, many of these organizations were INGOs or stronger national NGOs. HakiElimu and Maarifa ni Ufunguo, in particular, appear to be quite unique when compared to the membership of networks in other countries such as Mali (Cherry & Mundy, 2007), Kenya (Sivasubramaniam & Mundy, 2007) and Burkina Faso (Maclure et al., 2007). Maarifa ni Ufunguo has played a key role in developing research, and leading TEN/MET early on; while HakiElimu plays a watchdog role activities and provides a portion of core funding to TEN/MET. Despite the evidence of stronger and more active members, however, the quieter CSOs still adamantly supported TEN/MET and its work, even if they cannot participate as active members (Interviews C23; C27; C31; C37; C75; C77).

**Official Statements of TEN/MET’s Areas of Activity**

TEN/MET has documented its major areas of activities in its two Strategic Plans (2004-2007 and 2007-2010). This thesis addresses only one of these areas, focusing on the area of governance and policy change. However, I have included the other areas of activities, namely capacity building and information sharing, to show the breadth of TEN/MET’s activities. In Table 3 below I have listed key examples of documents that have come out of these activities. Individual members have participated in an even greater array of issues and programmes, of which only the more successful have been documented in the following chapter. By TEN/MET’s own admission, many of its planned activities have not been as successful or even undertaken, suggesting that the network has areas for improvement. However, the progression between the two Strategic Plans gives one a sense of the direction of the organization.

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15 The space limitations of this thesis do not allow me to state beyond this, but a quick perusal of TEN/MET’s directory (TEN/MET, 2006a) would give one the sense of its members’ breadth in both issues and strategies.
### Table 3: Key Examples of TEN/MET’s and Members’ Research, Advocacy, Capacity Building and Information-Sharing Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maarifa ni Ufunguo</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Cost sharing: A case study of education in Kilimanjaro</td>
<td>Research/Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCDD (Associated Network)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Lessons learned from TEN/MET’s experience on monitoring the impact of cost sharing in primary school education</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakikazi Catalyst</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Bouncing Back, Some Grassroots Responses to the PRSP</td>
<td>Research/Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyer, K.</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>A simple guide to working with finances and education</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maarifa ni Ufunguo</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Financing education in Kilimanjaro: The story continues</td>
<td>Research/Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN/MET</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>What has happened to Capacity Building under PEDP?</td>
<td>Research/Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakikazi Catalyst</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Participatory Monitoring of PRS and Pro-Poor Expenditure in Selected Regions and Areas of Arusha Region, Tanzania</td>
<td>Research/Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumra, HakiElimu &amp; TTU</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The living and working conditions of teachers in Tanzania: A research report</td>
<td>Research/Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN/MET</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>School Committee Capacity Development: Lessons from Civil Society Organization</td>
<td>Research/Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Graaf*</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Tracking (PET) in Tanzania at district-level: Effects on local accountability: Participatory research of and by Tanzanian NGO's</td>
<td>See note*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyer, K.</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The cost of poverty: Transaction costs and the struggle to make aid work in the education sector in Tanzania</td>
<td>UNDP HDR Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HakiElimu, LHRC &amp; REPOA</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Access to information in Tanzania: Still a challenge</td>
<td>Research/Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HakiElimu</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Three years of PEDP Implementation: The government assesses its own progress</td>
<td>Research/Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkombozi Centre</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Inventory on current education policy and practices</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN/MET</td>
<td>2005/2006</td>
<td>Newsletters. No. 1 – No. 7</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HakiElimu &amp; REDET</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>What can people know? Access to information in Tanzania.</td>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN/MET</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Strengthening Education in Tanzania: CSO contributions to the Education Sector Review 2006</td>
<td>Statement to Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN/MET</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>TEN/MET Strategic Plan 2007-2010</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: de Graaf is a representative of SNV who is not a TEN/MET member, but this report references TEN/MET members’ work in this area.
The Strategic Plan of 2004-2007 (TEN/MET, 2007a) outlined four core areas of activities that the network attempted to undertake, with varying success. Policy debate and advocacy, the area on which much of this thesis is focused, was one of its main activities. In this area, their goal was to influence education policy through their members participation in policy forums at all levels and in all zones of the country. As well, they sought to document and disseminate the proceedings and debates of these forums to their members, although in 2007 they admit they had achieved limited success in this. According to their 2007-2010 Strategic Plan (TEN/MET, 2007a), they were more successful in this regard in the use of media professionals and outlets in this regard. This success is mirrored in the snapshot of policy changes I give in the following chapter.

Another core area of activity was monitoring the impact of policy at the district level. This was done through joint efforts in conducting workshops and research, tracking the government’s budget expenditure, and analyzing finance, exclusion and quality issues, some of which are addressed in the snapshot below. In order to be effective in the above two core areas, the remaining core areas of activities focused on improved communication and information sharing, and capacity development of their members. The 2007-2010 Strategic Plan (TEN/MET, 2007a) shows an evolution from these areas, with a greater focus on lobbying and campaigning. It states that TEN/MET’s intentions are to support members in engaging in policy. In addition, it also aims to develop the Secretariat’s internal institutional capacity in advocacy and monitoring (at both a national and international level) and direct participation in policy formation and implementation. In order to improve its communications with members, the new strategy aspires to increase the sharing of knowledge and experiences, with the goal of promoting more collaboration on policy analysis and research, and lobbying and advocacy.

**Conclusion**

In summary, TEN/MET is a relatively young network with a large mission and a diverse membership. Its members come from all regions of Tanzania, and range from the subnational to the international level, although they are more concentrated in the Northern and Coastal regions, with a predominance of national and subnational members. In turn, these members are concerned with a wide array of education issues in Tanzania. It is certainly a challenging job for the Secretariat to represent all its members.
In its short history, it has purposely tried to place specific organizational rules in place to ensure both a balance of power and increased opportunity for voice. These measures included representation from all regions of Tanzania on the Board of Directors, and a limit of international CSO space on the Board. TEN/MET has chosen to charge a range of membership fees, while also allowing potential organizations (i.e. those who have not paid) to participate. The network has also established its own Secretariat with an independent office, to ensure that its voice is not confused with that of its individual members. However, it also has an identifiable group of movers and shakers within the organization, who many participants highlighted during the interviews. The two most prominent of this group were the national NGOs HakiElimu and Maarifa ni Ufunguo – both which have played significant roles in TEN/MET’s engagement in education policy, as will be seen in the next few chapters.

By TEN/MET’s own account, it is not a perfect organization, and there is room for improvement. Its second Strategic Plan states where it has not lived up to its goals, particularly in the areas of knowledge sharing and capacity building. It also notes TEN/MET’s fears about its sustainability in an era when its major donor (the CEF) ceases to operate. However, given its track-record for continually changing and improving over the past few years, it shows promise, which hopefully other donors will recognize.

This chapter has introduced TEN/MET and its members. It is in the next few chapters that we will see what TEN/MET has accomplished in the education policy arena, and how it has managed to achieve this.
Chapter Five: How TEN/MET has Impacted Education Policies and Structures

The overall focus of TEN/MET is to contribute to improvements in the education policy arena in Tanzania. The government, donors and CSOs in Tanzania each gave concrete examples of TEN/MET’s impact on the governance of education, in contrast to other research on networks in Kenya, Mali and Burkina Faso (Sivasubramaniam & Mundy, 2007; Cherry & Mundy, 2007; Maclure et al., 2007). In particular, several policy changes have been attributed to the contributions of TEN/MET members, including changes to the structure of the education policy process. This chapter sets out to document several of TEN/MET’s key impacts on the governance of education; an important contribution given that these types of impacts have been largely under-documented to date.

At the outset, it is important to note that the extent of TEN/MET’s impact is difficult to measure. Policy changes are often the result of a complex interplay of numerous factors. As the policy formation literature points out, it is difficult to directly correlate one actor’s input with a policy change (Perkin & Court, 2005). Echoing this idea, James notes that “An impossible challenge for any advocacy programme is to be able to directly attribute impact” (2002, p. 30). Each policy change would require a thesis unto itself to be able to assess the measure of TEN/MET’s impact on it. It is more realistic to seek a “plausible association” between a policy actor and a policy change (James, 2002, p. 30), using such criteria as whether a policy change is mentioned by numerous actors and/or diverse types of actors. It is in the interest of individual CSOs to draw attention to their organization’s contributions, but when organizations cite the work of another CSO, or when donor or government officials refer to CSO contributions, it is more plausible that a particular policy change can be associated with CSO action. Given the multiple accounts that suggest TEN/MET members’ participation in each of the policy changes below, plausible association is not difficult to see. Even though advocacy initiatives are carried out by an individual member or a group of members, these TEN/MET members frequently attributed their individual contributions as part of the whole network’s advocacy initiatives, as will be seen below.
Many of the following education policy impacts were documented in the researcher report submitted to CIDA in July 2007 (Haggerty, Mundy and Manion, 2007), while a few others have emerged in the course of analysis for this thesis. Each of the examples below can be traced to the work of TEN/MET as a whole or the contributions of its active members.

**Abolition of User Fees**

The most well-known example of TEN/MET’s influence on education policy is its contribution to the abolishment of user fees (i.e. school fees) (Interviews C16; C25; C26; C36; C48; C49; C73; C87; IO22; R10). What follows below is the story of TEN/MET’s involvement in this policy change, a change that led to 1.6 million more children attending primary school in Tanzania (UNDP, 2005).

The Tanzanian government had informally introduced user fees into the education system in the 1980s in response to the economic crisis that gripped the country, as mentioned in Chapter Three. User fees at the time were policy initiatives supported by the international financial institutions (namely the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) as “cost-sharing” measures that would promote community “ownership” and supplement district-level funding (Kattan & Burnett, 2004; Maarifa ni Ufunguo, 2001; Alonso-Terme, 2002). The Tanzanian government formally mandated user fees in primary education in 1995, when parents were required to pay the district up to 2000 Tsh. per year (less than US$2, with the money supposedly being directed back at the schools). The 2000 Tsh. was often too much for poor parents after paying for uniforms, books, and so on, especially for parents who had multiple children. Often parents did not see the return of their funds to the school as the fees were often used to fund non-education projects in the district (Alonso-Terme, 2002). It is generally held that the Tanzanian government, being unable to fully fund its education system without the support of international financial institutions, was supportive of user fees as late as 1999.

In 1999-2000, the Arusha-based NGO Maarifa ni Ufunguo, together with Oxfam GB, undertook research documenting the negative effects of user fees and other education costs (books, uniforms etc.) on the poorest children (Maarifa ni Ufunguo, 2001, 2003). The study was conducted by almost a dozen smaller CSOs, who received training from Oxfam GB and Maarifa ni Ufunguo, thereby building their capacity in research. The
Kilimanjaro region, which is one of the richer regions of Tanzania, was chosen to highlight the fact that if children in this region could not afford a basic education, how could those in areas of greater economic disparity. The report influentially documented the actual costs of education to families, and showed how the costs were prohibitive for some parents (Maarifa ni Ufunguo, 2001).

The active distribution of the report and its use to lobby the Tanzanian government and donors, bilateral and multilateral, was one of the key factors in the decision of the Tanzanian government to abolish school fees. Maarifa’s study was publicized through the TEN/MET network, which had newly been created in 1999. Through videos produced during the research (January-February 2000), the TEN/MET members were able to target the local communities, the district education offices and the Ministry of Education. This produced a buzz on the street about the issue (Cuffe, 2002; Otieno, 2001; Meek, 2002; Maarifa ni Ufunguo, 2003). Lobbying was carried out by several members of the Kilimanjaro Education Network (KEN/MEKI), one of the regional CSO networks whose members were also part of TEN/MET (Maarifa ni Ufunguo, 2003). In addition, in March 2000 the study was presented formally to the Tanzanian government, donors and NGOs during a meeting about debt relief from the HIPC community, which resulted in garnering support from several donors (Alonso-Terme, 2002). Interestingly, the government itself then used the research at the World Education Forum in Dakar in April 2000, “to stress the importance of abolishing school fees” and to call “on the international community for help to end fees for all children attending primary school across the developing world” (CEF, n.d.).

In the context of the October 2000 elections, the Tanzanian government announced in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper that it intended to abolish primary school fees, starting in the 2001/02 fiscal year (URT, 2000; Maarifa ni Ufunguo, 2001). Until this point, cost-sharing had been considered an essential part of the primary education. It was only when donors were willing to provide the necessary funds to make up the shortfall (with which to deal with the expected influx of students), that the government was able to change its decision (Alonso-Terme, 2002).

The report also received extensive publicity internationally. Contributing to a 1999-2000 campaign against user fees by Jubilee 2000, Results, AFL-CIO and others, the
report’s rationale was used to put together a manifesto which asked readers to contact the World Bank, the IMF, the US Treasury Department and members of the US congress to encourage these organizations to clearly change their stance towards the elimination of user fees in health and education. In the United States in October 2000, an amendment to the US foreign operations appropriations bill required the Secretary of the Treasury to “instruct the US executive director in all international financial institutions ‘to oppose any loan of these institutions that would require user fees or service charges on poor people for primary education or primary healthcare’” (Alonso-Terme, 2002, p. 4).

Oxfam also used Maarifa’s report to influence both the World Bank and a UN special session on children in May 2002. Maarifa ni Ufunguo brought its experiences of “The Policy Context in Tanzania” to a World Bank sponsored workshop in the United Kingdom on “School Effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Maarifa ni Ufunguo, n.d.); while TEN/MET presented its position at an international meeting in Finland and then at the UN Assembly in New York (Interview C73).

How much impact Maarifa’s report and TEN/MET’s advocacy had on changing the mind of the Tanzanian government, World Bank officials, and other world leaders remains a mystery. One of the key authors of Maarifa’s report modestly says that the policy change was an “aligning of the stars” to which the Maarifa report contributed (Interview C48). A sketch of the issue by the World Bank also draws to light the multiple factors that contributed to the mass shift in policy on a worldwide scale (Alonso-Terme, 2002). One of TEN/MET’s members documents how, when the government had decided to make the policy shift following civil society’s advocacy internationally, the government claimed ownership for the policy change, saying that it had been the government’s plan all along (Interview C14). Despite a myriad of other facts however, it remains clear in each of these assessments by civil society actors in Tanzania, as well as the opinions of many other interviewees (Interviews C16; C25; C26; C36; C49; C73; C87; IO22; R10) and documents outlined above, that Maarifa’s report and TEN/MET’s activities have had a strong “plausible association” with the abolition of user-fees in Tanzania.
Increasing Resources for Quality Improvements in Education

TEN/MET has also been associated with policy changes that resulted in an increase in financial resources for several quality initiatives. These changes were due to TEN/MET’s participation in the Basic Education Development Committee (BEDC) and its four technical working groups, as described in Chapter Three. The specific policy changes attributed to TEN/MET include:

Advocacy for primary schools to receive a capitation grant of $10 per child, to assist in facility repairs; textbooks, teaching guides and materials procurement; and training for school committees. (Interviews G1; C14; IO22)

Advocacy in PEDP for schools to be able to procure their own materials, instead of procurement at the central level. Now also in SEDP. (Interviews G1; IO22; C73)

Advocacy for more resources for in-service teacher training, in order to have more classroom-friendly teachers. (Interview G1)

(Haggerty, Mundy and Manion, 2007, p. 19)

It is notable that the government itself credits civil society as being key in these policy changes, showing the extent to which civil society’s contributions are now recognized at the policy table (Interview G1). Based on the experiences of civil society networks in other countries such as Malawi (James, 2002), Mali (Cherry & Mundy, 2007) and Kenya (Sivasubramaniam & Mundy, 2007), a seat at the policy table does not necessarily lead to policy change. As explored in the previous chapter, civil society voices can be side-lined, used for rubber-stamping, or simply ignored. Although side-lining has occurred in Tanzania as well, (as will be seen in Chapter Six), this does not appear to have been the overall experience of TEN/MET. The Tanzanian Education Network’s voice has been both heard and taken into account, and due credit has been given, as demonstrated above.

Co-writing Policy Documents

It can be assumed that part of the reason why the above changes have been associated with TEN/MET’s participation in BEDC is because TEN/MET members actually played a role in authoring the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP), in which most of the above changes are mandated. Whereas in the past only the government truly wrote the education policy documents, TEN/MET members now play an active part.
In fact, this shift in the structure of dialogue was highlighted by several participants as one way that TEN/MET has influenced education policy in Tanzania.

Shaping the wording of PEDP . . . This included writing CSOs into the framework and making sure issues like education quality were addressed. (Interviews G1; D1; D21; C25; C32; C49; C66; C67; C73)

(Haggerty, Mundy and Manion, 2007, p. 19)

For example, the Primary Education Development Plan’s words were drafted through the collective input of the BEDC participants. In this case, this meant that TEN/MET members who were involved in BEDC actually wrote parts of the PEDP document (Interviews C49; C14; D1; D21). In contrast, TEN/MET members had much less impact on the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP), partially because it was designed at a quicker pace, but also because BEDC chose to focus on primary education and a similar forum for government/donor/civil society discussion did not emerge for secondary education.\(^{16}\) This has had an impact on the CSOs’ sense of ownership of PEDP and SEDP, as well as their cooperation with the government. As one CSO representative explained:

A lot of input really was put into the development of PEDP. That’s why the SEDP is having problems because there was you know, very limited involvement of civil society organizations . . . Whereas with the PEDP document we had time; we had very productive time working with different technical working groups . . . Yes, throughout to the end, we worked together with government officials. And that’s why actually there’s a great sense of ownership from the NGO side for the PEDP. (Interview C73)

It is important to note that TEN/MET members were expected, by government officials, civil society actors and donors, to represent most civil society perspectives in the BEDC meetings, even though the government has continued to invite some select

\(^{16}\) Although my goal is to document TEN/MET’s plausible association to policy change, it should be noted that donors too may have an even greater impact on helping to open up the space in which civil society actors can have such an impact. For example, there are many bilateral donors in Tanzania that are supporting primary education, but very few (except the World Bank) who support secondary. In correlation, there is space for dialogue in the BEDC about PEDP, but very little time given for SEDP. A future study on the non-monetary effects of donors on civil society space and the direction of dialogue is warranted.
representatives from faith-based groups and the private schools (whose consultation by the Education Ministry dates at least to the 1990s, as representatives of important constituents [Interview D22]). As such, TEN/MET’s Board appointed specific TEN/MET members to represent the network at BEDC meetings throughout the year. These members are chosen for their expertise on select issues. For example, an international NGO, the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), was chosen for its interest in institutional arrangements; an African regional NGO, the Federation of African Women Educationalists in Tanzania (FAWE-TZ), for its expertise in gender; and a national NGO, HakiElimu, for its knowledge of resource allocation and finances. TEN/MET representatives in BEDC suggested that when they are representing TEN/MET, the network’s goals come before their own organizations, even though their presence was also strategic on behalf of their own organization (Interviews C3, C4).

**Monitoring Government Expenditure**

Monitoring government expenditure, through budget-analysis and public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) was still in its infant stages in Tanzania at the time of the interviews, but several TEN/MET members and others identified it as a potentially powerful tool for creating more transparency and accountability in the education sector (Interviews C4; C9; C18a&b; C36a&b; C88; D1). TEN/MET and several of its members (such as Hakikazi Catalyst, Maadili, Kivulini, ActionAid and Oxfam GB) have undertaken public expenditure tracking in the education sector, to track funds and implementation at the national and district level as well as the flow of funds between these levels (Interview C88; Hakikazi Catalyst, 2004; TEN/MET 2003; 2004; see de Graaf, 2005; Sundet, 2004; TCDD, 2003). These reports were then publicized to government officials and donors through workshops and general hard-copy dissemination. Their experiences revealed that obtaining information is extremely difficult (HakiElimu, LHRC & REPOA., 2005; HakiElimu & REDET, 2006), and the methodologies employed by different CSOs needed to be more consistent (de Graaf, 2005; Sundet, 2004; TCDD, 2003).

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17 Three organizations are invited separately to the BEDC, namely the Christian Social Services Commission represented Christian interests; BAKWATA represented Muslim interests and TAMONGOSCO represented the managers and owners of non-governmental schools (not-for-profit and for-profit). The Tanzanian Teachers’ Union is notably absent. I do not have evidence as to why, except that it has been seen by many in Tanzania as a union only concerned with wage issues (Swai, 2004).
Despite these setbacks, several reports suggested that budget tracking has had varying impact (from small to significant) at the district level, where budget tracking has contributed to the districts’ improvement in the transparency and distribution of resources to the schools, as well as an improvement in school committees’ capacity to manage their capitation grant expenditure (de Graaf, 2005; Poulsen & Galabawa, 2005). Although there is limited evidence to date of the impact of this monitoring on improving the national government’s allocations (Poulsen & Galabawa, 2005), the abundant work being pursued in this area suggests that civil society is hopeful in this regard.

In addition to their own studies and reports, TEN/MET members have also used data from other groups to create advocacy platforms to push for change. For example, the independent research group, REPOA (Research on Poverty Alleviation), has created online a Tanzania Government Notice Board, where the public can access national budget or expenditure information (see REPOA, 2005). This raw data has then been used by several skilled TEN/MET members (namely the ‘movers and shakers’ of TEN/MET, outlined in the previous chapter), to do analyses and produce statements to back up their positions in BEDC meetings and other similar events. Speaking about REPOA, one participant commented:

REPOA is independent – it's not an activist organization. So they might analyze, or they might try to make things more transparent in terms of the budget, but they'll not say, “education has received too little” . . . The NGOs will take the information, and use the information that REPOA makes available, to give their opinions, to have an opinionated analysis.

(Interview C88)

According to HakiElimu, REPOA’s data has been “very helpful in placing the issue on the agenda, and some improvements in implementation” (quoted in Poulsen & Galabawa, 2005, p. 24).

**Improving the Living and Working Conditions of Teachers**

Instead of having research precede advocacy initiatives, sometimes TEN/MET members have undertaken research in order to bolster an already established advocacy theme. This was the case of the research on the “Living and Working Conditions of Teachers in Tanzania” (Sumra, HakiElimu & TTU, 2004), which was a joint
collaboration of the Tanzanian Teachers Union and HakiElimu. In the year 2006, the Global Campaign for Education (GCE) called for its annual ‘Global Week of Action’ to be centered on the theme “Every Child Needs a Teacher” (GCE, 2006). TEN/MET therefore asked the Tanzanian Teachers’ Union to be the lead organization in Tanzania for that year, with support from several of its members, including Oxfam, FAWE and ActionAid. They decided to change the theme slightly to “Every child needs a quality, effective teacher” (Interviews C79/80; also C66; C68; C10), in order to better address the need for an emphasis on quality, as well as to hook the theme specifically to the issues addressed in the above research. They also sponsored a national event surrounding the theme, including a large public rally, with cultural events and testimonials to which the Minister for Education and Vocational Training attended as the guest of honour (TEN/MET, 2006c). Other TEN/MET members used the same theme and hook to organize district level events, such as the Arusha Education Network’s event in pastoral villages and a CARE-Tanzania event in a rural ward (TEN/MET, 2006c).

These advocacy events and the TTU’s research can be plausibly associated with several of the government’s policy changes. First, the research documented the difficult payment situation that teacher’s often encountered – their salaries often have not arrived on time, and therefore the teachers are forced to miss school in order to travel to a bank several times monthly to receive their money. An article in Tanzania’s Guardian newspaper documents that the government is now taking action to ensure that teachers receive their salaries on a set date each month, with corresponding praise from civil society advocates such as HakiElimu: “The government deserves praise for its action. Following this development, we [HakiElimu] have instructed TV and radio stations to stop airing its spot regarding teacher’s salaries and housing” (Rajani in Shekighenda, 2006). Second, the government-approved Aide Memoire from the 2006 Education Sector Review specifically identifies the following related challenges: “living and working conditions for teachers, especially in remote areas;” and, “retaining and motivating competent teachers in (public) schools, rural and A-level,” stating that their resolution “would need constant attention” (URT, 2006, p. 7). There was little evidence of government attention to these issues until TEN/MET’s research and campaign for
teachers. As such, there is a plausible link between TEN/MET’s campaign and government attention.

**Pregnancy and the Right to Education**

TEN/MET has also collaborated with other networks to achieve change in common areas. In fact, some TEN/MET members belong to both TEN/MET and other networks, (such as the Policy Forum, the gender network FemAct, and the Early Childhood and Development and Education network, TECDEN), allowing for greater cross-fertilization and collaboration among the civil society networks in Tanzania. The support that TEN/MET members give to these other networks is in return reciprocated, contributing to a stronger civil society voice. One area where this has been most prominent is on the issue of girls’ education, an issue jointly supported by TEN/MET and FemAct. Participants identified the following as one example of civil society’s influence on education policy:

> Advocacy for changing informal ‘policy’, in order to support the re-entry of pregnant teenagers into schools. (Interviews C3; C8; C25; C65)
> (Haggerty, Mundy & Manion, 2007, p. 20)

Starting around 2006, gender CSOs decided to focus on the pressing need to ensure that pregnant girls were not kicked out of school, but received their right to education. Although not an official policy, it was common practice in Tanzania for pregnant girls to be refused attendance at school during their pregnancy, and denied the opportunity to return afterwards. Focus around this issue happened to grow during the time TEN/MET was experiencing strained relations with the government (due to strained relations between the government and HakiElimu, and TEN/MET’s decision to boycott the Education Sector Review). Therefore, the gender education CSOs strategically decided to use FemAct as the main front for their advocacy efforts, instead of TEN/MET. As one participant stated, it was a strategic move – they felt they would have greater chances of success, at that time, using FemAct instead of TEN/MET (Interview C3). This strategic move was supported by TEN/MET members, and at the time of interviews, many CSOs interviewed indicated that they expected a government policy change on this imminently. Their advocacy appears to be paying off, with the President of Tanzania now calling for changes to ensure that pregnant school-girls have the opportunity to go back to school after pregnancy. A newspaper article in June of 2007 quotes the President saying:
“We must find the solution to this problem as soon as possible,” said [President] Kikwete, calling for the arrest of people who made school-girls pregnant and urging parents and community leaders to ensure teenage girls completed school. (IRIN, 2007a)

Whereas this issue received very little attention before CSOs brought it into the public light, it is clear that their strategic use of different networks, and support between those networks, has contributed to the government’s concern over the issue. As contrasted to the government’s resistance to address the issue in 2004 (TGNP, 2004), the government is now reviewing the country's laws on both the re-entry of pregnant girls into schools and raising the age of marriage from 15 to 18 years (see IRIN, 2006, 2007a, 2007b; United Nations Girls Education Initiative, 2006).

**Conclusion**

Throughout this chapter, I have documented several education policy changes that have been at least partially influenced by the work of TEN/MET and its members and connections. What also emerges is that TEN/MET and its associates have accomplished this through a variety of strategies. Sometimes one strategy sufficed, whereas other times a combination of strategies was used. In particular, the following six overarching strategies can be drawn out from this chapter, each of which contributed to impacting the policy changes:

- Building trust among CSOs
- Working directly with the government
- Combining research and advocacy initiatives
- Engaging media
- Collaborating and exchanging information with other networks and non-education CSOs in Tanzania
- Linking to international movements

Each of these overarching strategies can be linked to other criterion for success that have been outlined by Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002). The first strategy, of building trust and collaboration among the CSOs in TEN/MET, is a cross-cutting theme in this chapter. Each of the policy changes that TEN/MET influenced required the network to establish a common voice for its members to rally around, as James (2002) suggests. This common voice required TEN/MET’s members to have trust in each other;
trust that was built through collaboration and working together. Building trust and a common voice were iterative processes, where prior interactions that built trust reinforced the feeling of collaboration in the next round. As Finnemore and Sikkink point out, “frequent interactions among people involving joint work on technical tasks would ultimately create predictability, stability and habits of trust” which in turn opens participants to forming common platforms for action (1998, p. 905). This strategy of establishing a common voice is explored more fully in the next chapter.

The second strategy, of working directly with the government, can be seen where CSOs influenced the increase of resources for quality improvements in education, and in co-writing the documents. Each of these came about as the outcome of TEN/MET’s participation in the Basic Education Development Committee. In some ways, this gave TEN/MET the inside edge to cooperatively work with the government. It also demonstrates several of the keys to success outlined by Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002). In particular, as noted in Chapter Four, TEN/MET had appointed key individuals with expertise in certain areas to represent the network at the BEDC policy table. Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002) have identified “key individuals” who can influence policy as an important factor in the success of a network. In connection with this, these key individuals also developed a rapport with government and donors – it was obvious during the interviews that donors, government officials and TEN/MET’s appointed BEDC members knew each other, and often viewed each other, as individuals, with respect. I believe these meetings helped create trust between these groups, which allowed for successful influence on the part of TEN/MET, particularly in the government’s decision to take on board TEN/MET’s suggestions for increasing quality improvement resources. In other words, not only did frequent interactions build trust among TEN/MET members, frequent interactions also built habits of engagement between TEN/MET and the government and donors.

Perkin and Court have also suggested that creating trust among CSOs and the government is an important factor in the success of policy networks, where “informal links can be critical in achieving objectives” (2005, p. 27). These informal links may be even more important in the Tanzanian context, where informal politics are suggested to play a much stronger role than in Northern countries (Kelsall, 2002; Hyden, 1999). In
turn, TEN/MET’s participation in BEDC also shows a “complementing of official structures rather than duplication” (Perkin & Court, 2005, p. 26); co-writing the PEDP document required TEN/MET members to avoid such duplication.

The third strategy that emerges from the examples is the combined use of research and advocacy. Research was used as an advocacy tool in the cases of abolishing user fees, improving teachers’ conditions, and monitoring government expenditure. As was seen in Table 3 (Chapter Four), several major research and advocacy documents have been produced. However, in order to be effective, the research had to be relevant and credible. TEN/MET members’ capacity to produce high quality evidence, and to package it in a manner that donors, the government and others could use, represent two keys to success that both Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002) have noted.

It is interesting that James (2002) also points out the importance of having the dual strategic objectives of advocacy and capacity building – each which feeds the other in creating a strong network internally. In all three cases, strong CSOs collaborated with weaker CSOs to help them build the capacity to produce high quality evidence. In addition, TEN/MET and its members have created several “how-to” documents (listed as capacity building in Table 3), in order to help build the capacity of its members. Both working with weaker CSOs and providing these documents helped to increase the pool of members on which TEN/MET could draw to undertake research and advocacy in the future. This bodes well for the future of the network.

Fourthly, research and advocacy also need to be properly disseminated and at times made public through the media in order to have an increased impact. Often dissemination of information through the media is a key component of an advocacy strategy, in order to incite public support for the issue at hand. Several CSOs seemed to suggest that research and advocacy alone were not enough to influence government policy, but that media or public pressure was necessary (Interviews C10; C14; C65). This view was summed up by one participant as: “You can write any paper you want; as long as it’s not in the media, no one would bother you” (Interview C10). Because media is often an expensive medium, the TEN/MET Secretariat collaborated with its richer members, such as HakiElimu and the INGOs, to disseminate its message. Network
researchers to date, particularly Perkin, Court and James, have not addressed the importance of media engagement in the success of networks.

The fifth strategy constitutes TEN/MET’s ability to collaborate not only with its own members but with other networks and non-education specific CSOs in Tanzania. This strategy was key in influencing the government’s position on pregnant school-girls’ right to education. It was also important in TEN/MET members’ capacity building to undertake government expenditure monitoring. Again, this shows TEN/MET’s ability to make use of informal links, however, it also increases TEN/MET’s “strength in numbers” and its “representativeness”, which are two other keys to success identified by Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002). An additional important observation arising from this strategy is how, through leveraging other civil society networks, a civil society network can by-pass its own impediments. This was the case with pregnant schoolgirls’ right to education, where TEN/MET’s relations with the government were perhaps an impediment for its successful engagement in this issue, which was overcome by using another civil society network.

The sixth strategy, of linking with international actors, was clearly important in the abolition of user fees in Tanzania. More will be said about this strategy in Chapter Seven, but it is of note that neither Perkin and Court (2005) nor James (2002) identified linkages with international actors as being important to the success of national networks. However, the ability of TEN/MET to leverage this international body of actors in support of abolishing user fees appeared to be crucial in the government’s final decision, and in turn, in establishing TEN/MET as a body who can actually influence education policy. The ability to connect with these international actors was partially dependent on the improvements in ICT that have taken place over the last ten years, a factor which Perkin and Court (2005) identify as increasingly vital for a network’s success.

In sum, the impact on education policy is intimately linked to the strategies of engagement employed by the networks. These strategies are both relational (between CSOs, government, international actors, etc.), as well as operational (e.g. the use of advocacy, research, etc.). Having demonstrated in this chapter that TEN/MET has made a plausible impact on education policy, in the next two chapters I will turn to theorizing several of the relational strategies they have employed in this regard.
Chapter Six:
Intra-Network Relations and Successful Coordination

The Tanzanian Education Network (TENMET), acting on behalf of educational civil society, has successfully played a role in changing several education policies and structures. As donors, the government and CSOs profess, it has influenced policy (to varying degrees) in numerous areas, from user fees to teaching approaches. It has also created a common CSO voice in policy dialogue that is certainly heard and even occasionally heeded, as evidenced in the previous chapter. This chapter sets out to explore the different factors and strategies that contribute to successfully creating this common voice. It focuses on the intra-network relations of TEN/MET.

Strategy within the Network: The Common Voice of Many

If you want to dialogue with the government, you can’t dialogue with one organization, no matter how big it is. You need a strong voice, voices from all places. (Interview C54)

Unity is power, disunity is weakness. (Interview C36a, Kiswahili proverb)

A strong theme across my interviews was the importance of TEN/MET speaking as the common voice of educational civil society in Tanzania. Many participants stressed the importance of striving for this unified voice, even while they individually had their own agenda. This was commonly seen as the raison d’être of the network:

TENMET is a network. It is an advocacy forum. It is where CSOs want a bigger mouth – a bigger voice, you’ll go to TENMET. But each of the members has its own education agenda (Interview C73).

One may ask how “a common voice” is a specific strategy, as opposed to just an organizational feature of TEN/MET. However, as will be shown below, TEN/MET has actively pursued establishing a common voice for a range of civil society actors. Through this, it can legitimately claim to represent these actors and influence policy through the ‘loudness’ of its voice. If it was simply a feature of the organization, it would not be connected to a greater impact in policy.
Perhaps the simplest understanding of TEN/MET’s rationale behind its search for a common voice can be seen through the words of a member of its Secretariat:

Why are we so keen to increase our membership? We are an umbrella organization, and therefore we’d like all CSOs working in the field of education to be our members. Because then we can increase our voice – at the local level as well as the national level – at all levels. And because our vision is to see all people in Tanzania having quality basic education, we work with CSOs, CBOs, NGOs, faith-based organizations, et cetera. We work with them, actually, to influence policies – for the better. Better education, appropriate education. (Interview C25)

The extent of TEN/MET’s impact is related to the extent to which the government and donors see it as representative of all of civil society in education. On the one hand, TEN/MET presents a practical solution to the government’s and donors’ need for input from a diverse body of CSOs: “They didn’t have to go to 20,000 [CSOs], they can just go to one, which is located in Dar” (Interview C4). In fact, through TEN/MET the government and donors were also able to say that they had heard not only from NGOs, but from CBOs, FBOs, and the teachers’ union. However, CSOs also felt that a common voice was more likely to be heard by the government and donors (Interviews C54, C66), as is seen in the quotes that begin this section. Even organizations that did not play an active part in contributing to TEN/MET commented on the importance of having a common network from which to advocate for issues (Interviews C23; C27; C31; C37; C75; C77).

Achieving a common voice that represents all of education civil society (and thereby gaining the legitimacy to speak on its behalf) required TEN/MET to undertake several specific actions, as explored below.

**Representing a Wide Range of Actors and Issues**

Key to claiming to be the common voice of civil society in education is a diverse membership engaged in diverse education topics. This is one of the keys to success highlighted by both James (2002) and Perkin and Court (2005), however neither give an explanation of how this representation of a diverse membership is achieved. From the case study, it appeared that first one must be able to say that TEN/MET represents most
of civil society in education. To achieve this end, TEN/MET has pursued greater membership over the past few years, growing from 39 organizations to roughly 200. As was seen in Table 2 (Chapter Four), although centered in Dar es Salaam and the North, this membership has come from all corners of Tanzania and has had links to numerous governance spheres of influence, ranging from the local to national and international levels. TEN/MET’s members range from very small community-based organizations with limited budgets to large international NGOs, from unions to private or faith-based groups.

Second, TEN/MET must be able to demonstrate that it can represent a wide range of issues and stakeholders in education. TEN/MET has also achieved this through its membership drive, drawing a membership that fulfilled a vast range of activities and issues. For example, individual members focused on pre-primary to non-formal educational issues, including access, quality and budget accountability, as well as advocating for marginalized groups, environmental issues, ICT in the classroom, human rights, and gender education, among others. TEN/MET members undertake activities from building schools to building the capacity of teachers and school committees, advocacy, monitoring and service delivery. It is important to note that the Tanzania Teachers’ Union and the Tanzanian Association of Managers and Owners of Non-Governmental Schools and Colleges (TAMONGOSCO) were also represented by TEN/MET, thereby increasing the wide-range of important education stakeholders that TEN/MET can represent.

Third, in order to be seen as “the common voice”, TEN/MET needed to ensure that its diverse members had a say in deciding on issues and directions. This required putting in place structures and rules in order to avoid the network being hijacked by only a few voices. The literature has well-documented the possibility of international NGOs dominating discussions in networks (Mercer, 2003; Lexow, 2003; CEF, 2007a), and the tendency of the urban/elite voices overshadowing rural perspectives (Evans & Ngalwea, 2001; Lange et al., 2000). TEN/MET therefore has chosen to establish rules to ensure a balance of these power relations.

The network uses a participatory methodology in its decision-making processes (Interview C66), in order to be as inclusive as possible in its meetings and to hear the voices of all its members. This communication process is used to ameliorate
disagreements in opinion that occur among the group. TEN/MET also strives for inclusiveness in its Board composition. International NGOs can occupy only three of the twelve places on TEN/MET’s Board of Directors (Interview C73). The Board of Directors has a representative from each of Tanzania’s seven zones, in order to get the perspective of each of these areas, and the TEN/MET Secretariat provides funds for these regional members to travel to the Board Meetings and the Annual General Meeting (Interview C66). Through its membership drive over the past few years, it has also sought out greater representation in all regions. In addition, it strives to have new voices present on its Board of Directors. Every year, fifty percent of its Board members resign to allow new voices to come in, and fifty percent stay in order to have continuity (Interview C73). TEN/MET’s Secretariat now has its own office and clear demarcated roles to ensure that when it speaks, it is taken as the voice of the whole network, instead of perhaps being the voice of one member (Interview C73). All of these rules work together to portray an organization that is representative of its diverse membership.

Such a diverse group, having chosen to be represented by one network, in turn lends a necessary legitimacy to the organization (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002). As was discussed in my conceptual framework, criticisms of civil society have raised concerns about networks being representative of only urban CSOs or international NGOs, or CSOs focused on only one specific education issue. Through its diverse geographical and issues representation, as well as its balance of these voices on its Board, TEN/MET is able to legitimately say that it is the common voice of civil society in education in Tanzania.

**Building Solidarity in Difficult Times**

A common voice also implies support for each other – a sense of solidarity. This is particularly important when the government, who is the target of the group’s advocacy work, does not like the actions of individual members. It was believed that that without a common voice on issues, the government “marginalizes you” (Interview C66).

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18 As one participant highlighted, it is not an easy task to find representation from each of these zones, due to the concentration of CSOs in the Northern and Coastal regions of the country. He stated that sometimes there are only one or two CSOs in that region dealing with education that could adequately represent the region (Interview C73).
This was most clear in the case of the watchdog HakiElimu, when the government tried to restrict the watchdog’s activities in BEDC and in the greater community (as addressed further in Chapter Seven). The support of TEN/MET members and other CSOs in Tanzania and internationally was strong from the very beginning of the government’s indictment until the issue was resolved. The measure of member support can be seen when TEN/MET decided to boycott the Education Sector Review (see Chapter Seven), pointing out that civil society itself should choose which of its members should be its representative, not the government.

A sense of solidarity and support for each other has been seen as an important part in the strategies of Transnational Advocacy Networks and Social Movements. Mundy and Murphy (2001) document how several international CSOs supported each other in the creation of the Global Campaign for Education, and in lobbying high-level officials and international organizations at the World Education Forum in Dakar. Keck and Sikkink (1998) speak about how continued support from members helped movements maintain their momentum through difficult times.

“Common Platform for Action” (Interview C79)

A third component of establishing a strong common voice is agreeing on a “common platform for action” (Interview C79). This common platform for action would be described by social movement theorists as a common “mobilizing frame”. In other words, not only must TEN/MET members agree to be a part of the network, they must also agree on specific issues to address. This point has been identified by both social movement scholars and network scholars as a key to success (James, 2002; Perkin & Court, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). TEN/MET’s members have joined together on several common platforms on specific issues, such as addressing user fees, education budget issues, and presenting a joint document expressing civil society’s position on the Education Sector Review (URT, 2006). Fundamental to designing these platforms was the basic assumption held by TEN/MET’s members that “through the networks like TEN/MET, I think it is possible to find a common ground and work together” (Interview C67).

However, always finding common ground that could address all its members can be a task fraught with difficulties. Given the size of the country and the diversity of
education organizations (Interviews C4; C67), where “different organizations tend to go different ways” (Interview C25), it is only to be expected that members would have diverse views. A collective voice comes with the risk of marginalizing some voices, or as one participant expressed, voices are “weeded-out” (Interview C4). In addition, the same CSO mentioned that a commonly heard opinion was that “only one or two people who were determining the agendas” (Interview C4). However, when asked to identify any tensions that existed within the network, all participants tended to express that there were almost no disagreements, although they emphasized that there were several tensions between individual organizations. This seemed to suggest that TEN/MET members actively sought to find a common platform and avoid tensions within the network itself. A few mentioned that CSOs had been divided on whether to boycott the Education Sector Review in early 2006, but this in turn was not related to the issues on education, but rather to whether TEN/MET should approach the government in a confrontational or conciliatory manner (as is explored below).

TEN/MET’s consensus may rely more upon the members will to have consensus than their actual commitment to specific issues, as a close look at the data suggests. One researcher spoke about the substantial pressure that CSOs currently felt, about the need of being a member in a network (Interview C48). In other words, some civil society members may not have originally joined because they agreed with all of TEN/MET’s specific stances, but because membership was a necessary requirement or had additional benefits, such as contributing to donors’ views of an individual organization as reputable. A lack of commitment to specific issues was also suggested by another participant, who stated that although consensus of the issue was there, this was not accompanied by sufficient collective action:

When it comes to issues, and if there are issues of clarity, issues which deal with our mandates and so on, I have not experienced any tension. What I have experienced is the lack of us not taking a lot more of these collaborative efforts. Because of the nature of our work. Because we have our own mandates. I have an office to come to, and I have to answer first to my office regulations, before I go to TENMET. I mean TENMET
becomes part and parcel of my work, but it doesn’t take priority.

(Interview C3)

Perhaps a similar prioritization is experienced by many of TEN/MET’s members, leading to consensus in name, but a situation where active participation is dependent on how closely the activity matches the member’s mandate. This may be indicative of a shift in norms described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Overtime, TEN/MET members have come to perceive themselves as a common voice with a common set of general concerns, although their emphases on specific concerns differ. In other words, they develop a habit of seeing themselves as part of the group, even though individual members may choose to only engage in activities that are closest to their own mandate (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This ‘habit of trust’ is an iterative process, where previous experiences of trust and collaboration pave the way for future trust and collaboration. Members can have different opinions, and be engaged in different areas of advocacy, while still supporting and strengthening the common voice.

Attributing Individual Work to the Collective Voice

When collaboration in activities did occur, however, TEN/MET members appeared to give up their individual identities and truly represent the network. Supporting this idea, a noticeable trend emerged from the case study, centering around the way in which the more active TEN/MET members spoke of their work. For example, instead of referring to Maarifa’s work on school fees, many would speak about ‘our’ work, or ‘TEN/MET’s research’. Albeit, the school fees research was undertaken by several organizations who all had ownership of the work, but even those that had not been involved in the research spoke about it as if they had been a part of the research. In a sense they had ownership of the research as they had been active in its public dissemination and advocacy.

A similar collaboration and forfeiting of individual achievements, opting for the collective voice of TEN/MET, can be seen in several other examples from the previous chapter. Monitoring of the government’s expenditures and budget involved the research and advocacy initiatives of several TEN/MET members. In addition, although led by the Tanzanian Teachers’ Union, the research on teachers’ conditions and the advocacy activities during Global Week of Action was a result of the involvement of numerous
TEN/MET members. In sum, the examples do not suggest that the individual CSOs attempt to take all the credit for their work, but instead use their work to support the issue around which TEN/MET members have rallied. Although the importance of strength in numbers and representatives have been cited as keys to success (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002), this case study goes beyond to argue that it is in the individual members’ willingness to decline recognition for their own work, that TEN/MET is able to build the evidence and representativeness that allows it to successfully advocate for change.

This ownership is of a different ilk than what I have seen in many Northern organizations, where branding of the original research with that of the key organization is paramount. What seems to have greater importance to TEN/MET members is the whole issue cycle (i.e. their work from research to advocacy to dissemination to policy change) where a clear sense of research ownership by one organization is forfeited for the greater good of collectively advocating for an issue with a strong unified voice. Again, this supports Finnemore and Sikkink’s argument (1998) that over time actors change their own views towards the common view of the group. The group itself gathers strength from both the work done by its members and the perception of it as a common voice.

**Keeping One’s Eye on the Ball: Focus on Advocacy, not Structure**

TEN/MET’s ability to successfully create a common voice for education issues may also be due to its aptitude to concentrate its efforts on its original purpose: advocacy for quality education. Although TEN/MET had put in place internal governance structures to address challenges in representation and coordination, it was TEN/MET’s work in advocacy, not its governance structures, on which its members concentrated their discussions. The governance structures of the network were mentioned and contributed to a better-functioning network, but members were clear that their purpose of having an advocacy network was to advocate for change in government and donor education policies.

In fact, the time when TEN/MET had made significant impact on policy (roughly 1999-2002, through crafting PEDP, and publicizing the issue of school fees) is the period in which the structure of the network and its rules of engagement were still forming. This suggests that although a strong structure helps a network sustain and expand its membership and be more effective in the long run (allowing more equitable voice and
representation to take place), it may not be essential to accomplish change through advocacy.

It may seem like an obvious point – that an advocacy network should be created to do advocacy – yet it contrasts radically with the experiences of similar education advocacy networks in Mali and Malawi. Whereas TEN/MET focused on the issue of user fees, Mali’s education networks suffered from disagreements on how the networks should be governed, and what their common platform for action/mobilizing frame would be, long after their formation (Miller-Grandvaux et al., 2002; Cherry & Mundy, 2007). TEN/MET’s creation also contrasts with the experiences of Malawi’s education coalition, which had its origins in research undertaken by Oxfam and ActionAid in 2000 around the “viability of forming an NGO coalition” (James, 2002, p. 7). Both of these networks were created at a time when creating advocacy networks seemed to have become somewhat of a fashion in the education field, following the creation of the Global Campaign for Education. Education networks in Mali and Malawi were more concerned about their governance structures than the advocacy that their networks were created to undertake.

In comparison, TEN/MET members came together around an issue first (advocating for the abolishment of user fees); an issue on which all members could agree on as a common platform. These members came together of their own volition, prior to the existence of an international education advocacy body and the encouragement of civil society networks through groups like Oxfam and ActionAid. Then, over time TEN/MET further evolved its structure to better represent its members.

It may be asked why TEN/MET did not disband after it had achieved the goal of its first common platform. In fact, this is what had happened in Kenya, where the education network has been comparatively ineffective following the successful abolition of user fees and subsequent loss of its common platform (Sivasubramaniam & Mundy, 2007). In contrast, after the achievement of their goal, TEN/MET started commonly working towards its stated mission of “promot[ing] quality basic education as well as accountability and transparency to communities . . . [as well as] meaningful learning” (TEN/MET, 2007, p. 33). It is plausible that the broadness of its mission statement was enough keep the group together. A second factor may have been that TEN/MET successfully moved from access to quality issues coincidentally at the same time that the
international NGOs made a similar move. Being in sync with the broad agenda of international NGOs, while maintaining its own autonomy, may have allowed the network access to a more open political opportunity structure, as discussed in the next chapter. Finally, in contrast to the competitive nature of Kenya’s education networks (Sivasubramaniam & Mundy, 2007), TEN/MET was overwhelmingly cooperative, as shown in the previous chapters. Perhaps this habit of collaborating together during this early time became an entrenched part of their ways of working – in other words, the habit of collaborating together in itself became a norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

**Intra-Network Communications**

Intra-network communications are an essential part of a network that wishes to fully represent and engage its members. Although other researchers have highlighted the importance of ICT and communications in the success of networks (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002), there has been little written on the exact strategies and challenges of networks in this regard, particularly in developing countries.

It can be seen that on some levels, TEN/MET’s communication was an important part of its success, particularly the Board of Director’s participatory method of communication and TEN/MET members ability to collaborate in research and advocacy. However, communication with the majority of its members remains a huge challenge for the network. As one participant articulated,

> “Given the pace of reforms, how is information flowing down, are you able to take this information from different tiers of civil society with whom you have a connect? Forget the Dar ones, forget the international NGOs with names and reputations - you know, the real people on the ground” (Interview C4).

One of the major challenges TEN/MET faces is the weak infrastructure of ICT in the country. Although the international NGOs and larger national NGOs have internet access, many others do not. An individual from TEN/MET’s Secretariat stated that they received timely feedback from only about 5% of their members (Interview C25) – a serious challenge if TEN/MET is supposed to be representing all of education civil society in Tanzania.
Another challenge several participants noted was that smaller organizations did not have the time to comment on TEN/MET documents, because they were engaged with activities such as finding funds for the survival of their organization or simply working on their own projects in education (Interviews C4; C31; C37; C56; C77). Although they were happy to be a part of TEN/MET, they were too busy or preoccupied with other matters to be active members in the network. As documented above, members may join more for the status of being a member than to actually collaborate in their work.

However, even though these challenges exist, what is notable is TEN/MET’s continual attempts to address these issues. Making the best of an imperfect ICT system, the TEN/MET Secretariat had developed three levels of communication in order to address this challenge (Interview C25). The first group of members had no access to email, and so the Secretariat reached them by post, local transport, and for those that had telephones, through that means. The second group had access to email through internet cafes, however downloading was slow and printing was expensive. This group received small documents by email, but larger documents were sent via the post office and bus service. The third group consisted of those who could easily access the internet, and therefore could reply to documents in a short amount of time. One can easily see from the structure of its communication reality, that TEN/MET was more likely to get feedback from this third group than from the first. This is especially if, as often seemed the case, TEN/MET had only a short turn-around time in which to get feedback from its members about government documents. On the other hand, it is notable that these smaller and more remote members, at least those we spoke with, were still willing to put their voice behind TEN/MET’s common platform.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above discussion that good intra-network relations, and in particular establishing a common voice of many actors, are the result of the interplay of a variety of factors. These include representing a range of actors, supporting solidarity in the face of difficulty, having a common platform or mobilizing frame, attributing individual work to the collective voice, a focus on purpose not rules, and improving basic information-sharing and communication. Many of these factors have been described as important to the success of networks and movements by researchers such as Perkin and

The value of successful intra-network relations is three-fold. First, it provides the necessary foundation from which to launch an advocacy campaign. If these CSOs had not come together in a cooperative manner and worked on common issues, it is uncertain whether any of the specific education policy changes in Chapter Four would have taken place. Second, intra-network relations provide a perception of cohesiveness, accountability, and legitimacy to outside actors, such as the government and donors. This perception encourages these actors to trust the network as a legitimate actor in their dialogues. Thirdly, it has been argued that the continual collaboration of these CSOs becomes a habit, and over time their identities as members of this network evolve towards shared norms and interests (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This means that the very act of coordination further encourages future collaboration and common identity, thereby helping to secure the sustainability of the network in the future.

The challenges and limits of intra-network relations are also apparent in this case. Information sharing and communication is still a major hurdle in an environment with an underdeveloped ICT sector. Even if this were overcome, many of the smaller organizations operate in a resource-scarce environment, where adding their input to the network is a far lower priority than their very survival. There is a constant tension between gathering strength in numbers (one key to success), and being representative of your members (another key to success), particularly in a policy environment where decisions and feedback need to be given quickly. Although TEN/MET has tried to expand membership, while balancing representativeness on its Board, it is possible that it is undermining its true representativeness of all its members when it quickly makes decisions for the policy table. However, there is hope that TEN/MET will continue to strive for a balance between these demands, given its track-record of continually changing to address the organizational problems it encounters.
Chapter Seven:  
**Domestic and International Relations:**  
**Balancing Contention and Complementarity**

This chapter sets out to describe some of the relational strategies that TEN/MET has used to affect change in education policy in the domestic sphere. Given that civil society networks’ strategies for engaging government and international actors are not dealt with by either Perkin and Court (2005) or James (2002), I turn to the social movement theorists to look at some of TEN/MET’s strategies in the face of their political opportunity structures. The first part of this chapter deals solely with the relations between government and the civil society network. I examine the contentious and complementary strategies that TEN/MET engages in, in both invited and created spaces. In the second part of this chapter, I look at its use of international opportunity structures in order to affect change in the domestic sphere, using Sikkink’s concept of the “boomerang” strategy (2005).

**Government-Network Relations**

Government and civil society relations in Tanzania have often been described as difficult, as was seen in Chapter Three’s section outlining the history of civil society in Tanzania. Civil society, for the most part, has been described as weak, and the government has occasionally taken an authoritarian stance against organizations. It is therefore unsurprising that one of the main debates among TEN/MET members was whether to take a more complementary or contentious strategy in their relations with the government. It was uncertain which of these strategies would affect the greatest change in the Tanzanian education system. However, the interviews and documents revealed that TEN/MET has taken both approaches, simultaneously using them as strategies through which to affect education policy change. It should be noted that these strategies are not diametrically opposed; it is possible for engagement with the government to start with a complementary strategy and shift to a contentious, or to be a mixture of the two from the outset if more than one issue is being addressed.

In both strategies, TEN/MET has made use of spaces to which it has been invited by others, as well as creating its own space to voice its advocacy platform. Invited spaces are those which were initiated outside the network, but which the network’s members
have engaged in as domestic opportunity structures open to affecting change. These include invitations to by the government to participate at the policy table, as well as invitations by internationally organized groups to participate in education advocacy campaigns, or to organize advocacy events on key strategic days. Created spaces, in contrast, are those that have been initiated solely by TEN/MET and its members. Some of the more common examples of created spaces are domestic advocacy campaigns and the engagement of the media. Created spaces can take place in already open domestic opportunity structures, or they can be used to try to further open opportunity structures. Each of these will be examined, as well as the risks inherent in using each of these strategies to achieve policy change.

**Complementary Strategies to Government-Network Relations**

Many of TEN/MET’s members spoke about the importance of working with the government to affect change (Interviews C3; C4; C12; C13; C31; C37; C38). They commented that since 2000 there had been significant strides made on behalf of the government to include civil society directly in its policy processes, citing the roles outlined in the poverty reduction papers (URT, 2000; URT, 2005), and the PEDP and SEDP (URT, 2001b; URT, 2004), including “planning, implementation, and monitoring activities”, “policy analysis and advocacy”, “accountability”, “shar[ing] information” and “mobilizing and enhancing community participation.” Through these actions, government has helped to create an open domestic opportunity structure, where the possibility for civil society intervention was now feasible.

When TEN/MET’s members spoke of positive and complementary relations, they often had two meanings in mind. The first meaning was to work in line with the government’s education plan. Examples of this, as shown below, were the projects of the Aga Khan Foundation and FAWE-TZ, which contributed directly to the goals outlined in the PEDP and the SEDP. Often this complementary approach was undertaken by organizations that do service delivery or innovation, contributing to areas or ‘gaps’ that the government cannot fulfill at that time. The second meaning, more often used in my interviews, meant taking a non-confrontational, conciliatory approach to the government, resulting in positive constructive dialogue that does not ‘rock the boat’. These two meanings were often interchangeable in the interviews.
**Complementary Strategies in Invited Spaces: Participating at the Policy Table**

Complementary strategies were used by TEN/MET members in several of the government’s “invited spaces” where TEN/MET had received an invitation to participate directly at the policy table. Specifically, by dialoging in a positive way with the government and donors, several of TEN/MET’s members had actually written parts of the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) (Interviews C4; C36a&b; C49; C73), as documented in Chapter Five. At the time of the interviews, this positive relationship had enabled TEN/MET’s Secretariat to be chosen as the civil society representative to co-write other documents such as the Education Sector Review Aide Memoire, and the upcoming Ten Year Education Plan (Interviews C25; C66). Through participating in the actual composition of the documents, TEN/MET was able to have a direct influence on the content of education policy. This was in contrast to prior to 2000, when it had no influence on the actual words of these documents. It was an effective strategy to affect change in the governance of education.

Beyond writing the documents, TEN/MET’s participation in the BEDC and its Technical Working Groups also provided a clear forum in which civil society’s position could be stated and heard. As one INGO commented, this inside view, with the development of a positive relationship, gave them an added edge through which to advocate within the Ministry: “It’s really a very strategic way – we are in a very strategic position, of lobbying the Ministry for changes” (Interview C4).

**Complementary Strategies in Created Spaces: FAWE and the AKF**

In addition to directly contributing at the policy table, select TEN/MET members have created their own space for developing a complementary relationship with the government. In particular, they have developed several successful innovations in capacity building and service provision. Through participation in the invited space of the government’s meetings, these INGOs have had the opportunity to convince the government to partner with them to institutionalize these innovations. Two active members of TEN/MET who have pursued this type of complementary relationship with the government are the Aga Khan Foundation and FAWE-Tanzania.

The Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) partnered with the government on one component of its large ‘Support to Education in Primary Schools’ (STEPS) project
(which is, in turn, one of AKF’s ‘School Improvement Programmes’). The government has funded the Foundation to develop and implement the AKF pilot course on training Ward Education Officers in other districts through the country. Through this service provision/capacity building activity, the AKF indirectly affects policy (Interviews C4; C/R10; C25; AKF, 2002; AKF, 2006). The connection between the AKF’s scaling up of its innovations through the government and influencing policy in this manner was highlighted by a civil society representative outside of the AKF:

Innovations in education – we are making a contribution there. That is one way of influencing policy – it’s an important, important contribution by CSOs. Like Aga Khan Foundation’s STEPs project. It’s well recognized by the government in the training of school committees, working with the teachers and improving the governance issues as well as the teaching in the classrooms. (Interview C25)

FAWE had been working with the government, and the University of Dar es Salaam, to mainstream some of its “best practices”, in particular a girl’s empowerment tool targeting secondary school girls, known as Tuseme (‘Speak Out!’ in Kiswahili) (FAWE, 2004; Nyoni, 2006; University of Dar es Salaam, 2007). The Ministry of Education and FAWE had developed an MOU where the government planned to mainstream Tuseme in secondary schools nationwide by 2009:

We have an excellent relationship on how we work with the Ministry, and also to have a budget line support, because the Ministry supports Tuseme . . . We are doing [the government’s] work, because they don’t have the capacity to do that, and we are the ones who developed the idea. We are the ones who want to pursue the issue of girls’ education. So we work together. (Interview C3)

Both AKF and FAWE had been chosen by TEN/MET’s Board to represent TEN/MET in select Technical Working Groups. The two organizations have developed a strong reputation over the past decade, and in turn have been developing a positive relationship with the government, which has convinced the government that it should use these CSOs’ projects as models for the nation. These innovations were in line with government priorities, but provided the skills and expertise that the government on its
own did not readily have available. On the other hand, it was the organizations’ strategic use of their place at the policy table that enabled these changes to take place. In other words, the organizations took advantage of an opening domestic opportunity structure to affect change. As a representative of one of these CSOs explained:

> The timing and the conditions had to be right. We advocated for this particular course at various levels. I did at my level, others did at their level. We made sure that we hit some of the budget requirement . . . We had to advocate to people while they were budgeting and sitting outside the education management money. We had to make sure that our people on the ground were compatible with the [government’s agencies] . . . So it all worked for us. We do a lot of training. But it is really the first time that we’ve managed to institutionalize something. (Interview C4)

Fostering a complementary and positive relationship with the government was also appreciated by the government. As one official stated, he felt that it was civil society’s role to “complement” the government’s efforts, citing that the Education Training Policy of 1995 spells out that the government alone cannot provide all services in education (Interview G1). He also informally acknowledged that “sometimes the government is not very good at initiating and spearheading issues on quality of education . . . civil society is good at that” (Interview G1). In this way, a complementary strategy was encouraged by the government in order to add ideas and education solutions that were in line with the government’s thinking.

**Risks of Complementary Strategies**

Despite the positive impact that can be achieved through taking a complementary strategy in relations with the government, there are several risks that were noted. A complementary strategy relies on the assumption that the government is valuing and listening to civil society dialogue in policy meetings, as well as taking note of the innovations that have had a positive impact on education. In the words of one participant, “Of course, advising is one thing, lobbying and being listened to is one thing, but also acting accordingly is another thing” (Interview C87).

Many of the CSOs who were involved at the policy table indicated that at times they often did not feel like they were heard (Interviews C9; C18; C25; C66; C68; C78;
C79; C87), referring to themselves as the “by-the way” people (Interview C9). Instead of being equal partners at the policy table, they expressed that donors’ opinions were given more weight, even though civil society was expected to be the one who understood the true needs of the communities on the ground. In fact, it was suggested that the government may have been deliberately trying to not gather the fullest input from civil society. Several participants noted that the timeframe and methods of communication often resulted in a situation where TEN/MET could not get proper feedback from its members, particularly those in regions outside Dar es Salaam (Interviews C9; C26; C49; C87). Communication often consisted of “One way traffic!” (Interview C18). This situation appeared to be found not only in education policy, but in other fora where civil society participated; the Tanzania Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) report on MKUKUTA’s progress (IMG, 2005) made the recommendation to improve CSOs involvement in this arena as well.

Even when TEN/MET was invited to the policy table, there was the threat that the government was simply using it as a legitimizing agent – to “rubber-stamp” (Interview R71) the government’s own initiatives. One active TEN/MET member indicated that this was the source of problems behind SEDP:

- It was like cooptation, you were co-opted into like looking at [it], and then when you send your comments and they say ‘Oh yes, we involved them’.

(Interview C49)

This is similar to the findings of Evans and Ngalwea (2001), who warned of the government’s attempts to marginalize NGOs with more radical views and opt for NGOs willing to “rubber-stamp” initiatives. An attempt at rubber-stamping was most clearly seen at the Education Sector Review, which TEN/MET had decided to boycott (as examined later in this chapter). In this case, the government sent out separate invitations to other civil society actors in order to be able to say that civil society participated, even though their views would not have been representative of all of civil society – in essence using civil society’s name without taking into account their input.

The greatest threat, however, is the fact that there are no rules about TEN/MET’s engagement with the government. The actual possibility of TEN/MET’s impact at the policy table is highly dependent on the structure of these meetings, over which civil
society has little control. As James (2002) points out, governments are the ones who have the power of invitation and who can decide what the rules of engagement are at any particular moment. Taking cues from a critical report on the BEDC structure (Lawson & Rakner, 2005), it is unlikely for any actor to have an impact if government officials are not present, if meetings do not occur regularly, are frequently postponed, or if the government reschedules meetings without informing TEN/MET members. In both complementary cases of TEN/MET members attending policy meetings or working with the government to bring innovations to scale, the government can at any time decide to pull out and abandon these relations, particularly if relations turn from complementary to contentious (Interview C14). In the words of a participant from another network who worked closely with TEN/MET and its members:

Well, one major lesson is that when you focus your whole strategy on engaging, in a process where you have no control, yet, over access – it’s very dangerous . . . We have engaged for several years. In the beginning, when the doors started to open up, the government started to realize and recognize that it actually is good to have civil society engagement, and it does help in certain ways; and that some of the things we said were actually things that they should be looking at. So, they encouraged it.

The more we engaged, the better we started understanding the issue, the more difficult the questions we started to ask. And we saw the doors starting to close back up. So people want you to engage, but up to a point. When you start asking tough questions, you start seeing the doors close back up for you quite quickly. And so, that’s why I was saying, if you focus solely on engaging, it’s actually quite dangerous. That has especially happened in the education sector, as I’m sure you’ve heard, but not just in the education sector. (Interview C9)

Given the possibility of a changing relationship with the government, it is therefore prudent to have available other strategies to affect policy change that do not rely on cooperating with the government nor working under the government’s rules of engagement.
Contentious Strategies in Relations with the Government

A strategy of contention is sometimes necessary in order to affect the greatest change in the government’s education policy. There will be some education issues that the government does not see as a priority to address and others that the government does not want to be held accountable for, requiring civil society networks to take a strategy that draws the ire of government officials. For this reason, following a contentious strategy through to a successful policy change is likely more difficult than a complementary strategy, because of the negative backlash that one often has to contend with.

A contentious strategy is evident in cases where TEN/MET members act as watchdogs, holding the government accountable for the promises it has made, or notifying the public about areas where the government should be making more promises. Tensions between watchdogs and the government are only to be expected, as one participant illuminates:

On the one hand you have the government which is responsible for the development of its people; on the other hand you have civil societies, which are like a watchdog to what the government is doing. Now, in what terms can the implementer and the watchdog be partners of equal interests? (Interview C54)

TEN/MET and its members have engaged in contentious strategies with the government in spaces the network has been invited to (such as within the BEDC), as well as in spaces it has created (such as advocacy through the media). What is interesting is that these spaces, invited and created, appear to often mix when undertaking a contentious strategy. As the case below shows, an action in a created space (publishing a report) might be the result of information gained in an invited space. In addition, the action in a created space might be taken as an offence by the government and affect the invited space, such as the BEDC. Categories of invited and created space, although useful in examining complementary relations, appear much more interrelated when looking at contentious strategies.
A Watchdog’s Contentious Strategy: HakiElimu’s Story

HakiElimu is one of the more well-known and active organizations within TEN/MET. In the summer 2005, HakiElimu compiled several of the government’s own documents into one report that highlighted the failure of the government to achieve the targets laid out in the PEDP. The government viewed the findings as quite embarrassing, given that it had framed the education sector as one of its success stories. HakiElimu then widely publicized its results, and the issue received extensive coverage by the media – an example of a created space. In addition to independent news coverage, they had for some time placed informational adverts in the newspapers and on the radio, asking citizens to think about what priorities they had for education and to contact the government and HakiElimu with their views. These adverts proved effective in getting the message out. For example, on three separate occasions, Tanzanians on the street whom I was chatting with initiated a conversation with me about HakiElimu’s adverts, generally portraying the organization as risky for having taken such a confrontational strategy in relation to the government, but also stating that the adverts were informative, and added to their perspectives on education issues.

The issues illuminated in the report created quite a buzz nationwide, throwing a dark shadow on the education sector, given that the government had previously been viewed positively in this sector since the abolition of school fees. The government felt that HakiElimu had acted in bad faith – as it had been “invited” to the policy discussions and had used insider information to discredit the government.¹⁹ In a strong response, the government progressively tried to restrict the activities of HakiElimu.²⁰ First it placed an interdiction that prevented HakiElimu from “undertaking and publishing studies on Tanzanian schools” (HakiElimu, 2007a). In the public arena, the government prevented HakiElimu publications from being distributed to schools, withheld statistical data and

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¹⁹ One government official expressed a personal opinion that HakiElimu had gained access to all of these documents because of its involvement in one of the BEDC’s Technical Working Groups (Interview G1).
²⁰ It is interesting that the government did not attempt to ban the organization, as it had done with a women’s CSO in 1997, BAWATA. In fact, many Tanzanians were under the impression that it had been banned, and were surprised it was still around, according to several HakiElimu representatives. One unexplored reason why the government may have been reluctant to take this approach is because HakiElimu is legally registered as a not-for-profit company, not a society or a trust which fell under the restrictive Societies Ordinance. This may have given the government less legal options in its attempts to restrict the CSO. However, more research is required to verify this hypothesis.
information, and stopped media from broadcasting HakiElimu’s adverts on PEDP and SEDP.

Within the “invited spaces” of education policy meetings, it stopped HakiElimu from representing TEN/MET in the BEDC Technical Working Group (although TEN/MET had elected HakiElimu for this position) and tried to prevent the CSO from attending the Education Sector Review. In a letter to HakiElimu, it stated that the CSOs activities were “contrary to public interest” and threatened “strict legal action” (Luhwago, 2007). For over a year, HakiElimu attempted to resolve the issue with the government, but had no success. It was only after a renewed interest of the media in early 2007 that the Prime Minister agreed to meet with HakiElimu, following which it has slowly lifted the restrictions (HakiElimu, 2007b).

How does the contentious advocacy strategy of one TEN/MET member relate to TEN/MET’s overall effect on education policy? TEN/MET could have decided to not support HakiElimu in its initiatives. This would have made it much easier for the government to continue to persecute and restrict HakiElimu’s activities. Instead, TEN/MET consistently and publicly supported HakiElimu throughout its tribulations. It organized a statement of ninety-six CSOs, calling upon the government to reconsider its decision and to re-examine the legal and constitutional rationales of the case, stating “We view these actions as a threat to CSOs in Tanzania to enjoy their rights and responsibilities” (Joint Statement on HakiElimu, 2005). Through TEN/MET’s connections to international civil society organizations, such as the Global Campaign for Education (GCE) and CIVICUS, letters of support flooded in from many different organizations in other countries – adding to the weight of the public eye that was closely watching the Tanzanian government’s further actions (see GCE, 2005; CIVICUS, 2005). For example, both the Canadian Global Campaign for Education (CGCE) and the Irish Coalition GCE, networks in Canada and Ireland comparable to TEN/MET, asked their governments to quietly and diplomatically signal their disapproval of the government’s actions and further push support for freedom of association in Tanzania (CGCE, 2005; Irish Coalition GCE, 2005). In addition, TEN/MET continued to appoint HakiElimu as its representative in the Technical Working Group on ‘Resource Allocation, Cost Effectiveness and Funding’, and had plans for HakiElimu to be one of TEN/MET’s
representatives at the Education Sector Review, despite the government’s displeasure with these decisions. Through these actions, TEN/MET was able to further portray itself as a united collective voice, as well as reiterate that it was an independent voice, not a group that was a proxy or puppet for the government.

This example shows how much influence TEN/MET’s member can have on the political landscape through a contentious strategy. Although no policy changes have resulted, it has reiterated the freedom for civil society associations. As well, it is an example of how a CSO successfully made the government pay attention, and then used the education network for support in its struggle. As a participant noted, if HakiElimu’s tactics of dissemination and bringing media attention had been ineffective, no matter how damning the report, it is very likely that the government would have simply ignored HakiElimu and continued on in its business (Interview C14). The notoriety surrounding the events have also helped push the views that HakiElimu has been expressing throughout this process, where, according to two participants, Members of Parliament are now talking about issues that HakiElimu has brought up (Interviews C14; C9).

**Risks of Contentious Strategies**

The risks in using a contentious strategy are numerous. They include the risks as outlined in the above section on complementary strategies. In addition, it is very possible for the government to block a CSO’s participation in an invited event, as seen when HakiElimu was not allowed to participate and represent TEN/MET in the Technical Working Group or the Education Sector Review. These risks appear to be the same as those experienced by civil society networks in Malawi, where the government’s perception of CSOs “trying to join politics” resulted in anonymous threatening calls to civil society leaders (James, 2002, p.16). An even greater risk comes from the ability of the government to limit a CSOs work, and at the extreme, deregister the organization. As shown in Chapter Three’s discussion on civil society’s participation in Tanzania, the government has previously taken this approach in the past (e.g. deregistration of the women’s CSO, BAWATA). In fact, one HakiElimu employee told me how surprised many other CSOs and citizens were, when they found out that HakiElimu still existed and was still undertaking advocacy work: “You’re still here?” they would exclaim (Personal Communication, April 30, 2007).
In addition, although TEN/MET has been supportive throughout HakiElimu’s entire ordeal, it is uncertain what would have been HakiElimu’s fate if TEN/MET had decided to take an alternative position. Without TEN/MET’s solid voice and its other complementary relations, it is possible that the government could have restricted TEN/MET’s activities and place at the policy table in exactly the same manner as it had restricted HakiElimu’s. In a culture that where rocking the boat is not greatly encouraged, where people patiently wait for change to come to pass (Afrobarometer Network, 2005, 2006; Hyden, 1999), the extent to which individual CSOs and citizens might support an organization like HakiElimu is limited without a strong collective voice.

**Combining Complementary and Contentious Relations with the Government**

It is also possible for civil society networks to oscillate between complementary and contentious relations with the government. On the one hand, TEN/MET is trying to foster a positive relationship with the government, so that its concerns can be heard in the education policy meetings. In this case, a complementary strategy may be most apt. On the other hand, as described above, a contentious strategy may be useful in drawing attention to realities that the government would rather not deal with. The following case of the Education Sector Review shows one example of how a balance between complementary and contentious relations may be the best strategy for eliciting change in the policy arena.

**Education Sector Review 2006**

In 2005, TEN/MET was invited by the government to participate in education policy planning discussions that cover the whole education sector (as opposed to just primary or secondary education), culminating in the Education Sector Review. These whole sector discussions, occurring only in the last two years, were the first of their kind since the 1998 Education Sector Development Plan. The government first invited TEN/MET to nominate twenty-three of its members to attend the first Education Sector Review, a review that has been institutionalized to take place yearly. TEN/MET members therefore came together to choose these members, which would have been somewhat different than those who attended the BEDC and the Technical Working Groups. In this case, TEN/MET’s goal was to have as broad a representation as possible at the Education Sector Review (Interview C25; TEN/MET 2006d). The event, however, was postponed at
the eleventh hour until February 2006, and although TEN/MET members lost money and travel time, the 23 members met anyway to formulate TEN/MET’s agreed upon positions for the Education Sector Review (see TEN/MET 2006b). When the government re-sent the invitation to the February event, it had revised the number of CSO representatives to 11, (citing the reason of a small event space), and at the same time boldly expressed that it did not want a specific member of TEN/MET, HakiElimu, to be present at the meetings.

First, TEN/MET members hotly debated among themselves whether to take a complementary or contentious strategy at this event. Should they be contentious and boycott the event, thereby proclaiming CSOs right to freedom of association and choice, but perhaps resulting in a souring relationship with the government? Such a strategy might see their “invited space” at the BEDC and other policy events close. On the other hand, they could take a complementary approach, attending the Education Sector Event and ensuring that important education changes that TEN/MET was advocating for were addressed in the meeting. However, this might allow the government to infringe on their autonomy in the future, and they might be seen as cow-towing to the government.

In the end, TEN/MET decided on the contentious strategy and boycotted the forum. In the letter that TEN/MET presented to the Education Sector Review in lieu of its presence, it objected to government censorship on which civil society groups should be represented, stating that “We hold to the principle that civil society should be able to choose its own representatives” (TEN/MET, 2006d). It felt that CSOs should be able to choose independently who could best represent their interests. As well, the network expressed that 11 CSOs were not sufficient to represent the breadth of civil society actors in education (TEN/MET, 2006d). However, in a complementary move, in addition to the letter, it sent multiple copies of a twelve-page statement outlining its core positions on all major issues in the education sector, as well as recommendations for improvements (TEN/MET, 2006b).

TEN/MET’s contentious strategy caused a furor among the bilateral donors and the government, primarily because in order for money to be transferred from the bilateral donors to the government, the Education Sector Review needed a “Satisfactory” rating. The presence of civil society actors at the Review was one of the conditions of receiving
this satisfactory stamp of approval. In an equally contentious move, the government attempted to fulfill this condition by quietly sending out invitations to a few select CSOs that it had good relations with. Two of these CSOs were INGOs that had not heard about TEN/MET’s decision to boycott because of a miscommunication and due to the last-minute nature of TEN/MET’s decision,\(^\text{21}\) while three others were not TEN/MET members. However, interviewees present told us that donors were hesitant to give the satisfactory stamp of approval without TEN/MET’s presence, whom the donors saw as more comprehensively representing CSOs in education. In the end, the carefully worded Aide Memoire allowed the donors to give tacit approval to the Education Sector Review while taking TEN/MET into consideration:

This Education Sector Review was the first of its kind as far as the holistic - including all sub sectors - approach is concerned. This Review therefore could not yet provide an assessment of overall education performance on the basis of ‘agreed results and targets’, one of the criteria for a ‘satisfactory review’ within the Partnership Framework Memorandum (PFM) governing General Budget Support (GBS) but provided an opportunity to set the stage for the development of a full sector strategy. The Review made an attempt to provide some first strategic benchmarks in order to be able to measure satisfactory progress in the sector as a whole at a later stage. (URT, 2006, p. 4)

The statement of TENMET (reasoning the non-participation at the Review) stressed the importance of inclusiveness, effective engagement, full participation and the importance of sharing information between all stakeholders and the public. (URT, 2006, p. 17)

Through using a contentious strategy, TEN/MET was able to both re-assert its independence as well as bring to light the various issues it had with the government over participation (such ensuring that the rules of participation in policy meetings, including dates, numbers, lead-time for documents, and so on, are more clearly articulated by the government). However, its previous complementary strategy of participating in the BEDC meetings had built up its reputation among donors as the legitimate voice of civil society in education, and as a voice with expertise to bring to the table. Therefore, following the Education Sector Review, TEN/MET was again invited to participate in a

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\(^{21}\) This miscommunication may indicate a weakness in TEN/MET’s communication structure, even among its more active members, however the data is not sufficiently conclusive.
complementary way in the co-writing of the Aide Memoire and the upcoming Ten Year Education Plan (Interviews C25; C79).

It is important to note that this balance between complementary and contentious strategies may help the network be sustainable into the future. Given the experiences of other civil society organizations who have engaged in contentious strategies, such as BAWATA (who was disbanded, see Chapter Three) and HakiElimu (who was nearly disbanded, above), the government could have easily chosen to further block TEN/MET’s involvement in education policy. Its decision to again include TEN/MET may indicate that the government sees the value of TEN/MET’s contribution, and recognizes TEN/MET as the voice of civil society in education, or it may mean that the government has been forced into this recognition because the political backlash from donors and other civil society actors would be too great for them to exclude TEN/MET from these fora. However, TEN/MET’s complementary strategy over the past five years also may have indicated that the government and TEN/MET could successfully work together to bring about policy change. Similar to the iterative manner in which norms become internalized over time (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), TEN/MET and the government’s relations may be seen as an iterative process, where periods of complementarity allow stability during times of contention, further building a ‘habit of engagement’ between the two groups over time.

**Strategies in the International Arena: The Boomerang Strategy**

The above strategies of contention and complementation rely on the civil society network already having a relationship with the government. In this way, they presuppose some degree of openness in the domestic opportunity structure. However, there is always the threat that the government may decide not to listen to the suggestions proffered, or at its worst, may change the rules and bar civil society participation in either government meetings or in the general public (i.e. a closed domestic opportunity structure). For this reason, it is important for civil society networks to establish an alternate strategy through which it can advocate for change, without a direct relationship with the government. One such strategy is to by-pass national arenas of focus, and to use the international arena to put extra-national pressure on the government to change its policy. As explored in my conceptual framework, Sikkink (2005) refers to this as a “boomerang” strategy, when the
international community may be open to change, but the government is closed to the suggestion.

**Abolition of User Fees: Re-examined as a Case of the Boomerang Strategy**

TEN/MET employed such a “boomerang” strategy in the policy change it is most often given credit for – the abolition of user fees. Although I have documented these events in Chapter Five, it is worth a restatement in order to clearly see the use of the boomerang strategy to achieve policy change.

When Maarifa and other TEN/MET members first undertook research on the effect of user fees, civil society did not yet have a guaranteed place at the education policy table. In fact, the main policy document at the time did not mention civil society involvement except as service providers to fill the government’s gaps (see URT, 1995). Only two years before Maarifa’s research report was published, the women’s CSO, BAWATA, had been deregistered and banned by the government. As such, the national arena was not conducive to dialogue with the government. Even when the report was published, I found little evidence of the government reacting to it at this time. One CSO documented the government’s stance as somewhere along the lines of: it may be true that user fees affect enrollment, but we do not have the finances to support their abolition (Interview C14). According to Sikkink’s schemata, the domestic opportunity framework at the time was closed.

In contrast, the international arena appeared to be quite open to the suggestion that user fees prevented children’s enrollment (Alonso-Terme, 2002; Kattan & Burnett, 2004). In the final years leading up to the millennium, Oxfam, other international NGOs and Christian churches had launched an anti-debt campaign known as Jubilee 2000, which connected high debt repayments to inadequately funded social services sectors. It was argued that governments could not sufficiently fund the education sector because they were required to use the government’s budget to repay interest on debts. This meant that parents were required to bear the financial burden of their children’s education. The Maarifa study easily contributed to this debate, showing how this rationale resulted in children out of school. As well, pressure at the time was mounting to refocus development on poverty reduction, and rights-based approaches, as evidenced through the new Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers required by the World Bank, and the
Education for All conferences, where promises had been made in 1990, and were to be followed up upon in 2000. Again, the Maarifa study easily added to these frameworks. As explained earlier, civil society actors used the report in order to pressure the United States Congress, and through it the World Bank, to change its stance towards user fees (Alonso-Terme, 2002).

Seeing the potential shifting of the tides, the Tanzanian government suddenly became receptive to the idea of abolishing school fees. This support can be seen by the fact that it was the government itself who presented Maarifa’s study at the World Education Forum in Dakar (CEF, n.d.). However, the Tanzanian government chose not to abolish user fees until it had secured financial support from the international donor community. In this way, it was in the interests of the Tanzanian government to abolish user fees, as through this policy it would able to access more funding from the international community for the education sector. Through this complicated set of boomerang relations, where the domestic CSO network used the international arena to encourage domestic change, a policy change that had been unforeseeable prior to 2000 suddenly became a reality.

A necessary tweaking of the Boomerang Strategy

TEN/MET’s advocacy for abolishing user fees is clearly an example of Keck and Sikkink’s boomerang strategy (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Sikkink, 2005). When national change appeared impossible, the civil society network used its connections to advocate for change in the international arena, thereby bringing change back to the national arena. However, this case also offers insight into a further refinement of Sikkink’s theoretical description of open or closed opportunity structures (2005).

Sikkink focuses on domestic opportunities as open or closed, as can be seen in this case, however the Tanzanian government was only closed as long as it was saddled with the financial burden of funding this policy change. When this burden was shifted to the international community, it was then in the interests of the Tanzanian government to become TEN/MET’s fellow advocate for this policy change. In fact, one wonders how much this positive relationship helped establish TEN/MET’s members as the main civil society representatives in the BEDC and Technical Working Groups that were created following this policy change.
This leads me to question, in cases such as these, who should be the targeted actor of a network’s advocacy. The targeted arena for change is obviously the national arena – TEN/MET wanted to abolish user fees for Tanzanian children. Sikkink’s theory suggests that the national actors with the power to change policy would be the targeted actors as well. However, in this case, it was not only the Tanzanian government who made this change in policy possible, but also the international donors whose funding was crucial to the policy change. In other words, the combined advocacy towards both domestic and international governments was essential in the boomerang strategy to abolish user fees.

In a refinement of Sikkink’s theory of a boomerang strategy, it is therefore worth considering that, although changes in the national arena might be the end goal, the ultimate path for changes may rest extra-nationally. For this reason, it may be worth future consideration to go beyond identifying just open or closed, and national or international opportunity structures, and further identify the change-enablers who will ultimately affect the change desired. This is particularly important in our world of increasing influence of other actors, including civil society, extra-national government and international organizations, in the governance of national policy.

Conclusion

In the previous chapters, I drew upon the research of civil society network analysts, particularly Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002) to understand the strategies and keys to TEN/MET’s success. However, as I mentioned in my conceptual framework, the internal functions and dynamics of a network can only explain a piece of the puzzle of successful advocacy. James also states that key to the success or failure of a CSO network is the “attitude of government and donors” (2002, p. 16), suggesting that networks dealing with highly contentious issues may have a more difficult time affecting change. However, he falls short of actually examining the strategies and spaces that civil society networks use in their relations with the government and the international community.

This chapter has first tried to describe these relational strategies in terms of contention and complementarity. In conclusion, it can be seen that TEN/MET and its members engage in both of these strategies at different times, and sometimes simultaneously, depending on the particular goal it seeks. Complementarity alone might
be the most appropriate strategy if the network wants to collaborate with the government on service provision or implementation projects. A contentious strategy carries with it the greatest threat, that of being disbanded, but it also may offer the most effective strategy at times when the government does not want to hear the network’s message, as can be argued in the case of watchdogs such as HakiElimu. On the other hand, engaging in a complementary strategy before launching a period of contention might ameliorate some negative aspects, as after the contentious period ends, one has already an established relationship of complementarity to go back to, as was the case with TEN/MET and the Education Sector Review. This iterative process may help create a habit of engagement between civil society networks and the government, which over time helps to further open the domestic opportunity structure for civil society. Both strategies have the potential to be used in a positive manner that encourages education policy change.

However, despite the pros of each strategy, complementary and contentious strategies also carry some risks, many of which have already been individually highlighted in the general civil society literature. Complementary strategies carry the risk that although civil society actors are seen at the policy table, they are not necessarily listened to by the government. This may be a possible trend in Tanzania, given that this risk is also addressed by Mercer (2003) in relation to Tanzania’s PRSP in 2001. One TEN/MET participant described this as the difference between “advising”, “being listened to” and “acting accordingly” (Interview C87). Beyond this, the government may in fact only be using the network to “rubber-stamp initiatives”, a risk that has been pointed out by other Tanzanian-focused researchers (Evans & Ngalwea, 2001; Mercer, 2003). As one further step, although the government has “invited” the civil society network to the policy, it may be subtly sidelining it in other ways, such as not distributing materials to the network, not giving notice about changes to meetings, and not giving the network enough time to receive responses from members. This may in turn give the government and the donors opportunity to speculate that the civil society network is not representative of members. This is similar to the government’s discriminating behavior towards a civil society network in Malawi documented by James (2002). James also mentions one further threat that one of the TEN/MET participants brought out: namely,
that in the end it is the government who has control over invitations and rules, and who can, at a moment’s notice, close the door to a civil society network’s participation.

In contrast to complementary approaches, contentious strategies, if done successfully, force the government to hear the civil society network’s demands. This was the case in both the HakiElimu and Education Sector Review experiences with contention. However, contentious strategies can also result in subsequent negative relations with the government or donors. Contentious strategies carry with them the risk of possibly being un-invited from government events, thereby closing the “invited space”. They can also result in being shunned by the government, or at the worst, the threat of being disbanded, two threats that have been previously highlighted by Kelsall’s (2001), Tripp’s (2000), and Iheme’s (2005) work on government-civil society relations in Tanzania.

Both complementary and contentious strategies face the possibility of not being listened to by the government, even if the government acknowledges the civil society network’s contribution in a friendly (as often results from complementarity) or acrimonious manner (as can result from contention). In the end, these strategies may fail to actually impact the government. This is especially the case given that donors’ opinions in Tanzania are often given more weight than internal actors, as my participants and Mercer (2003) suggest.

In the end, both of these strategies rely on the domestic opportunity structures being at least partially open. The examples that the participants gave of complementary and contentious strategies were all based on the assumption that direct civil society to government communication and change was possible. During most of TEN/MET’s short life-span, the domestic opportunity structures have been relatively open. This is partially due to two structural changes to the civil society arena in Tanzania in the past decade. First, changes to the NGO Policy and NGO Bill have allowed civil society greater freedom of expression and autonomy (Iheme, 2005). Second, the third “Big Shift” described in Chapter Three, where civil society is now an expected participant at the policy table, has created a domestic situation where the government is more likely to include civil society in its policy discussions.
However, when TEN/MET was first created in 1999, neither of these openings to the domestic opportunity structure had occurred yet. In cases where the domestic opportunity is closed, civil society networks may take a boomerang strategy where they target the international arena. As Sikkink (2005) posits, and as TEN/MET’s experience with the abolition of user fees shows, the boomerang strategy works well when the domestic opportunity structure is closed, but the international opportunity structure is open. In this case, the international opportunity structure had been opened by what I have described in Chapter Three as the first “Big Shift”, where there was a normative shift towards common education and poverty goals. The user fees case also points to a refinement to Sikkink’s conceptualization of the boomerang strategy. Whereas Sikkink (2005) suggests that the end-target of a network’s advocacy would be the national actors, in TEN/MET’s case the main agents of change were actually the international donors who funded the Tanzanian government’s short-fall, as the government itself had already began advocating to abolishing user fees. In other words, although the national arena is the end goal where one sees change take place in the boomerang strategy, some policy issues require both domestic and international political will.

In sum, both domestic and international opportunity structures, as well as strategies of contention and complementarity shape the successful engagement of civil society networks in the education policy arena. Relations are complex, and strategies for a successful network in this regard cannot be summed up as merely due to the attitudes of donors and the government as James (2002) had suggested. There is an iterative nature to these relations, where periods of complementarity and contention begin to build ‘habits of engagement’ over time; or as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) would put it, where engagement between civil society and government becomes a norm. Although the social movement literature has long recognized that political dimensions are important to the success of campaigns, the civil society network literature would benefit from further exploring these relationships and the structures that mold them, both domestically and internationally.
Chapter Eight: Summaries, Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research

This thesis explores the Tanzanian Education Network’s emergence, strategies and successes in influencing education policy in Tanzania. In particular, it broadly asks, “How has TEN/MET been able to successfully impact education policies and policy structures in Tanzania?” What the case study reveals is that TEN/MET’s impact is part of a dynamic, iterative process of change. As civil society networks are a fairly recent phenomenon in the international development arena, a case study on the success of one organization is an important contribution to understand their potentials and limits to impact education policy in Southern countries. The case study also suggests the need for theories on civil society networks to further examine the historical and political context that affects, and is affected by these networks. This concluding chapter gives a summary of the major findings of this thesis, in an attempt to draw a more concise picture of TEN/MET, its context, and its strategies.

The Rising Importance of Civil Society Networks in Education Policy

The last decade has seen the blossoming of civil society networks in the field of education. Growth of these new networks is partially due to the rapid emergence of new civil society organizations that rose to fill Southern governments’ education gaps of the 1980s and 1990s. Civil society networks began to emerge nationally around the turn of the new millennium, often with outside help from INGOs such as Oxfam and Action Aid. Education CSOs in Tanzania, coming together as TEN/MET, were one of the earlier groups to have formed this type of advocacy-focused civil society network.

The growth of civil society networks is particularly relevant because of the new roles in education policy that have been awarded to these entities. As I documented in Chapter Three, three ‘big shifts’ have occurred in the international realm, which have fundamentally changed the way that governments, donors and CSOs interact in education policy at the domestic level, as demonstrated in Tanzania’s case.

First, there has been a growing international consensus on specific education and poverty goals, such as Education for All, and the Millennium Development Goals. These give donors and governments new targets to strive for, and give CSOs set promises they can advocate and hold governments accountable for. Second, there has been an increasing recognition of the importance of having all actors (government, donors, and
CSOs coordinate their contributions towards a common national plan that is outlined by the national government. In Tanzania, this common education sector plan is known as the Education Sector Development Programme, and has aligned sub-sector plans such as the Primary and Secondary Education Development Plans (PEDP and SEDP respectively).

The third ‘big shift’ follows on the second, with the recommendation that although governments should be “in the driver’s seat” (Buchert, 2000, p. 406), policy structures should be opened to include civil society voices at the education policy table. This contrasts with the prior experiences of civil society actors, where they might have been consulted but were not often present at the policy table.

In the wake of these three big shifts, TEN/MET emerged as the coordinating voice of education CSOs in Tanzania. As discussed in Chapter Four, the network’s overarching mission is to promote quality basic education and equity, by influencing education policy and practices. Established in 1999 by 39 members, it has grown to roughly 200 members, ranging from subnational, national and international NGOs, to community-based and faith-based organizations, to the teachers’ union. Through its members, it addresses a wide range of issues as well, from primary to higher education, and from access to quality to equity issues in education. In line with the third ‘big shift’ of more stakeholders at the policy table, the Tanzanian government has invited TEN/MET to represent civil society’s voice in the Basic Education Development Committee (BEDC) and at other major education policy events. In contrast to the past experiences of CSOs in Tanzania, the network has the potential to greatly affect education policy change in Tanzania.

However, the participation of civil society networks in government meetings does not automatically equate itself with an impact on education policy. Other researchers have documented how civil society viewpoints have been sidelined or ignored by the government, even while the government claims to have received their input (Evans & Ngalwea, 2001; Mercer, 2003). These facts required me to ask whether civil society networks actually impact education policy, or whether education policy changes would proceed towards the same outcome without their input.
Impacting Education Policy

This case study shows that civil society networks can and do make a difference in education policy change. In answer to the research question, “What are the key education policy changes in which the Tanzanian Education Network (TEN/MET) influence has been important?”, I have found that TEN/MET has been plausibly associated with influencing several education policy changes. They have had an impact on:

- the abolition of primary school user fees in Tanzania;
- the increases in resources for quality improvements in education;
- the actual wording in key education policy documents;
- the improvements in the living and working conditions of teachers;
- the right of pregnant schoolgirls to finish their education; and,
- the improvement in government accountability through monitoring government expenditure.

In contrast to the experiences of several other education networks (James, 2006; Cherry & Mundy, 2007; Sivasubramaniam & Mundy, 2007), and civil society actors in various areas of policy in Tanzania (Evans & Ngalwea, 2001; Mercer, 2003; Kuder, 2004), these examples show TEN/MET to be a confirming case of civil society networks ability to impact policy change in education.

Strategies for Success in Impacting Policy

Following on the success of TEN/MET in influencing policy, my second research question asked, “What strategies have allowed TEN/MET to influence key policy changes in the education sector in Tanzania?” This case study shows that TEN/MET used a wide-range of strategies to incite change in education policy and education policy structures. Emerging from the examples of policy change in Tanzania, these strategies of engagement, (or what social movement theorists call ‘repertoires of contention’), include:

- Combining research and advocacy initiatives;
- Engaging media;
- Collaborating and exchanging information with other networks and non-education CSOs in Tanzania;
- Mobilizing a common voice;
• Working with the government; and,
• Linking to international movements.

The first three of these strategies share the commonality of all being activity-oriented strategies. The latter three constitute strategies that deal with relations: namely strategies dealing with inter-CSO relations, intra-network relations, CSO-government relations, and CSO-international relations. Each of them can be further broken down into various factors that influence their success. Drawing on both the keys to success from the civil society network literature (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002), and social movement theories of opportunity structures and norm formation (McCarthy, 1997; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001; Sikkink, 2005; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), one can see the complexity of the civil society network’s effectiveness. Particularly important to these strategies is the network’s management of contentious and complementary relations with other actors. These develop into relationships that build over time in an iterative process that strengthens both the network and its relations.

**Combining research and advocacy initiatives**

Combining research and advocacy initiatives was an important part of TEN/MET’s strategy for policy change. Similar to Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002), I found that the research produced had to be relevant and credible, and packaged in a usable format. My research also confirms James’s observation (2002) that having dual strategic objectives of advocacy and capacity building helps civil society networks succeed. By increasing the capacity of its weaker members, through training and “how-to” documents, TEN/MET was able to increase the pool of members capable of doing research and advocacy in the future.

**Engaging media**

Engaging media was also a strategy used by TEN/MET members. This was seen as an important part of gaining the public support needed to pressure government to take action. This observation is an important one to the civil society network literature, and one that has not yet been pointed out by Perkin, Court or James. However, further research on the interrelation between media, advocacy and civil society networks is warranted to understand the importance of this strategy in depth.
Collaborating non-education networks and CSOs in Tanzania

Collaborating and exchanging information with other networks and non-education CSOs in Tanzania led to an overall strengthening of TEN/MET’s capacity. It demonstrates several of the keys to success outlined by network theorists. In addition to showing a civil society network’s ability to make use of informal links, it indirectly increased the network’s strength in numbers and representativeness. In other words, if the target of one’s advocacy is the government, increasing the number and type of voices that call for policy change helps nudge the government in that direction. However, this strategy goes beyond network theorists observations, in that it documents, how a civil society network can by-pass its own impediments (such as a rocky relationship with the government) through allowing other civil society networks to lead an issue. In this way, this strategy is a new contribution to the literature.

Mobilizing a common voice

This case study confirmed Perkin and Court’s (2005) and James’ (2002) observations that intra-network relations are an important part of the success of a civil society network. However, as my participants pointed out, exhibiting a strong common voice is also important strategically, particularly in dealing with the government. As one participant pointed out, “If you want to dialogue with the government, you can’t dialogue with one organization, no matter how big it is. You need a strong voice, voices from all places” (Interview C54).

In Chapter Six, I examined several factors that contributed to successfully mobilizing a common voice. First, a civil society network must be able to represent a wide range of actors and issues. This has been confirmed by James (2002) and Perkin and Court (2005), however neither give an explanation of how a civil society network attains and successfully represents a diverse membership. This case study shows that a civil society network first attains this through membership drives. It then ensures that these diverse new members have an opportunity to contribute to core network discussions by establishing rules and structures that ensure a balance of power relations and help inhibit the network from being hijacked by only a few voices. This in turn lends legitimacy to the organization (Perkin & Court, 2005; James, 2002).
Second, a common voice requires the network to build solidarity in difficult times, without which, the government is able to marginalize civil society actors. Although this factor has not been highlighted by civil society network theorists, both Mundy and Murphy (2001) and Keck and Sikkink (1998) have demonstrated the importance of solidarity when the forces are against you.

Third, part of building solidarity requires having a common platform for action, or what social movement theorists refer to as a common mobilizing frame. This factor has been explored extensively by many scholars as key to a campaign’s success (James, 2002; Perkin & Court, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). TEN/MET’s success in this regard may be a result less due to their members’ actual commitment to a particular issue, and more do to the members’ perception of themselves as part of the same group. Drawing on Finnemore and Sikkink’s ideas of norm formation (1998), I argue that over time, through trust and collaboration, TEN/MET actors have developed “habits” of collaboration and trust, internalizing the idea that they are most effective working as a group.

Fourthly, TEN/MET members strategically expand the scope of TEN/MET’s work by attributing their individual organization’s work to be part of TEN/MET’s work. This contrasts with my experiences of Northern organizations that focus on branding their research and advocacy. This phenomenon of joint attribution in Tanzania appears to be newly documented in this case-study, although it is easy to see how it contributes to strengthening the numbers and representativeness of the civil society network, as argued by Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002).

Fifthly, TEN/MET’s ability to build a common voice also rests on its continued emphasis on advocacy, not structure. In other words, it has tried to put in place organizational structures that allow for a balance of power and coordination among its members, but has not lost sight that the structures only exist for the purpose of its mission statement, which requires it to focus on advocating for educational change. This is an important point, as several researchers have documented the failure of civil society networks in advocacy, because of the network’s inability to go beyond their structural issues (Miller-Grandvaux et al., 2002; Cherry & Mundy, 2007). This confirms both
Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002), in that having clear governance structures is an important part, but not the overall focus, of a network.

Sixth, Perkin and Court (2005) argue that a common voice requires good intra-network communications. On this front, however, TEN/MET falls short in its performance. It too recognizes the importance of communication for the success of the network; however, the financial and time-related realities of its members, combined with the underdeveloped ICT infrastructure in Tanzania severely inhibit its communication abilities. It has developed a contingency plan for communicating with its members, but this remains one front on which TEN/MET could improve its performance.

On the whole, the participants highlighted the importance of mobilizing a common voice as a strategic factor in influencing education policy change. Although civil society network theorists have touched upon various factors of mobilizing a common voice, this case study contributes to the literature by further breaking down intra-network relations into various components.

**Working with the government**

As might be expected, I found that TEN/MET’s ability to work with the government proved to be an important strategy in encouraging education policy change. Both Perkin and Court (2005) and James (2002) briefly mention the importance of positive government-CSO relations. James talks about the necessary attitudes of government and donors in affecting policy change, while Perkin and Court propose the importance of complementing official structures. However, TEN/MET’s experiences suggested to me that there is more to this than the civil society network theorists had anticipated, particularly since these theorists seem to ignore the role that contention and politics can play in producing policy change. One way that civil society network theorists can expand their concepts in this area is by drawing on concepts that have already been articulated by social movement theorists. In fact, social movement theorists appear to assume the possibility of contention in their theories, in contrast to the civil society network theorists who tend to assume consensus.

TEN/MET’s case suggested that the civil society network engaged in strategies that complemented and worked with the government, as well as strategies that were purposely contentious to the government. These strategies were used in both spaces to
which the government had invited CSOs, as well as spaces that the CSOs had created for themselves.

In invited spaces, complementary strategies appeared to be particularly effective, as it allowed several new inputs by CSOs, namely the ability to influence the actual words that went into major policy documents, as well as the ability to scale-up innovate civil society projects. On the other hand, contentious strategies may be particularly important for monitoring the government and holding it to account. Contention in invited spaces may lead to a closing of doors, whereas it may be particularly successful in the created spaces of media campaigns. Although in slightly different ways, both strategies run risks that are commonly found in the civil society literature (as opposed to the civil society network literature), such as rubberstamping or being side-lined, ignored or shut down by the government (see Evans & Ngalwea, 2001; Mercer, 2003; Kelsall, 2001; Tripp, 2000; Iheme, 2005).

Although the ideas of complementarity and contention are old ones, the new aspect that the TEN/MET case brings to the literature is the acknowledgement that it is in balancing these strategies that the civil society network perhaps achieves the greatest successes. By oscillating between complementary and contentious strategies, the network is able to build trust and good reputation with government and donors, while asserting and maintaining its own independence. In an iterative process, these groups build habits of engagement over time, which further solidifies the network’s position as a participant at the policy table. In a short time period, it was able to hold the government to account for its actions, and then work side-by-side with the government for other policy changes. The case study shows that the management of both complementary and contentious strategies is important in the achievement of education policy change.

**Linking to international movements**

Linking to international movements is also an important strategy in TEN/MET’s repertoire. Civil society network theorists have unfortunately ignored this aspect of domestic network relations, although it has been explored extensively in research on Transnational Advocacy Networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Mundy & Murphy, 2001; Sikkink, 2005). The case study of TEN/MET reveals that this strategy was particularly important in its most famous contribution to education policy, that is to say, its influence
on the abolition of user fees. Using Sikkink’s typology of open and closed domestic and international opportunity structures, I evaluated TEN/MET’s experience using the boomerang strategy (2005).

It appears that TEN/MET’s contentious and complementary strategies with the government, as discussed above, relied on at least a partially open domestic opportunity structure. These strategies assumed that domestic change was at least potentially possible through pressuring the domestic government. In contrast, the boomerang strategy, used in 1999, occurred at a time when government was not open to change (or more accurately, when it could not be open to change). At that time, however, the international opportunity structure was open to change, and so TEN/MET’s energies were most effectively concentrated on linking to the international movement for abolishing user fees. As Sikkink (1998) suggests, a change in the international sphere in turn allowed the domestic government to change its policy. This important strategy is one that will likely become more salient to civil society networks in the future, as ICT and global communications increase in density.

However, the TEN/MET case also suggests a slight adjustment to Sikkink’s theory. Sikkink (1998) tends to give examples of cases where domestic CSOs lobbied international actors who in turn pressured domestic governments to implement change. In these cases, the main agents of change were the domestic government. In contrast, TEN/MET’s experience shows that the agents of change were both the domestic government and the international donors – once the donors had agreed to provide the Tanzanian government with aid to cover its shortfall resulting from the abolition of user fees, the Tanzanian government was able to oblige with changing its policies. In other words, it is imperative not just to look at whether the domestic and international opportunity structures are open or closed, but also at which actors are key agents in removing the obstacles preventing change from taking place.

In summary, TEN/MET has engaged in a wide variety of strategies of engagement in its efforts to affect education policy in Tanzania. Different strategies were chosen depending on the relative openness of domestic and international political opportunity structures, the nature of the policy change, as well as the strength of the
network’s common voice. Although civil society network theorists have addressed some of these strategies, further consideration needs to be given to the potential of social movement concepts in this field. This case study has only scratched the surface of understanding civil society networks.

**Suggestions for Future Research**

More research is needed to understand the operations of civil society networks and their influence on policy in developing contexts. Although the theoretical literature on civil society organizations and networks is growing, there are very few empirical studies that back up these theoretical propositions. Particularly, there needs to be more research on domestic civil society networks. A closer look at the roles played by different types of members within civil society networks, and how they differ from the past roles of these actors, (such as the teachers’ unions more active role in education policy) is needed. More work is also warranted on the interrelations between media, advocacy and civil society networks.

Turning from empirical documentation, I see the need to further develop the theories related to civil society networks. Although theories are well-developed in some areas, they are underdeveloped in other areas – so although social movement theory is able to explain relations among civil society and governments or international actors, these relations have not yet been fully addressed by civil society network theorists. This case study suggests some directions in this manner, but a full theory on domestic civil society network relations in the international context is warranted.

In addition, this case study elicited several questions that I was unable to address in the scope of this thesis. How representative are these networks of the actual voices of marginalized people? They rely on their members for legitimacy through representation, and yet it was unclear how representative these members are. How important are civil society networks to democracy? This is related to the above question, but also asks to what extent these networks contribute to the strengthening of democracy through increasing the density of civil society actors (Putnam, 2000). The question also asks how much civil society networks actually undermine democracy, as many of the policy discussions bypass formal government representatives. If parliamentary representatives are supposed to be the legitimate representatives of the people, then why are they not
more involved in education policy in Tanzania? Is there a balance that needs to be sought between encouraging civil society cohesion and strengthening formal democratic processes? Beyond formal democracy, questions need to be asked about the connection between national and international agendas in an increasingly globalised world. For example, is there a link between TEN/MET’s historical concentration on primary education (instead of secondary), and primary education as a pet topic of donors and NGOs? How much do external actors, such as donors or INGOs, sway the agenda of civil society networks? These are but a few of the overarching questions that linger.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, this case study of TEN/MET confirms that civil society networks can play a powerful and positive role in education policy change. They are seen by government, donors and other civil society actors as important in the fruition of select education policy changes. In order to influence education policy, TEN/MET has engaged in a wide array of strategies, some of which are activity-oriented, where others focus on the development of strategically important relations between actors. Although some of these strategies seem relatively straightforward, such as the use of research and media in advocacy campaigns, others are actually the result of the combination of a multitude of factors, as was seen in TEN/MET’s strategy of portraying a common voice. It is important for civil society networks not to limit themselves to only certain approaches. In some cases, a complementary strategy is most effective for change, whereas in others a contentious strategy is better at getting at the heart of an issue. In still other cases, one must creatively look outside one’s immediate surroundings to see what other actors can be leveraged to help influence change. Both complementary and contentious strategies work together in an iterative process to develop the norm of civil society engagement in education policy. Civil society network strategies are as diverse and complex as the problems they attempt to address, which bodes well for encouraging education policy changes.
References


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Swai, F. (2004). Organize or die: Exploring the political and organizational activities of the Tanzania Teacher Union [Electronic version]. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.


Appendix A:

Permission to use Data

June 1, 2006

Dear Megan Haggerty,

This is to confirm that you are welcome to use in your Master’s thesis the Tanzanian data from the larger four-country comparative study on “Civil Society Participation and Governance of Educational Systems in the contexts of Sector-Wide Approaches in Basic Education”. I give you permission to use both the interviews and supplementary material that you gather in Tanzania this summer, as well as information from your previous desk-study on Tanzania. I am pleased that this work will contribute to your Masters thesis.

Sincerely,

Karen Mundy
Associate Professor
Canada Research Chair in Global Governance and Comparative Education
OISE-University of Toronto
252 Bloor Street West
Toronto, Ontario
CANADA M5S 1V6
Design of Field Research

(Source: Mundy, 2005)

Design of Field-research

The heart of the project will be the field based case studies, in which researchers will seek to answer the following questions:

– Do civil society actors have the ability to be active policy advocates, holding their governments accountable to educational promises?
– Are they capable of introducing new ideas into the policy cycle?
– Are civil society actors prepared to undertake high quality policy research and analysis and/or are there opportunities for them to collaborate with independent policy or research institutions to do so?
– Do civil society organizations effectively represent and/or relay information back to local citizens and children?
– What can be learned from variation in civil society capacity across countries?
– What steps might be taken to support local capacity?

Field research will have three components:

i) Mapping civil society organizations engaged in education

We will begin by contacting NGOs, community based organizations, teachers unions and research organizations identified as active in education during the desk research phase of this project. Contact will be made with NGO umbrella organizations in the country. Interviews will be conducted with senior staff members around a set of questions designed to gain four types of information. First we are interested in documenting their participation in education sector planning, implementation and monitoring/advocacy work. This is essentially an "audit" or history of their activities, and should allow us to characterize the scope and capacity of civil society. Second, we want to understand how their policy-level or governance work relates to their community level activities or mandates - who do these organizations claim to represent and what role do they play in helping local level actors to engage in and express their educational aspirations? Third, we want to better understand how these actors behave in relation to one another - do some engage more frequently or effectively in governance activities than others? do they perceive their goals and interests to be overlapping or in conflict? Finally, we want to understand how these actors interact and perceive their interactions with other key actors in the governance of the educational system - particularly with donor organizations and Ministry of Education officials.

In addition, wherever possible we will request permission to attend, as research observers, meetings among civil society organizations active in education. Our purpose here will be to better understand the character, capacity and interrelationships among civil society actors in education.
ii) Civil Society from the View of the Ministry of Education and Donor Organizations

This part of the field research will build on the analysis of Ministry of Education and Donor organization approaches to the engagement of civil society organizations in education sector governance conducted during the desk based phase of our research. We anticipate interviews with 4-6 Ministry of Education officials, as well as with senior representatives from leading donor organizations aiding the education sector. We will also request permission to attend and observe Ministry led policy meetings and donor coordination meetings at which civil society actors are invited participants.

iii) Research Communities and their Linkages to Civil Society

In each country we will attempt to meet with scholars inside tertiary institutions and in social science research organizations to provide a rudimentary profile of capacity in the field of educational policy analysis and research.

iv) Triangulation

Wherever possible, we will try to gather information that allows us to compare civil society activities in the education sector to civil society engagement in other public policy arenas, such as health, environment, gender, debt relief. To gain such information we will ask informants in the civil society organizations we meet with, as well as from government and donor organizations to comment on the way in which civil society engagement in education compares to that in other sectors. We will also meet with scholars or researchers familiar with civil society activities in these other sectors.

Interview schedules will be created to guide semi-structured interviews with informants from each of the categories described above. We will also prepare a preliminary coding guide to assist with observation of meetings and events. Data from the field research will be entered into a ethnographic research database software program (N*6) by individual researchers. This will allow for coding and cross case analysis.
Participant Consent Form

University of Toronto

Civil Society Participation and the Governance of Educational Systems in the Context of Sector-Wide Approaches to Basic Education

The Research Project

This study will explore state and civil society partnerships in the governance of the country’s education sector, particularly under the education sector plan. The research will focus on:

- understanding which civil society actors are engaged in the education system, their spheres of activity, their networks and their partnerships with the state
- understanding how these actors are involved in the governance of education, particularly in policy processes, and how this participation in governance has changed over time

This study is part of a broader research project focusing on civil society participation within the governance of education in eight Southern countries (7 of them in Africa). The goals for the broader research project include: understanding civil society capacities, identifying best practices for civil society engagement, and developing recommendations for a longer-term, collaborative program of support for Southern civil society groups engaged in education sector governance.

The Research Team

The research is being overseen by principal investigator Dr. Karen Mundy, professor at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto, Canada. The field research will be conducted by graduate students.

The Research Strategy

Funding for the research is provided by two agencies of the Canadian government: the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The study involves both desk-based research and field research in the country. Interviews will be held with government policy-makers and authorities, foreign donors and civil society actors.

The importance of your participation

Your participation is of great importance in enhancing the research team’s understanding of how civil society participation and state-civil society collaboration in
education governance may be more effectively put into practice. The research findings will be of value to a broad group of actors who are working towards relevant, accessible, good-quality educational opportunities for all.

Details of your participation

Should you agree to participate, you will be contacted by telephone, email, or in person to arrange a 60-minute interview. The interviews will be conducted in person, and in English. They will contain questions about civil society activities within the education sector, their role in education policy, and the successes and challenges of state-civil society partnerships in educational governance.

You may decline to answer any question, at any time. The information provided during your interview will not be identified or reported on an individual basis to your superiors or to other study participants. During interviews, you will not be asked to provide information that may be deemed professionally or personally sensitive. Your participation within this research is on a strictly volunteer basis, and you may refuse to participate or withdraw from the research at any time, without negative consequences. You will be given a copy of this consent form, to retain for your own records. If you wish, you may have a copy of the study results sent to the e-mail address or mailing address of your choice.

Privacy & Confidentiality

Your participation in this research will be kept confidential. Although we prefer to use audiotaping, your permission will be sought first, and audiotaping will be turned off at any time during the interview, if you request it. All tapes and data will be stored under lock and key at a secure location, both during field research in the country, and upon return to Canada. The tapes and data will be destroyed within five years of completion of the research (to allow time for the other country case studies to be completed and the results compiled). You will be assigned a numerical code for the duration of the study, and the numeric code lists will be stored separately from the raw data. Your name will not be included during analysis and report-writing, in the raw data, draft documents, or final versions. While quotes from your interview may be used in writing up data, they will not be attributed to you. Only the principal investigator (Dr. Karen Mundy) and graduate student researcher will have access to the raw data and numerical codes.

The Products

The data from this research will form the foundation for the country case study report to the funding agencies, CIDA and IDRC; those reports are likely also to be made publicly available. In addition, the data obtained will be used within the cross-case analysis of the broader research project, and compiled into a report for submission to CIDA and IDRC, and again, likely made publicly available. Other possible products of
this research on might include scholarly articles, graduate theses and academic conference presentations.

**Consent**

I agree to participate in an interview for this research project. I am aware that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time, without negative consequences. I have retained a copy of this consent form, for my own records.

_________________________
Print Name

_________________________
Signature

_________________________
Date

**For more information, please contact:**

Dr. Karen Mundy, Principal Investigator
Adult Education Department, OISE/UT
252 Bloor St. W
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1V6 CANADA

OR

Megan Haggerty, Graduate Student Researcher
Adult Education Department, OISE/UT
Appendix B: TEN/MET Directory

Note: The data below comes primarily from TEN/METs compiled Directory of Education CSOs (TEN/MET, 2006), supplemented by interviews. It should be noted that the first version of the directory was incomplete, as it openly stated in its preamble, and was therefore only an estimate of TEN/MET’s membership. At the time of the interviews, TEN/MET would have liked to give me a more complete list, but the small Secretariat’s staff-resources made this unfeasible given its other pressing priorities.

The 2006 Directory neglected to include information on three of its current Board members, namely WOWAP, Mzeituni and LUDEA, as well as failing to document two thematic education networks with which it interacts, specifically the regional Manyara Early Childhood Education Network (MECDEN) and the national Tanzanian Early Childhood Development and Education Network (TECDEN). It also failed to include several non-education CSOs and networks with whom TEN/MET members collaborate on education issues (e.g. FemAct). I have added these organizations to the table below.

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